05000368/LER-1987-001, :on 870130,field Engineer Discovered Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Not Sealed as Required.Caused by Personnel Error While Performing Plan Mod.Fire Watches Posted & Personnel Scheduled for Training

:on 870130,field Engineer Discovered Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Not Sealed as Required.Caused by Personnel Error While Performing Plan Mod.Fire Watches Posted & Personnel Scheduled for Training

ML20207R729
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	03/09/1987
From:	Enos J, Taylor L ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
2CAN038701, 2CAN38701, LER-87-001, LER-87-1, NUDOCS 8703180073
Download: ML20207R729 (4)

LER-1987-001, on 870130,field Engineer Discovered Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Not Sealed as Required.Caused by Personnel Error While Performing Plan Mod.Fire Watches Posted & Personnel Scheduled for Training

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3681987001R00 - NRC Website

text

NRC Fcra 366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9-83)

Approved OM8 No. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (L E R)

FACILITY NAME (1) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two l DOCKET NUMBER (2) lPAGE (3) 10151010101 31 61 81110Fl0(3 TITLE (4)

Breach of Fire Barriers Caused by Personnel Error While Performing Plant Modification EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) l l

l 15equentiall IRevision i

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Monthi Day l Year (Year I l Number l l Number IMonth! Oay l Year i Facility Names Docket Number (s1 l

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5 0 0 0 Of 11 31 01 81 71 81 71--l 01 01 Il--I 01 01013101918171 N/A 0

5 0 0 0 OPERATING l (THIS REPORT 15 SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5:

MODE (9) l 11 (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWERl l_l 20.402(b) l l_l 50.73(a)(2)(iv) l _ l 20.405(c) l_1 73.71(b) l LEVELl l _l 20.405(a)(1)(1) l_l 50.36(c)(1) l_l 50.73(a)(2)(v) l 50.36(c)(2) l l 50.73(a)(2)(vii) l _l 73.71(c)

(10) 1110101 l 20.405(a)(1)(ii)

Other (Specify in l _l 20.405(a)(1)(iii) l l 50.73(a)(2)(1) l _l 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)l_ l Abstract below and l _ l 20.405(a)(1)(iv) l_l 50.73(a)(2)(11) l_l 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)I in Text, NRC Form i I 20.405(a)(1)(v) l I 50.73(a)(2)(iii) i_i 50.73(a)(2)(x) i 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name i Telephone Number l Area l Larry A. Taylor, Plant Licensing Engineer ICode l 51011191614l-13111010 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (L3) l l

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i SUBMISSION l l l Yes (If yes. complete Expected Submission Date) lil No I DATE (15) 1 I I I I I ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 1/30/87, while performing a visual inspection for installation verification of a plant modification, a field engineer discovered two fire barrier penetrations were not sealed as required. These penetra-tions consist of conduits associated with the plant paging system which pass through three hour rated fire walls located in the lower south and lower north piping penetration areas. The opening inside the conduits was not sealed at either end as required to prevent the spread of combustion products between the areas. Upon discovery of the discrepancies a fire watch was posted in both areas within one hour.

The conduits were sealed internally on 2/4/87 with a foam sealant at the barrier penetrations and verified acceptable. The affected areas are equipped with fire detection instrumentation which alarms in the control room, are readily accessible within a few minutes following an indication of a fire, and suppression equipment is located in the areas. The cause of this event was failure by personnel installing the plant modification to recognize that an activity necessary to complete the modification constituted a breach of the barriers. Corrective action to prevent recurrence will include training of personrel responsible for installation of plant modifications that affect fire barriers with emphasis on identification of fire barrier breaches and required actions. Similar events of fire barrier breaches were described in LERs 50-368/80-081, 50-368/82-039, 50-368/83-045, 50-368/85-021 and 50-368/86-008.

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Form 1062.01BU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9-83)

Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires: 8/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) l DOCKET NUMBER (2) l LER NUMBER (6) l PAGE (3) l l

l lSequentiall lRevisioni Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two l

l Year Number Number l 1015l010101 31 61 81 81 7 06 01 1 01 Ol012l0Fl013 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I.

Description of Event

A.

Unit Status ~

The unit was operating in Node 1, power operation, at 100% power at the time of discovery of this event. Unit status for the period while these deficiencies existed would be lengthy and would not serve to clarify the circumstances of the event, therefore, no description of the unit status for this period is offered.

B.

Component Identification The components involved in this event are three hour rated penetration fire barriers; EIIS Identifier = NF-PEN / SEAL.

These fire barrier seals are installed internally inside conduit which penetrate fire barriers, i.e., walls or floors. The seals serve to prevent the spread of flame, smoke or combustion products through the penetration. Typical construction consists of injection of a fire retardant silicone foam internal to the conduit at one end.

C.

Sequence of Events On 1/30/87, while performing a visual inspection for installation verification of a plant modification, a field engineer discovered that two conduits penetrating three hour rated fire barriers in the unit two auxiliary building were not internally sealed as required by design specifications. The conduits were sealed internally using a fire retardant silicone foam and verified acceptable on 2/4/87. An evaluation performed by the plant fire protection specialist and licensing group completed on 2/10/87, established that the event was reportable based on the conclusion that the absence of an internal seal could have allowed the spread of combustion products between the affected areas and that a fire watch was not posted as required by Technical Specifications.

II. Event Cause

A.

Event Analysis

In order to improve communication capability in several plant areas, a plant modification was initiated in 1984 to install additional plant paging phones in specific plant locations. The routing of conduit associated with the additional phone stations required penetrating some three hour rated fire walls. In July 1986, fire walls in the lower south and lower north auxiliary building piping areas were core drilled to facilitate installation of conduit to install phones in these areas. Due to delays in completion of subsequent work, the conduits were capped on both sides of the walls and grouted-in, thereby providing an adequate penetration seal. In August 1986, work was reinitiated on the design change. The caps were removed and the conduits were routed to a junction box and a plant phone station on each side of the walls. Personnel performing this part of the modification failed to recognize that l

removal of the caps from the conduit ends constituted a breach of the fire barriers, and, l

therefore, the need to establish fire watches in the areas to insure compliance with i

Technical Specification was not identified. The need for internal sealing of the conduits as required by design specifications was also not identified at this time. The safety consequences of this event are believed to be minimal. This conclusion is based on the facts that although the areas affected by this event contain safety related equipment, they are equipped with fire detection instrumentation which alarms in the control room, are readily accessible within a few minutes following an indication of a fire, and suppression equipment is located in the areas.

B.

Root Cause During the installation of plant modifications, several different types of situations arise i

which can lead to fire barrier breaches. It is not possible to provide detailed instructions covering every possible scenario, therefore, personnel are provided guidance and training on i

recognition of construction activities that may cause breaches in fire barriers and required l

actions.

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Fars 1062.01B NRC Firm 366A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (9-83)

Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires: 8/31/85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAfl0N FACILITY NAME (1)

(DOCKET NUMBER (2) l LER NUMBER (61 i PAGE (3) l l

l lSequentialu i Revisioni Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two l

l Year Number Number l 10151010101 31 61 81 81 7 01 01 1 01 Ol01310Fl013 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The root cause of this event was failure by personnel installing the plant modification to recognize tnat the affected fire barriers were being breached when work was reinitiated on the plant modification in August 1986. This error was cognitive in nature. A contributing factor to the root cause is the fact that completion of this modification spanned a time frame of several months. This led to the involvement of several different personnel and affected continuity of the project.

C.

Basis for Reportability This event is reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) since it can be demonstrated that operation occurred which was prohibited by ANO-2 TS 3/4.7.11 and the applicable action time allowances were exceeded.

III. Corrective Action

A.

Immediate Upon discovery of the discrepancies, a fire watch was posted in the affected areas within one hour.

B.

Subsequent Maintenance activity was initiated to seal the penetrations. The conduits were sealed internally with a foam sealant at the barrier penetrations and verified acceptable on 2/4/87.

C.

Future Future corrective action will include additional training of personnel responsible for installation of plant modifications which affect fire barriers with emphasis on identification of barrier breaches and required actions.

IV. Additional Information

Similar events of breaches of penetration fire barriers related to plant modification activities were reported in LERs 50-368/80-081, 50-368/82-045, 50-368/83-045, 50-368/85-021 and 50-368/86-008.

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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 UTTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (501)371-4000 March 9, 1987 2CAN038701 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6 License Event Report No. 87-001-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), attached is the subject report concerning a breach of fire barriers caused by personnel error while performing plant modifications.

Very truly yours, J.

Enos, Manager Nu ar Engineering & Licensing JTE:RJS:1w Attachment cc:

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 l

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