The inspectors identified an apparent violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, And Drawings, having potential safety significance greater than green. The finding was associated with the licensees inability to close the containment equipment hatch in an expeditious manner while the plant was in the refueling shutdown mode, fuel was in the reactor vessel, the
time to boil was estimated to be less than 30 minutes, and the
reactor coolant system was open to the containment atmosphere. The inability to close the containment equipment hatch was caused by a design error in a large steel rail system installed inside the containment which was to be used to bring heavy equipment into the containment. This large steel rail system obstructed closure of the containment equipment hatch. The inability to close the hatch in an expeditious manner violated the licensees procedure requirements to do so. This finding was more than minor because it affected the
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective and was associated with the
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of containment boundary preservation. Since this finding was determined to be potentially greater than Green using the
SDP Phase 2 Process, this finding is of a to-be-determined (
TBD) safety significance pending review by the NRC Significance Determination Process/Enforcement Review Panel (
SERP). (Section 1R20.b.2)
