05000277/FIN-2014004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Scaffold Obstructs A RHR Discharge Check Valve |
| Description | A self-revealing finding was identified involving an NCV of very low safety significance (Green) for Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 Procedures, because Exelon did not correctly implement procedure MA-MA-796-024-1001, Revision 8, Scaffold Criteria for the Mid-Atlantic Stations. In addition, work order (WO) C0244158, Open/Close CHK-2- 10-48A for OPS Torus Support, instructions were not implemented as written to remove a gag (i.e., eyebolt) on the Unit 2 A residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valve, CHK-2-10-48A, following restoration of the 2 A RHR system after a September 16, 2012, maintenance and fill activity. By not implementing these procedures and instructions, the eyebolt prevented full closure of CHK-2-10-48A after the 2 A RHR pump was secured. Exelon entered these issues into their CAP as IR 1680741, IR 1690648, and action request (AR) 02387793. Exelon removed the eyebolt and scaffold midrail to prevent any obstruction of movement on CHK-2-10-48A. The finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance in the area of reliability and availability of the 2 A RHR train. Specifically, due to the stuck open check valve during a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA)/loss of offsite power (LOOP) scenario, voiding could occur and create a potential water hammer resulting in pipe support damage. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, because the finding did not represent a loss of system function, did not represent a loss of a single train for greater than its allowed TS outage time, and did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the function of 2 A RHR remained available because RHR piping would remain intact and containment cooling would not have been lost during the postulated water hammer scenario. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Work Management, because in the case of the erected scaffold, Exelon did not plan, control, and execute work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. Specifically, the work process did not coordinate effectively with different groups (i.e., operations, engineering, scaffold builders, and maintenance) and job activities to identify and preclude the scaffold from obstructing an eyebolt attached to the swing arm of the 2 A RHR pump discharge check valve. |
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000277/2014004 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves F Bower J Heinly S Barr S Hansell W Cook B Smith |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Peach Bottom - IR 05000277/2014004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Peach Bottom) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Peach Bottom)
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