The inspectors identified an apparent violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with two examples, for the failure to: 1) treat the February 14, 2007,
emergency diesel generator failure as a significant
condition adverse to quality; and 2) promptly identify and correct a significant
condition adverse to quality (high resistance on field flash circuit contacts) after determining that similar operating experience was applicable. In addition, a contributor to the
inoperable emergency diesel generator included the failure to revisit the diesel generator operability evaluation in response to the applicable operating experience. Overall, the licensee responded to various problems in isolation and did not adopt a corrective action process that maintained
emergency diesel generator reliability and availability. This apparent violation was greater than minor because it affected the
mitigating systems cornerstone objective (equipment performance attribute), to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. For the preliminary significance determination, the inspectors used a 14 day exposure time, which was half the time period between the last successful surveillance and the February 14, 2007, failure. However, this exposure time could increase to 28 days if the NRC determines the failure was caused by contact binding, versus contamination. Using the NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,
significance determination process, a Region IV senior reactor analyst determined that the finding was potentially Greater than Green. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience component, because the licensee failed to institutionalize relevant operating experience in a reasonable time (
P.2(b))
