05000373/FIN-2008002-07
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, states, in part, that: Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to this requirement, various corrective actions taken by the licensee to manage and prevent recurrence of fuel channel distortion effects, a significant condition adverse to quality, in the Unit 1 reactor core following their L1R11 refueling outage in February March of 2006 were ineffective. Specifically, the Unit 1 Cycle 12 core, which began operation on March 17, 2006, was designed to be free of fuel channel distortion adverse effects. Despite this design, fuel channel distortion adverse effects, several of which resulted in the licensee having to declare control rods inoperable and forced them to be inserted into the core to comply with TS, were identified by the licensee during fuel channel distortion surveillance testing near the end of the cycle. The objective of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective, one of the key attributes of which is equipment performance. The violation was further determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent the actual loss of a safety function for any single train or system, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as IRs 667185, 727361, and others. Corrective actions by the licensee included the performance of root cause investigations, enhanced coordination with industry working groups on this issue, and significant revisions to their fuel channel distortion monitoring program for both units |
Site: | LaSalle |
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Report | IR 05000373/2008002 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | G Roach N Shah F Ramirez K Riemer J Jandovitz M Mitchell J Neurauter D Kimble J Yesinowski |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2008Q1
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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