05000318/LER-2003-001, For Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Regarding Emergency Air Lock Containment Penetration Closure Requirements Violation
| ML031150007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/2003 |
| From: | Nietmann K Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 03-001-00 | |
| Download: ML031150007 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3182003001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Kevin J. Nietmann Plant General Manager Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4101 410 495-4787 Fax Constellation Energy Group April 23, 2003 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318; License No. DPR 69 Licensee Event Report 2003-01 Emergency Air Lock Containment Penetration Closure Requirements Violation The attached report is being sent to you as required under 10 CFR 50.73 guidelines. Should you have questions regarding this report, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours, KJN/ALS/bjd Attachment cc:
J. Petro, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC G. S. Vissing, NRC H. J. Miller, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR L)' o- --
D
Abstract
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant's Technical Specifications requires one door in the emergency air lock (a containment penetration) to be closed during core alterations or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the Containment Building. However, on February 24, 2003 at 1500 during a Containment Building tour, it was identified that the Unit 2 Emergency Air Lock was not in the Technical Specification required status. Specifically, "daylight" was seen around a hose penetrating the emergency air lock temporary closure device. The emergency air lock temporary closure device can be used in place of an emergency air lock door. Subsequent investigation determined that the violation occurred on February 23, 2003 at approximately 1300 when a contract employee cut through the foam sealant in the temporary closure device to install an oxygen hose needed to support steam generator replacement activities. The oxygen hose was removed and the hole was sealed on February 25, 2003, prior to commencing core off-load.
However, since core alterations (specifically control element assembly uncoupling) were performed on February 23, 2003 from 0955 until 1805, a condition existed that is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 366 (7.2001)
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IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A.
Plant procedure change requests have been initiated to require installation of chains and signs at the EAL requiring notification of operations prior to entry and to require planners to include containment closure compliance steps in future work packages.
B.
The existing work packages were changed to include a caution statement regarding work at the EAL during containment closure.
C.
Contract personnel have been trained on lessons learned from this event and on expectations of using human performance error prevention tools.
V.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.
Affected Component Identification:
IEEE 803 IEEE 805 Component or System EIIS Funct System ID Reactor Containment Building PEN NH B.
Previous Similar Events
A review of Calvert Cliffs' licensee event reports over the past several years was performed.
The review did not identify any similar reportable events where the containment penetration closure requirements were violated due to personnel error.
A review of Calvert Cliffs' issue reports over the past several years was also performed. The review identified one similar non-reportable event. Specifically, as documented in Issue Report No. IR4-015-734, contract employees installed a 1/4 inch copper tube through the Unit 2 EAL on February 21, 2003 to support steam generator replacement activities. The contract employees were unaware of containment closure requirements and failed to install isolation valves and caps. However, containment closure requirements were satisfied due to the installation of a foreign material exclusion device on the tubing end. The subsequent causal analysis identified inadequate work packages, inadequate communications, and lack of ownership as contributing factors. The condition was discovered on February 25, 2003, therefore, corrective actions were not established in time to prevent the subject event described in this licensee event report.