05000315/FIN-2009003-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Gap in Remote Strainer Waterway |
Description | The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Specifically, the inspectors identified a gap in the remote strainer waterway for the emergency core cooling recirculation sump that was greater than the gap size allowed by the surveillance test acceptance criteria. Consequently, debris larger than the allowed particle size could enter the emergency core cooling recirculation sump. For corrective actions, the gap in the remote strainer waterway was repaired prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, which required the recirculation sump to be operable. Licensee personnel also completed a past operability determination, which concluded that while the gap in the waterway was a nonconforming condition, there was reasonable assurance that the recirculation sump was operable and that the nonconformance would have had an insignificant impact on the recirculation sump function of providing a filtered supply of water during the recirculation phase of a loss of coolant accident. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report AR 00850005. This finding was more than minor because it was related to the design control attribute of the mitigation systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the gap in the remote strainer waterway could result in larger than allowed debris entering the emergency core cooling recirculation sump, which could impact the reliability and capability of long term decay heat removal cooling systems. This finding was of very low safety significance because no loss of safety function actually occurred and the finding was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or sever weather initiating event. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance regarding work controlwork planning (H.3 (a)) |
Site: | Cook |
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Report | IR 05000315/2009003 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Jacobson M Phalen J Lennartz P Laflamme J Cameron W Jessup |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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