10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that the design basis is correctly translated into specifications. Contrary to the above, the design basis was not correctly translated into specifications in that the specification for the mechanical flood seal used in spare four inch conduit was not adequate such that a design basis flood could have penetrated the conduit and allowed water intrusion into the switchgear rooms. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program as
CR-VTY-2012-02391. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the missing conduit seal would not cause a plant trip or an initiating event, degrade two or more trains of a multi-train system, degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a risk significant system, or involve the total loss of any safety function. Specifically, Entergy procedures direct a plant shutdown and staging of portable pumps to remove water from the manholes within the switchgear rooms during a design basis flood. The calculated flow rate of water through the conduit was bounded by the capacity of the two portable pumps.
