05000373/LER-2010-001, Regarding Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area

Regarding Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area

ML101180332
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/28/2010
From:	Rhoades D Exelon Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA10-029 LER 10-001-00
Download: ML101180332 (4)

LER-2010-001, Regarding Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3732010001R00 - NRC Website

text

LaSalle Generating Station 2601 North 21St Road Marseilles, IL 61341-9757 RA10-029 www.exeloncorp.com April 28, 2010 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 10 CFR 73.71(d)

Facility Operating License No. NPF 11 and 18 NRC Docket No. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject:

Licensee Event Report In accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (d), Exelon Generation Company, (EGC), LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 10-001-00, Docket No. 050-373.

This report does not contain any safeguards information.

Nuclear This letter contains confidential information and is considered exempt from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Terrence W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully, David P. Rhoades Plant Manager LaSalle County Station

Attachment:

Licensee Event Report cc:

Regional Administrator - NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station DECONTROLLED ON NOVEMBER 6, 2012, DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN 10 CFR 2.390 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION DECONTROLLED ON NOVEMBER 6, 2012, DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN 10 CFR 2.390 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9*2007)

, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

13. PAGE LaSalle County Station Unit 1 05000373 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area.

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR LaSalle County Station Unit 2 05000374 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 03 2010 2010 - 001 - 00 04 28 2010

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check al/ that apply) 4 o 20.2201(b) o 20.2203(a)(3)(i) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) o 50.73(a)(2)(vii) o 20.2201(d) o 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iii) o 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL o 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) o 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 50.36(c)(2) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71(a)(4) 000 o 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) o 50.46(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71(a)(5) o 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

~ OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(O) 73.71(d)

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME I

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Joseph Barichello, Access Analyst 815-415-2902 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION o YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

~NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

An unauthorized person gained access to the protected area. The individual's badge had been previously cancelled, but was able to access the protected area through the Main Access Facility (MAF). The individual was escorted out of the protected area by security. An ENS one hour notification was completed per 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1). This event affects both units due to the shared protected area.

The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The unauthorized individual displayed no malevolent intent to gain access.

The apparent cause evaluation determined that an authorized individual unlocked the turnstile, but stepped away for assistance. The authorized individual failed to perform proper human performance techniques for self-check. While the authorized individual was seeking assistance, an unauthorized individual accessed the protected area via the unlocked turnstile. Actions taken include coaching the individual on the proper human performance techniques when using vital doors or security access turnstiles.

This report is being issued based on the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(d), Reporting of Safeguards Events within 60-days of the event.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

A. PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric Boiling Water Reactor, 3489 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core Power

CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Reactor Mode(s): 4 Mode(s) Name: Cold Shutdown

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Event Date: 3/3/2010 Power Level( s): 0%

Event Time: 07:47

3. PAGE 2

OF 3

On March 3, 2010, at 07:47 an individual approved for protected area access inserted their security badge into the Main Access Facility (MAF) turnstile #5 card reader and received the proper response (green light on card reader and turnstile unlocked) for authorized entry. The individual believed that the proper response for accessing the plant was not received and stepped away from the entry point to obtain help from a Security Officer. Turnstile #5 remained unlocked. The Security Officer called the Security Control Center at 07:49. The Security Officer was informed that the individual had already logged into the protected area at 07:47. Security approved protected area access for the individual at 07:49. The individual entered the protected area through a turnstile manually unlocked

~~~

On March 3, 2010, at approximately 07:47, a second individual that was not authorized for protected area access inserted their security badge into the turnstile #5 card reader. The individual failed to identify that they had not received the proper response for entering the protected area and proceeded through turnstile #5 and entered the protected area. The individual was able to access the protected area through turnstile #5 because the turnstile remained unlocked from the previous individual's attempt to gain access. Once the individual passed through turnstile #5, the turnstile returned to the locked position.

The second individual, now in the protected area, identified that his co-workers could not gain access.

At approximately 07:58, the individual proceeded to the exit turnstiles. The individual inserted his security badge at the exit turnstile card reader and received an error message. Security immediately responded and took control of the individual.

At 08:25 on March 3, 2010, Security contacted the operations Shift Manager and notified him of the issue. At 08:51 CST an ENS one hour notification was completed per 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1). This event affects both units due to the shared protected area.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was that the authorized entrant did not follow the process for entering a vital door or turnstile. The individual did not enter or challenge turnstile #5. A contributing cause was that the second individual did not properly use human performance tools to validate access approval on indication at the security card reader.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

2. DOCKET

6. LER NUMBER

3. PAGE 05000373 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV NUMBER NO_

3 OF 3

2010 001 00 The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The unauthorized individual displayed no malevolent intent to gain access. The individual has been approved for access at other nuclear facilities and was unaware that their security badge had been cancelled. Access approval forms had been properly completed with no discrepancies identified.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A site wide communication was issued to inform station personnel of the event. The communication included a description of the proper techniques required for security card usage on vital doors and security access turnstiles. The individuals were coached on the proper human performance techniques when using vital doors and security access turnstiles.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURENCES

LaSalle County Station has not previously experienced an unauthorized individual in the protected area.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Not Applicable PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER