05000312/LER-1981-054, Forwards LER 81-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

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Forwards LER 81-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20033B044
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 11/12/1981
From: Mattimoe J
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20033B045 List:
References
NUDOCS 8111300315
Download: ML20033B044 (1)


LER-1981-054, Forwards LER 81-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
Event date:
Report date:
3121981054R00 - NRC Website

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e suuo SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT C 6201 S Street Box 15830, Sacramento, California 958137,t916) 452 3211 5

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R H ENGELKEN, DIRECTOR REGION V 0FFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT r*

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DOCKET NO. 50-312 LICENSE NO. DPR-54

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-54

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j j In accordance with Rancho Seco N'iclear Generating Station' Technical Specifications Section 6.9.4.2c and Regulatory Guide 1.16 Section C.2.b(3),

the Sacramento Municipal Utility District is hereby submitting a thirty-dg report of Reportable Occurrence 81-54.

On October 24, 1981, while performing 1-108C, RPS Channel C Test, as a part of Surveillance SP 200.08C, Monthly RPS Channel C Surveillance, the test was incorrectly completed in that the actual breaker trip was not verified; only the loss of 118V AC power to the breaker was verified. This is normally acceptable while the reactor is shutdown and this is the method the Instrument Technician used to complete the test.

However, the procedure requires, prior to startup af ter a cold shutdown, that a breaker trip test is performed to verify proper action of the trip relay. This requirement was not met.

On October 26, 1981, this omission was discovered; however, the reactor was

.ow cri t ical. The trip test was then performed on October 26 with satis-factory results.

To insure thi situation does not recur, the Instrument Technicians were re-Instructed in the use of the 1-108 series of tests, emphasizing the section involved in this occurrence.

Since the RPS has four channels, sufficient redundancy existed to ensure that the reactor could be tripped, even assuming failure of the Channel C associated trip relay. Further, it was verified that the trip relay did in fact function.

For these reasons, there was no effect on public or plant safety. There were no transients associated with this occurrence.

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Jdhn J.* att.imoe Assistant General Manager I

and Chief Engineer

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