05000389/LER-2011-002, Regarding Unplanned Automatic Reactor Trip During Reactor Protection System Testing
| ML11224A293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2011 |
| From: | Richard Anderson Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-2011-0279 LER 11-002-00 | |
| Download: ML11224A293 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3892011002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
0 FPL Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 August 5, 2011 L-2011-0279 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 2011-002 Date of Event: June 6, 2011 Unplanned Automatic Reactor Trip During Reactor Protection System Testing The attached Licensee Event Report 2011-002 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
Very truly yours, Richard L. Anderson Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant RLA/dlc Attachment an FPL Group company
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-20 10)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resourse@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not Sreuired to respond to, the information collection.
j
- 3. PAGE St. Lucie Unit 2 05000389 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Unplanned Automatic Reactor Trip During Reactor Protection System Testing
- 6. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE 1
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKETNUMBER
~~NUMBER NO.
FIACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 06 2011 2011 -
002 00 08 05 2011
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 1] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[] 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 100%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E] OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in The conditional core damage probability (CCDP) and conditional large early release probability (CLERP) associated with having an automatic reactor trip due to human action over 24 hrs is 1.17E-09 and 1.OE-12, respectively. Based on these values, the safety significance due to this event is minimal (Green).
Corrective Actions
The corrective actions and supporting actions listed below are entered into the site corrective action program.
Any changes to the actions will be managed under the corrective action program.
- 1. Revise procedure I/2-OSP-63.01 to remove the requirement to hold the Matrix relay hold pushbutton pressed in during the entire two-out-of-four trip functional testing sections.
- 2.
Implement Engineering Change to replace the matrix relay hold pushbuttons for RPS and AFAS with rotary switches for both Unit 1 and 2.
- 3.
Change the monthly functional test procedure for AFAS to reposition the system select switch to the off position prior to depressing the Matrix Relay Hold Pushbutton.
Similar Events
A search of the correction action (CR) database for the last five years revealed no automatic reactor trips due to human error.
Industry operating experience from other Combustion Engineering Plants could have possibly avoided this event.
Failed Components NA