05000335/FIN-2009006-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1 Requirements for the Overpressure Protection for the CCW Surge Tank |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to translate the design basis as specified in the license application into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. The licensee did not ensure that the component cooling water (CCW) surge tank design included adequate overpressure protection for all procedurally allowed configurations as required by the applicable ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1. The code requires that no intervening stop valves be between the vessel and its protective device or devices or between the protective devices and the point of discharge. The team concluded that stop valve V6466 was an intervening stop valve for the CCW surge tank vent path to the chemical drain tank (CDT). The issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2009-23473. Immediate licensee corrective actions included verification that the valve was in its open position and the implementation of administrative controls to maintain the valve open. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control, i.e. initial design, was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that if left uncorrected, this design deficiency had the potential to impact the operability of safety-related systems and, thus, become a more significant safety concern in that a closed intervening valve had the potential for overpressurizing the CCW surge tank. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Reactor Inspection Findings for At- Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. The team reviewed the finding for cross-cutting aspects and concluded that this finding did not have an associated cross-cutting aspect because the design of the CCW surge tank relief was established in an original plant design, and therefore, was not representative of current licensee performance |
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
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| Report | IR 05000335/2009006 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Desai J Hamman M Shylamberg N Greca R Moore R Taylor S Rose |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2009006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
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