05000382/FIN-2006010-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Potential for Loss of Both Trains of Safe Shutdown Equipment From Damage Due to Fire |
| Description | On June 12, 2006, the licensee determined, while reviewing a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of manual actions designated to be performed in Fire Area RAB-7 (relay room), that the manual actions were not feasible. This was due to postulated environmental conditions (smoke) that could be present in the fire area during a fire in any adjacent zone of the fire area. The preliminary analysis indicated that the manual actions could not be performed within the time prescribed in the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis. Furthermore, the preliminary analysis indicated that there could be damage to equipment in the room needed to achieve safe shutdowns, due to a hot gas layer in the room. Fire Area RAB 7 is divided into four fire zones by partial height walls. These partial height walls were approved in a deviation granted by the NRC in 1984. The licensee determined from fire modeling that a manual action required in 10 minutes may not be feasible with the amount of smoke in the area. The licensee's immediate corrective action was to initiate a fire watch in the fire area. However, since a continuous fire watch was already in place in Fire Area RAB 7, no additional action was needed. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2006-01735. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the manual action described in Procedure OP-501-524 was not required since it could be performed concurrently from the control room. The concern identified by the licensee in a preliminary analysis regarding potential damage to equipment due to a hot gas layer present throughout the room will be evaluated by the licensee in their transition to NFPA Standard 805. This LER was reviewed and no findings of significance were identified. Based upon the interim enforcement policy, enforcement discretion would be granted for violations identified by the licensee in their evaluation of equipment damage due to a hot gas layer in Fire Area RAB 7 since the licensee is in transition to NFPA Standard 805. The teams review concluded that this finding meets the criteria for enforcement discretion for plants in transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program as allowed per 10 CFR 50.48(c). Since all the criteria were met, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion for this issue. This LER is closed. |
| Site: | Waterford  |
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| Report | IR 05000382/2006010 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2006 (2006Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Livermore J Mateychick L Smith R Mullikin |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2006010 | |||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2006Q3
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