05000373/FIN-2008002-06
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | TS 5.4.1(a) requires that written procedures recommended by Appendix A of RG 1.33, Revision 2, be established, implemented, and maintained by the licensee. Section 1.c of RG 1.33, Appendix A, specifies the requirement for procedures that control equipment clearance and safety tagging, and the licensee implements this requirement with procedure OP-AA-109-101, Clearance and Tagging. On February 16, 2008, contractor pipe fitters performing work on the 13C FW heater removed a section of 3-inch condensate booster system piping that was interfering with the installation of heater drain system pipe 1HD12BC-24. Although this pipe was required to be removed to allow the necessary FW heater work to be completed, the piping was mistakenly believed to have been a 3-inch pipe associated with the floor drain system. Contrary to the requirements contained in OP-AA-109-101, the piping that was actually removed was not covered under an appropriate equipment clearance order specifically intended for that work. The objective of the Initiating Events Cornerstone of Reactor Safety is to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. In accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective, one of the key attributes of which is equipment configuration control. The violation was further determined to be of very low safety significance because at the time of the event the Unit-1 condensate booster system was shutdown with and depressurized due to other refueling outage work activities. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as IR 737285, and immediately initiated actions to correctly revise the WO and tie an appropriate safety clearance order to the section of 3-inch condensate booster system piping that had been removed. Additional corrective actions by the licensee included the performance of CAP human performance and apparent cause investigations |
Site: | LaSalle ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000373/2008002 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | G Roach N Shah F Ramirez K Riemer J Jandovitz M Mitchell J Neurauter D Kimble J Yesinowski |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2008Q1
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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