05000331/FIN-2013008-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failed to Ensure the SBDG Power Cables Were Not Submerged |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality following discovery of water and mud in safety-related electrical conduit 1K109 associated with the A Standby Diesel Generator (SBDG). Specifically, the licensee identified an obstruction characterized as mud located 8-feet from the turbine building (TB) end of conduit 1K109. As a result, the licensee failed to take corrective action to remove the water and mud from the conduit and to evaluate the mud obstruction. The licensee entered the finding into their Corrective Action Program as AR 01909315, NRC 5059/MOD Inspection Violation of App B Criterion 16, dated October 3, 2013. The licensee has performed insulation resistance checks on the EDG power cable and obtained satisfactory results. Additionally, the licensee performed an evaluation of the mud-like material in the conduit and determined that it is likely cable pulling compound, as opposed to degraded cable jacket material. The licensee also set a date for further inspection of the conduit to April 2014, which coincides with the next EDG outage period. These corrective action items are being tracked in CR 1909315. Additionally the licensee is evaluating the frequency interval for inspecting this and other similar conduits. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstones attribute of design control for ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to Initiating Events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, material characterized by the licensee as mud facilitated continual exposure to a wetted and water submergence environment of the safety-related A SBDG power cables. Continual exposure to a wetted and water submergence environment could lead to cable failure. Cable failure would prevent the system from carrying out its intended safety-related function of automatically starting and connecting to its corresponding essential service bus to supply power to emergency loads in an event (i.e., a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) and/or degraded/under-voltage condition). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions to correct a condition adverse to quality following discovery of water and mud in safety-related electrical conduit 1K109 associated with the A SBDG. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an effective review of the safety-related consequences of their decision not to complete the inspection of conduit 1K109 to ensure that no water and mud remained inside the conduit subjecting the cables to a submergence environment. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2013008 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Daley D Oliver G Hausman R Winter S Sheldon |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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