The inspectors identified an
NCV of very low safety significance (Green) of
technical specification 3.5.E,
High Pressure Coolant Injection (
HPCI) System, because Entergy staff failed to identify that
HPCI was
inoperable, enter the required limiting condition for operation, and immediately verify that the
reactor core isolation cooling (
RCIC) system was
operable. Entergy initiated
CR-VTY-2010-01420 and
CR-VTY-2010-01506 to address the issues, issued standing orders to ensure
HPCI and
RCIC are considered
inoperable when not aligned to the condensate storage and transfer system (
CST), and initiated corrective actions to ensure design basis analysis associated with
power uprate is properly incorporated into various documents, including technical specifications (TS) and the
updated final safety analysis report (
UFSAR). This finding is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent . undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the availability of the
CST to provide water for core cooling to
HPCI during
transient and emergency situations was affected. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the exposure time associated with the
HPCI suction valves being not properly aligned to the
CST was 45 minutes, i.e. less than three days. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the corrective action program (
CAP) component because Entergy personnel did not completely and accurately identify the issues associated with
HPCI being aligned to the torus instead of to the
CST. (
P.1(a)