05000271/FIN-2013003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Corrective Actions for Sealing Flood Pathways into the Electrical Switchgear Rooms |
Description | A self-revealing NCV of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified because Entergy did not promptly identify and correct two separate conditions adverse to quality related to flood protection of the switchgear rooms. Specifically, mechanical screw-type flood seals were not promptly replaced with reliable foam seals and an open drain line was not promptly identified and corrected allowing for water intrusion pathways into the switchgear rooms. Entergys corrective action to restore compliance consisted of placing the issue into the corrective action program and sealing all the potential pathways with Sylguard by April 8, 2013. The inspectors determined that the failure to identify the flood pathways was a performance deficiency that was within Entergys ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to external events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed flood barriers provided an external flood water pathway that could potentially impact the reliability and availability of both electrical switchgear rooms during a design basis flood event. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 4 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because, in spite of the failed flood barriers, sufficient water removal capability was available to ensure there was no loss of electrical switchgear safety function. The switchgear would still have been able to perform its function because the water level would have been maintained below floor level using the additional sump pump capacity available on site. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Entergy did not identify these issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, Entergy had opportunities as part of the extent of condition from a 2012 flood seal failure and as part of the Fukushima flooding walkdowns to identify the additional possible flood paths and did not. |
Site: | Vermont Yankee |
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Report | IR 05000271/2013003 Section 1R01 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | S Rutenkroger J Furia J Laughlin F Bower B Sienel R Clagg J Nicholson S Rich J Deboer |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
CCA | P.1, Identification |
INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Vermont Yankee - IR 05000271/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vermont Yankee) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Vermont Yankee)
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