On September 30, 2015, the Unit 2 Reactor Water Sample Outboard (0B) Isolation Valve (HV243F020) failed Inservice Testing ( IST) stroke time surveillance testing. The close stroke was timed at 3.85 seconds (the acceptance criteria requires closure in less than or equal to 2 seconds). This required entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3 Condition A.
Based on the history and cause, Susquehanna concluded that firm evidence existed that the condition existed prior to discovery on September 30, 2015 for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. As a result, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The direct cause was sticking/sluggishness of Solenoid SV24320 resulting in excessive closed stroke time.
The apparent causes were less than adequate corrective action following HV243F020 stroke time failure on July 1, 2015 and less than adequate Preventive Maintenance (PM) strategy for HV243F020/SV24320 Immediate corrective action included replacing the faulty solenoid valve, and actions are planned to revise the HV243F020 actuator overhaul preventive maintenance scope to include solenoid valve replacement.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. |
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit 1 — Mode 1, 97.5 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 — Mode 1, 100 percent Rated Thermal Power There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On September 30, 2015, the Unit 2 Reactor Water Sample Outboard (0B) Isolation Valve (HV243F020) [El IS System Identifier: AD, Component Function Identifier: ISV] failed In-service Testing (IST) stroke time surveillance testing. The close stroke was timed at 3.85 seconds (the acceptance criteria requires closure in less than or equal to 2 seconds). This required entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3 Condition A.
Following the September 30, 2015 stroke time failure, the associated solenoid valve, SV24320, was replaced. The defective solenoid was returned to engineering for disassembly and inspection. Inspection results confirmed that the previously installed solenoid was sticky/sluggish in changing plunger state.
HV243F020 had failed stroke time testing during the previous quarterly test on July 1, 2015. Investigative valve strokes were performed and timed to be within 1ST stroke time acceptance criteria following the failure. The limit switch was lubricated and a successful surveillance test was performed. A subsequent Failure Modes Analysis was performed and identified solenoid valve sticking as a probable cause, and limit switch sticking as an unlikely cause.
The direct cause of the second failure was sticking/sluggishness of Solenoid Valve SV24320 resulting in excessive closed stroke time. One of the apparent causes for second failure included less than adequate corrective action following the July 1, 2015 failure.
Based on the history and cause, Susquehanna concluded that firm evidence existed that the condition existed prior to discovery on September 30, 2015 for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. As a result, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The direct cause was sticking/sluggishness of Solenoid SV24320 resulting in excessive closed stroke time.
The apparent causes were as follows:
1. Less than adequate corrective action following HV243F020 stroke time failure on July 1, 2015.
2. Less than adequate Preventive Maintenance (PM) strategy for HV243F020/SV24320
ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The actual consequence of this event was HV243F020 being declared inoperable, which involved isolating the affected penetration flow path as required by LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The stroke time failure also resulted in a Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure (MPFF).
Potential consequence of this event would be complete failure of HV243F020 to close, and concurrent failure of the Unit 2 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve, HV243F019. This would also require isolation of the penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (rather than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) and, if unable to isolate the penetration, entry into MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. The faulty solenoid valve was replaced.
2. The HV243F020 actuator overhaul preventive maintenance scope will be revised to include solenoid valve replacement.
COMPONENT FAILURE INFORMATION
Component Identification — HV243F020 Component Name — Unit 2 Reactor Water Sample OB Isolation Valve Valve Manufacturer — Masoneilan Valve Type — Globe Valve Size — 1 inch Actuator Manufacturer — Masoneilan Actuator Model/Size — Model 38, Size 9
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
The following are similar Susquehanna events that have occurred within the past five years:
CR-1733145 - On August 5, 2013, HV243F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) failed close stroke time. The cause was identified as solenoid exhaust port blockage combined with potential for solenoid valve internal sticking.
CR-2014-26599 - On August 21, 2014, HV143F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) failed surveillance testing. The caused was determined to be solenoid valve vent blockage and sticking.
|
---|
|
|
| | Reporting criterion |
---|
05000387/LER-2015-001 | Inoperability of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator due to Fuel Oil Leakage LER 15-001-01 for Susquehanna, Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Drift of Reactor Pressure Steam Dome - Low Switches | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000388/LER-2015-001 | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Drift of Reactor Pressure Steam Dome - Low Switches | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | 05000387/LER-2015-002 | Secondary Containment Inoperability Due to Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000388/LER-2015-002 | Secondary Containment Inoperability Due To Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000387/LER-2015-003 | Secondary Containment Inoperability Due to Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 LER 15-003-01 for Susquehanna, Unit 1, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperability Due to Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000388/LER-2015-003 | Unit 2 Automatic Reactor Scram Caused by Main Turbine Trip Due to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000387/LER-2015-004 | Secondary Containment Inoperable due to Secondary Containment Boundary Door Found Ajar | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000388/LER-2015-004 | Degraded Condition Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Caused by Vibration and Stiff Pipe Connection | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000388/LER-2015-005 | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000387/LER-2015-006 | Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperability of Both Trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System and a Loss of Safety Function of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System due to Air Flow Controller found in Manual LER 15-006-01 for Susquehanna, Unit 1, Regarding Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperability of Both Trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System and a Loss of Safety Function of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System due to Air Flow... | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000388/LER-2015-006 | Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Secondary Containment Boundary Door 104-R Breached. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000387/LER-2015-007 | Unit 1 'B' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve, HV141F022B closed during surveillance test which caused a SCRAM on Unit 1 LER 15-007-00 for Susquehanna, Unit 1, Regarding 'B' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve, HV141 F022B Closed During Surveillance Test Which Caused a SCRAM | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000388/LER-2015-007 | 1 of 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000387/LER-2015-008 | 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000387/LER-2015-009 | Pressure Boundary Leakage From an Inadequate Weld Repair in Small Bore Pump Seal Vent Piping LER 15-009-00 for Susquehanna, Unit 1, Regarding Pressure Boundary Leakage From an Inadequate Weld Repair in Small Bore Pump Seal Vent Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded |
|