A violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 6, Criterion XVI, was identified for the failure to ensure that
conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, etc., are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, on July 21, 2004, during surveillance testing of
Emergency Diesel Generator 2, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a failure of Fuse 2FU in the
emergency diesel generator excitation circuit. The failure to identify and correct this condition resulted in
Emergency Diesel Generator 2 being
inoperable from July 21 to August 19, 2004, a period of 29 days, exceeding
Technical Specification 2.7 allowed outage time of 7 days during any month when the
reactor coolant system temperature was greater than 300F. This finding was considered more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the
mitigating systems cornerstone in that the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a failed fuse in the
Emergency Diesel Generator 2 excitation circuit that left the
emergency diesel generator inoperable for a period of 29 days. The finding was characterized under the
significance determination process as having low to moderate safety significance because
Emergency Diesel Generator 2 was unavailable to respond upon demand for a loss of off-site power and would have been unable to perform its mitigating system function
