05000373/LER-2014-004, Re Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC Inoperable Due to Compressor Trip
| ML14310A291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2014 |
| From: | Vinyard H Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RA14-049 LER 14-004-00 | |
| Download: ML14310A291 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3732014004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
MLaSalle Sation
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V 2601 North 21st Road Exe!.on Generation..
Marseilles, IL 61341 815 415 2000 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.73 RA1 4-049 October 27, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-1 1 and NPF-1 8 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2014-004-00 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC Inoperable Due to Compressor Trip In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Exelon Generation Company (EGC), LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 2014-004-00 for LaSalle Units 1 and 2.
There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Guy V. Ford, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 415-2800.
Respectfully, Harold T. Vinyard Plant Manager LaSalle County Station
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report cc:
Regional Administrator - NRC Region Ill.
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 02-2014)
,02.2,4 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections J LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by O
intert e-mail to tnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC for each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters fcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE LaSalle County Station, Unit 1 05000373 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC Inoperable Due to Compressor Trip
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH AYER SEQUENTIAL IREV M
D I
FACIUTY NAME IDOCKET NUMBER DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 05000374 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 28 2014 2014 004 00 10 27 2014 1 N/A N/A
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(1i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
E] 50.36(c)(1I)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
C1 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(fi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 1E 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract betow or
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Phil Hansett, Senior Manager Plant Engineering 1(815) 415-3801CAS YTM CMOET MANU-REPORTABLE CAS YSE OMOET AU R~F EPORTABLE CMOET FACTURER TO l
CAUSE
COMPONEN TO EPtX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (if yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE kBSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On August 28, 2014, both Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 at 100% power. The 'B' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room ventilation (VE) was inoperable due to a planned repair of an oil leak. The Main Control Room ventilation envelope
- onsists of both the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room. Both the Control Room HVAC (VC) and VE were required to be operable at the time of the occurrence. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5 Required Action (RA) A.1 had been entered to restore the control room area ventilation (VC) air conditioning subsystem to operable status within 30 days.
At 1227 hours0.0142 days <br />0.341 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.668735e-4 months <br /> CDT, the Main Control Room received a start alarm on the Unit 1 plant process computer (PPC) for the 'A' train VE compressor. A check of the PPC computer point indicated that the 'A' train VE compressor was not running. The rounds operator responded and reported that the 'A' train VE compressor was cycling on and off. The 'A' train of VCNE was declared inoperable. With both trains of VCNE inoperable, the Station entered TS 3.7.5 RA B.1 to verify control room area temperature less than 90 degrees once per four hours, and RA B.2 to restore one control room area ventilation air conditioning subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The cause of the event was a shorted wire on liquid line solenoid valve ORGO53A that caused the solenoid valve to close, resulting in the compressor shutting down on low suction pressure. The corrective action was to repair the wiring problem and return the compressor to service.
NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
4RC =
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 are General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactors with 3546 Megawatts Rated Core Thermal Power.
A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit(s): 1 /2 Reactor Mode(s): 1/1 Event Date: August 28, 2014 Mode(s) Name: Power Operation Event Time: 1227 CDT Power Level: 100% / 100%
B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On August 28, 2014, both Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 at 100% power. The 'B' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room ventilation (VE)[VI] was inoperable due to a planned repair of an oil leak. The Main Control Room ventilation envelope consists of both the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room.
Both the Control Room HVAC (VC) and VE were required to be operable at the time of the occurrence.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5 Required Action (RA) A.1 had been entered to restore the control room area ventilation (VC) air conditioning subsystem to operable status within 30 days.
At 1227 hours0.0142 days <br />0.341 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.668735e-4 months <br /> CDT, the Main Control Room received a start alarm on the Unit 1 plant process computer (PPC)[lD] for the 'A' train VE compressor. A check of the PPC computer point indicated that the 'A' train VE compressor was not running. The rounds operator responded to the area and reported that the 'A' train VE compressor was cycling on and off. The 'A' train of VCNE was declared inoperable. With both trains of VCNE inoperable, the Station entered TS 3.7.5 RA B.1 to verify control room area temperature less than 90 degrees once per four hours, and RA B.2 to restore one control room area ventilation AC subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
This occurrence is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An ENS report was made to the NRC (EN 50413) at 1726 CDT on August 28, 2014, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
This event constitutes a safety system functional failure for Unit 1 and 2.
C. CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause of the event was a strand of wire that was grounding to the valve case on the liquid line solenoid valve (ORGO53A). This caused the liquid line solenoid valve to close, resulting in the compressor shutting down on low suction pressure.
D. SAFETY ANALYSIS
The safety significance of this event was minimal. The 'B' train of VCNE was repaired and restored to operable status at 2335 hours0.027 days <br />0.649 hours <br />0.00386 weeks <br />8.884675e-4 months <br /> on August 28, 2014. The approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> that both VCNE trains were inoperable is significantly less than the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time allowed by TS 3.7.5 Required Action B.2. Main Control temperature did not exceed 90 degrees, and online risk remained Green throughout the event.
E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The oil leak on the 'B' train of VE was repaired, and the train was returned to service at 2335 hours0.027 days <br />0.649 hours <br />0.00386 weeks <br />8.884675e-4 months <br /> on August 28, 2014.
The wiring problem on liquid line solenoid valve ORGO53A was repaired, and the 'A' train of VC/VE was returned to service at 0001 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> on August 29, 2014.
F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
LER 373-2013-008 On November 22, 2013, both Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 at 100% power. The 'A' train of Main Control Room ventilation (VC) was inoperable due to an emergent repair of a Freon leak. TS 3.7.5 Required Action (RA) A.1 had been entered to restore the control room area ventilation AC subsystem to operable status within 30 days.
At 1920 hours0.0222 days <br />0.533 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.3056e-4 months <br /> CST, the Main Control Room received an Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room (AEER) HVAC (VE) Panel Trouble Alarm. The rounds operator responded to the panel and reported that the 'B' AEER Cooler Condenser Fan trip alarm was in, and the fan (OVE03CB) was not turning. An acrid smell was detected coming from the fan motor breaker compartment. The 'B' train of VC and VE was declared inoperable.
With both trains of VCNE inoperable, the Station entered TS 3.7.5 RA B.1 to verify control room area temperature less than 90 degrees once per four hours, and RA B.2 to restore one control room area ventilation AC subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The cause of the event was a winding failure of the 'B' AEER Cooler Condenser fan motor. Corrective actions included replacing the failed fan motor, and performing a failure analysis to determine the cause of the winding failure. These actions would not have prevented the cause of the August 28, 2014, inoperability of the 'A' train VE compressor.
G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA
There were no component failures associated with this event.