05000311/LER-2005-004, Regarding Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification - Containment Isolation Valves
| ML052360235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  (DPR-075) |
| Issue date: | 08/15/2005 |
| From: | Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N05-0419 LER 05-04-00 | |
| Download: ML052360235 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3112005004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nluclear LLC AUG 15 2005 LR-N05-041 9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311/05-004-00 SALEM - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report, 'Required post maintenance testing not performed on Containment Isolation Valves," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The attached LER contains no commitments.
Sincerely, Thomas P Jo Site Vice President Salem Generating Station Attachment(l) 95-2168 REV. 7/99
FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0613012007
,6-2004)
EsUtmated, the NRC may digitscharacters for each block) sponsor and a person Is not required to respond to. the
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET NUM PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 0500031 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification-Containment Isolation Valves
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR S
EQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 15 05 2005 04 00 08 15 2005 9.OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2Xvii) 1 0
20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xii) 0 50.73(a)(2XiiXA)
El 50.73(aX2Xviii)(A) 0 20.2203(aXl) 0 20.2203(aX4) 0 50.73(a)(2Xii)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(viii)(B)
- 0) 20.2203(aX2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1XiXA)
E 50.73(a)(2XIii) 0 50.73(aX2)(ixXA)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1Xii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A)
E 50.73(aX2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(Iii) 0 50.36(cX2) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXA) 0 73.71(aX4)
El 20.2203(a)(2Xiv) 03 50.46(aX3Xii)
D 50.73(a)(2XvXB) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2Xv)
El 50.73(aX2)(iXA) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vXC) a3 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2Xvi)
ED 50.73(aX2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below nr in NPr~ Fnrm RAA
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Justin Wearne, Senior Licensing Engineer 856-339-5081
- 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANTU REPOREABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FCUE OEI A
KN ISV No
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0D NO DATE ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On June 15 and June 17, 2005 Salem Generating Station identified two containment isolation valves (CIVs) that did not have the required post maintenance testing performed following corrective maintenance. This was discovered during an extent of condition investigation for a related issue regarding post-maintenance testing of valves. Because of their particular system location and configuration these valves could not be retested in their as-found condition.
The valves were declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification actions were taken.
The apparent cause of this event was the failure of the Maintenance Planning organization to incorporate a leak rate testing (LLRT) activity into the work order after the scope of the order had become defined. A contributing cause of this event was these activities were handled as WIN (Work IT Now) activities.
Planned corrective actions are to perform the LLRT in the fall 2006 refueling outage. In the interim the flow path is isolated per TS 3.6.3 action statements. The procedure used by planners has been revised to include an activity for the in-service testing group (IST) to assist with determining work instructions and post maintenance testing requirements. The procedure used by the WIN team and the procedure used by the planning department will be combined.
This report is being made in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications...'
NRC FORM 366(6-2004)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC FOReM 366 (6-2004)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
- (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
Salem Generating Station LERs for years 2002 through 2005 were reviewed for similar occurrences of lack of proper post-maintenance testing causing inoperability of a component. None were identified.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE Neither of these corrective maintenance activities went through the normal planning process. They were handled as WIN activities. The WIN organization is chartered with performing simple and routine maintenance activities. Since these activities were planned as WIN maintenance, the level of detail in the planning was not sufficient to ensure the proper post maintenance testing was performed. Contributing to this was a lack of detailed written direction and poor communication between the planners, operations and IST.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. In the case of the two valves that have not been adequately retested following corrective maintenance, there was an OPERABLE containment isolation valve in series with the inoperable containment isolation valve. Additionally, once the inoperable containment isolation valve was discovered (on June 15 and 17, 2005), actions were taken to isolate the process line lAW Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.3. These actions remove the potential release path via the inoperable CIV.
This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Containment Isolation valves 2SS49 and 21 SS182 were isolated per TS.
- 2. Leakrate tests of ClVs 2SS49 and 21SS182 are scheduled for the fall 2006 refueling outage.
- 3. Planning Departments Desk Guide has been revised to ensure activities that involve CIV's receive a review by the IST group for planning and testing purposes.
- 4. The WIN team desk guide will be incorporated into the Planning Departments Desk Guide to ensure that work orders are planned to the same standards.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.