05000305/FIN-2005011-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure of Multiple Safety Related Trains During Internal Flooding Events |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding that was preliminarily determined to be of substantial to high safety significance because the licensee failed to provide adequate design control to ensure that Class I equipment was protected against damage from the rupture of a pipe or tank resulting in serious flooding or excessive steam release to the extent that the Class I equipments function is impaired. Specifically, the design of Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) did not ensure that the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps, the 480-volt (V) safeguards buses, the safe shutdown panel, emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1A and 1B, and 4160-V safeguards buses 1-5 and 1-6 would be protected from random or seismically induced failures of non-Class I systems in the turbine building. The finding is also an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for not ensuring that the design of KPS prevented turbine building flooding from impacting multiple safety related equipment trains needed for safe shutdown of the plant. The inspectors determined that a primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, because there was an earlier opportunity to discover and correct this issue based on the licensees 2003 experience when minor flooding from the turbine building had challenged safety equipment located adjacent to the turbine building basement. The finding was more than minor because it impacted Mitigating Systems cornerstone attributes of design control (initial design and plant modifications) and protection against external factors (internal flood hazards and seismic events) and it impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability and capability of multiple trains of safety related equipment to respond to events to prevent core damage. A Significance Determination Process Phase 3 risk analysis determined that this finding was preliminarily of substantial to high safety significance. The licensee has taken significant corrective actions, including extensive system and structural modifications to address this issue. |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2005011 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2005 (2005Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Yellow |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Baron J Giessner J Lara L Kozak M Satorius P Higgins S Burtonc Baronj Geissner J Larsen L Kozak P Higgins S Burton |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2005011 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2005Q3
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