05000321/FIN-2008002-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample FY2007-03 |
| Description | The inspectors identified the following issues prior to the planned reactor vessel head lift supporting the Unit 1 1R23 refueling outage: The licensee could not demonstrate that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) had been adequately updated to reflect information and analyses provided to the NRC in response to generic communications regarding heavy loads. The licensee could not demonstrate that their reactor vessel head lifts, which had lifted the head previously using the Unit 2 non-single failure proof crane over the irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, were bounded by any design calculations. These calculations should have evaluated the drop of the head through air and/or water onto the reactor vessel, vessel internals, and irradiated fuel. The licensee could not demonstrate that their procedures for the reactor vessel head removal and installation limited their head lifts to the use of the Unit-1 single failure proof crane. Failure to update the Final Safety Analysis Report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e) to reflect aspects of handling the reactor vessel head with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cranes was considered a potential violation. The NRC has found industry uncertainty regarding the licensing bases for handling of reactor vessel head lifts, and as a result issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-006, Enforcement Discretion for Heavy Load Handling Activities, on September 28, 2007. The Nuclear Energy Institute has informed NRC of industry approval of a formal initiative that specifies actions each plant will take to ensure that heavy load lifts continue to be conducted safely and that plant licensing bases accurately reflect plant practices. The NRC staff believes implementation of the initiative will resolve uncertainty in the licensing bases for heavy load handling, and enforcement discretion related to the uncertain aspects of the licensing basis is appropriate during the implementation of the initiative. The inspectors determined that the licensee implemented the following actions prior to the specified lifts in accordance with the industry initiative to warrant enforcement discretion: (1) For all heavy load lifts within the reactor building, the licensee has defined and implemented safe load paths, load handling procedures, and standards for training of crane operators, use of special lifting devices, use of slings, and design, inspection, testing, and maintenance of the reactor building cranes. (2) To support the Spring 2008 Unit 1 refueling outage, the process for lifting the reactor vessel head was changed to ensure the lift was conducted with the Unit-1 single failure proof crane. This change has been made to the procedures used on both Hatch units. (3) The movement of heavy loads will have administrative controls and risk assessments established as required to implement the requirements of 10 CFR50.65(a)(4). Therefore, consistent with the intent of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-006, enforcement discretion (EA-08-135) is being exercised for the violation described above in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy without any enforcement action. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2008002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Shaeffer E Michel J Hickey P Niebaum R Williams |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2008Q1
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