05000311/LER-2011-005, For Salem, Unit 2, Regarding Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3
| ML11264A038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/2011 |
| From: | Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N11-0276 LER 11-005-00 | |
| Download: ML11264A038 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3112011005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 0 PSEG NuclearLLC SEP 1 22011 10CFR50.73 LR-N 11-0276 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555-001 LER 311/2011-005 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 NRC Docket No. 50-311
Subject:
Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance With Technical Specification 3.0.3 This Licensee Event Report, "Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance With Technical Specification 3.0.3" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v(A) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(A).
The attached LER contains a commitment to supplement the LER at the completion of the cause evaluations. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. E. H. Villar at 856-339-5456.
Sincerfi ar J ricker it Vice President - Salem Attachments (1)
SEP 1 2 2011 Document Control Desk Page 2 LR-N 11-0276 cc Mr. W. Dean, USNRC - Administrator - Region I Mr. R. Ennis, USNRC - Licensing Project Manager - Salem USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, NJBNE Manager IV Mr. H. Berrick, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator Mr. L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (9-2007)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection
- 3. PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 05000311 1 of 4
- 4. TITLE Completion of a Plant Shutdown in Accordance With Technical Specification 3.0.3
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FAITYNMDOKTUBE NUMBER NO.
07 14 2011 2011 0 0
5 0
09 12 2011
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
Cl 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
R 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[1 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[I OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
TS 3.0.3 states "When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
- 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
- 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and
- 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The magnitude of the leak was estimated to be approximately 15 gpm. On July 14, at 2053 Salem Operations declared an Unusual Event (UE) due to unidentified leakage greater than 10 gpm in accordance with the Salem Emergency Plan. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notifications were performed in accordance with the Emergency Plan requirements.
At 0233 on July 15, 2011, Salem Unit 2 entered Mode 3 with all control rods inserted in the core and at 1259 Salem Unit 2 achieved Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.
The UE was terminated at 0339 on July 15, 2011, upon removal of power to the BIT isolation valves.
This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v)(A)" any event of condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to:
(A) shutdown the reactor...," and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(A) "The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specification."
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE Investigation determined that the leakage was approximately 15 gpm. A small portion of the leakage, approximately 0.5 gpm was physically identified as emanating from a weld crack in a fillet weld at a tee next to BIT relief valve 2SJ10. The majority of the leakage, approximately 14.5 gpm, was leakage through the seat of the 2SJ10 into the hold up tank.
Cause evaluations for the weld crack and 2SJ1 0 leakage are in progress. The results of these evaluations will be reported in a supplement to this LER.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Salem Station identified two similar events, LER 311/1990-005 "Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry; Two ECCS Subsystems Inoperable," and LER 272/2005-002 "Technical Specification 3.0.3 Required Plant Shutdown - Sample Line Leak," dated June 20, 2005. The apparent causes were (1) A defect in the root of the weld of a pipe to cap socket weld joint for LER 311/1990-005, and (2) A crack in the pipe weld of the drain valve due to stress corrosion aggravated by dissolved oxygen for LER 272/2005-002.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no actual consequences to this event.
Cause evaluations for the weld crack and 2SJ10 leakage are in progress. Once these analyses are completed, this LER will be supplemented to address the potential safety consequences of this event.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, occurred.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The affected weld was removed and replaced with a new straight run of pipe to minimize welded fittings exposed to the stagnant aerated borated water conditions.
- 2. The 2SJ10 relief valve was removed from the system and the valve internals were replaced. The relief valve was tested satisfactory and placed back in service.
- 3. An extent of condition visual examination of small bore and large bore welds in the safety injection piping (from the CVCS charging pumps to the BIT outlet valves in the main header) was completed in Unit 2 with no indication of cracks found.
- 4. A visual examination of identical welds in Unit 1 was performed, and the inspected welds were found to have no cracks.
- 5. An Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan was put in place and it will remain effective until the conclusion of the cause evaluations.
- 6. Cause evaluations for the weld crack and 2SJ10 leakage are in progress by independent parties.
Additional corrective actions will be determined upon completion of these evaluations.
COMMITMENTS
A supplement to this LER will be issued on completion of the cause evaluations.