05000354/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On February 27, 2017, during power ascension after completing a rod pattern adjustment, HCGS exceeded the fuel conditioning limit specified in their Boiling Water Reactor ( BWR ) Fuel Conditioning procedure, NF -AB- 440. Specifically, when all of the control rods were at their target positions, with reactor power at 89 percent RTP, the on- shift Reactor Engineer ran a core monitor predictor case which showed three percent more margin to the fuel conditioning limit than the predictions used in the written reactivity management plan. The Reactor Engineer then ran core predictions using this result. With these results, the Reactor Engineer recommended to the Control Room Supervisor to proceed to 100 percent RTP with no ramp rate restrictions. PSEG completed power ascension to 100 percent RTP and then a subsequent core monitor predictor case showing the fuel conditioning limit had been exceeded (maximum nodal power of 0.55 kilowatt/ foot which exceeded the maximum allowed value of 0.450 kilowatt/ foot). PSEG determined that weaknesses in the reactivity maneuver (ReMA) process and the application of the ReMA process allowed the on- shift Reactor Engineer to make a knowledge- based decision and implement a change to the ReMA without increased monitoring requirements. Failure to operate within the procedurally specified limits was a performance deficiency. TS 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be established and implemented covering the procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. OP -AB- 300- 1003, BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance, states in step 4.2.11.4, the high limit should be set at the limit specified in NF- AB- 440. In Attachment 5 of NF -AB -440, operators are directed to maintain the fuel conditioning limits within the specified maximum allowable threshold of 0.45 kilowatt/ foot . Contrary to the TS 6.8.1.a requirements specified above, PSEG did not implement their ReMA in accordance with their procedures for reactivity maneuvers. Shortly after reaching 100 percent RTP power, PSEG identified that the fuel conditioning limit had been exceeded and took immediate actions to reduce power per procedure, categorize the issue as a level 3 reactivity management event, and analyze off -gas and reactor coolant samples to ensure no indications of a fuel defect existed as a result of the event. The issue was entered into PSEGs CAP as NOTF 20757793, and the 20 operating department implanted prompt action to communicate the cause of the error to all operators and qualified reactor engineers. In addition, procedural reviews and additional management observations of power maneuvering activities were put in place. The inspectors determined this issue was more than minor because the performance deficiency impacted the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the physical design barrier (fuel cladding) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, PSEG not adhering to the fuel conditioning limits specified in their procedures could result in fuel clad damage (increased probability of fuel failure as a result of pellet -clad interaction) and adversely impact nuclear safety . The inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because no apparent fuel damage occurred. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2017002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Hawkins S Haney P Boguszewski E Burket N Floyd J Furia F Bower |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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