05000280/LER-2005-003, Regarding Fuel Leak Into Engine Oil Causes Emergency Service Water Pump Inoperability

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Regarding Fuel Leak Into Engine Oil Causes Emergency Service Water Pump Inoperability
ML052920046
Person / Time
Site: Surry  
Issue date: 10/06/2005
From: Jernigan D
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
5-668 LER 05-003-00
Download: ML052920046 (6)


LER-2005-003, Regarding Fuel Leak Into Engine Oil Causes Emergency Service Water Pump Inoperability
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2802005003R00 - NRC Website

text

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 1 OCFR50.73 October 6, 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.: 5-668 SPS: PAK Docket No.: 50-280 50-281 License No.:DPR-32 DPR-37

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2005-003-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be fo arded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very ly y urs, Donald E. Jernigan, Site Vice President Surry Power Station Enclosure Commitments contained in this letter:

None

cc:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 Mr. N. P. Garrett NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY IMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06131020G7 (6-2Oc4)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for each block) information collection.

3. PAGE Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF4
4. TITLE Fuel Leak Into Engine Oil Causes Emergency Service Water Pump Inoperability
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEUENTLALI REV Y.

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DY YA YERlNUMBER lNO.

MONTH DY Ei SUITV Power Station. Unit 2 05000 -281 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 11 2005 2005- 003 -

00 10 6

2005 05000

9. OPERATING MODE I1. THIS REPORT IS SUFBM lED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check althatapp/J) in-202201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

N Mr 20.2201(d) a 20.2203(a)(3)(0

[

50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(vtii)(A)

J 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50-73(a)J(2)(A)(B) 202203(a)(2)(i)

EJ so.36(c)(1)()(A)° 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 5073(a)(2)(i4(A)

10. POWER LEVEL a

202203(a)(2)(iQ) 1J 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

E 50.73(a)(2)(x J 202203(a)(2)(iii) a 50.36(c)(2) a 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) a 7371(a)(4) 100%

0 202203(a)(2)(tv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(1i)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

[] 73.71(a)(5) 0 202203(a)(2)(v)

[)

50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

° 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 0 202203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v(D)

Specify In Abstract below

___or In (if more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On August 11, 2005, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% reactor power, the results of the monthly engine oil sample for Emergency Service Water Pump (ESWP) 1 B [EIIS-BI, ENG]

indicated fuel contamination of the engine oil in the marginal range. Evaluation of previous monthly oil analyses revealed that although the results remained within the acceptable range, an increasing trend of fuel contamination began with the June 11, 2005 sample. The rate of fuel intrusion was such that the ESWP could not sustain long-term operation. Engine oil viscosity also exhibited a concurrent, declining trend but remained within the acceptable range as well. Based on this evaluation, ESWP 1 B was declared inoperable on August 11, 2005 at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />.

Subsequent inspection and pressure test of the fuel system found a leak at the connection between the fuel supply jumper and the #1 L fuel injector. The fuel injector and jumper were replaced, the fuel system was pressure tested satisfactorily, and the engine oil was changed.

ESWP 1 B was declared operable on August 17, 2005 following a successful return to service operational test.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.14.A.4 requires that the reactor coolant system not exceed 3500F or 450 psig or that the reactor shall not be critical unless three ESWPs are operable.

This requirement may be modified to have two ESWPs operable for a period not to exceed 7 days. ESWP 1 B was assumed to be inoperable beginning June 11, 2005 and remained inoperable until completion of testing on August 17, 2005, exceeding the allowed outage time of 7 days. Therefore, this report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's TS. In addition, during the period when the 1 B pump was assumed to be inoperable, a second ESWP was taken out of service to perform maintenance or modifications. The long-term service water requirement for a design basis accident on one unit and the service water requirement to bring the other unit to Hot Shutdown are greater than the design capacity of one ESWP. Therefore, this report is also being submitted pursuant to 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Each ESWP has a design capacity of 15,000 gallon per minute (GPM). The long-term service water requirements for a design basis accident in one unit with a simultaneous loss-of-station power and the second unit being brought to Hot Shutdown is greater than 15,000 gpm. Additional service water is required to bring the non-accident unit to Cold Shutdown.

Considering a single active failure of one pump, TS require three ESWPs to be operable to ensure sufficient cooling water is available in the event of an accident. One ESWP is permitted to be inoperable for up to a 7-day period to provide operational flexibility for testing or maintenance without requiring unit outages.U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1.2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACIGTY NAME
2. DOCKET
6. LER NUMBER
3. PAGE Y'EAR1 SEQUENnIAL lREVISION 05000 28 I

NUMBER 3

OF 4R Surry Power Station 05000-280 OF 4

I 12005-003

- 00w Although the ESWP 1 B was considered to be inoperable since June 11, 2005, it continued to operate during the monthly surveillance test. If needed, the pump would have been capable of satisfactory performance however, due to engine oil contamination would operate for a duration less than required by design basis.

A Safety Monitor analysis for one ESWP inoperable for the period June 11 to August 17, 2005, found the impact to be negligible at less than 5E-9/year. During this period, a second ESWP was removed from service for brief periods to perform maintenance or modifications.

Assuming a second ESWP out of service for the entire period, the integrated risk remained low and would be classified as an issue of very low safety significance.

3.0 CAUSE

The cause for the fuel entering the engine oil system of ESWP 1 B and for the lower oil viscosity was a leak at the connection between the fuel inlet line and the 1 L injector. The root cause for the leak was a failure to identify and correct a defect at the seating area on the inlet of the 1 L injector where the flared end of the fuel line seats. This defect was a flat spot that extends through the entire flared fitting seating surface. When initially installed, the connection did not leak, as indicated by the fuel system pressure test and the engine oil analysis. However, over time due to vibration, heat-up and cool-down this fitting began to leak.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

An inspection and pressure test of the fuel system for ESWP 1 B was conducted. During this inspection a leak was identified at the flared connection between the jumper and the inlet side of the #1 L fuel injector. The fuel injector and jumper were replaced, all other fuel system mechanical joints were tightened, the engine oil was changed, and a satisfactory fuel system pressure test as well as a successful return to service test run was performed.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

An engine oil sample was obtained after the return to service test. The results of the analysis for fuel contamination of the engine oil and for oil viscosity were acceptable. The oil analysis results for the September sample were also acceptable.

The engine oil analysis results from the two other ESWP diesels, the three Station Emergency diesels, the Station Blackout diesel, and the Security diesel were reviewed for fuel contamination of the engine oil and for oil viscosity. The review concluded that the results were consistent and within acceptable ranges.U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1.2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME
2. DOCKET
6. LER NUMBER
3. PAGE YEA I

SEOUENTIALI REVISION 05000-280 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station i

2005 -

003 00 4

OF 4

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Maintenance procedures have been revised to identify defects by inspecting the seating surface of the connection of the fuel lines to the injectors.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

Fuel contamination of Surry's Emergency Diesel Generator #3 engine oil was detected in 1984 and 1990. In both cases, the cause was determined to be a loose connection at the fuel injector. Engine oil testing for fuel contamination was initiated. Also, a visual inspection for fuel leaks during engine operation following maintenance was initiated. No additional issues for fuel contamination of engine oil were identified.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER Detroit Diesel Model 8V71

9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None