The team identified an apparent violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for the licensees failure to prescribe adequate procedures for maintenance and testing on
containment spray header isolation Valve HCV-345 which led to exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time. This issue was self revealed on September 13, 2006, when
reactor coolant water issued from the
containment spray header indicating that either Valve HCV-344 or Valve HCV-345 was not properly seated. The failure to perform adequate maintenance and testing for this component resulted in one train of
containment spray being
inoperable from May 11, 2005 to September 9, 2006, a period of 454-days. This exceeded the
Technical Specification 2.4(2) allowed outage time of
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the reactor is critical. The issue was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone due to the impact on availability and reliability of the
containment spray system. The finding was preliminarily characterized under the
significance determination process as having low to moderate safety significance (White) because one train of
containment spray was left in a condition contrary to its design and may have represented a bypass flow path from the
reactor coolant system during an accident condition. This condition was entered into the Omaha Public Power Districts corrective action program as Condition Report 200604627. Valve HCV-345 was repaired by the licensee and is no longer safety concern. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, specifically resources, in that complete and accurate procedures and work packages were not provided
