05000269/LER-2006-003, Re Foreign Objects Discovered in Rbes Outlet Piping
| ML062200342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2006 |
| From: | Brandi Hamilton Duke Energy Corp |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 06-003-00 | |
| Download: ML062200342 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) |
| 2692006003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
BRUCE H HAMILTON Vice President oft Energy Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation ONOl VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3487 864 885 4208 fax July 31, 2006 bhhamilton@duke-energy.com U.S'. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269,-270,
- - 287 Licensee Event Report 269/2006-03, Revision 0 Problem Investigation Process Nos.: 0-06-3928, 0-05-6829, and 0-06-02468 Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d),
attached is Licensee Event Report 269/2006-03, Revision 0, regarding foreign material discovered in the suction piping between the Reactor Building Emergency Sump and the Low Pressure Injection System sump isolation valves.
Analysis concluded that this foreign material could have adversely impacted one Low Pressure Injection Pump on Units 2 and 3 or one or more Reactor Building Spray Pumps on all three units.
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), operation or condition which was prohibited by Technical Specifications.
It is also submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) (v) (D),
event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A),
event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions of trains in different systems.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Very truly yours, Bruce H. Hamilton, Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site Attachment www. duke-energy. corn
Abstract
Video inspection of the Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) outlet pipes on all three Oconee units were performed with the units in cold shutdown.
The inspections discovered the presence of foreign materials, including various hardware items such as two nuts, a washer, a nail, an O-Ring, and a piece of an adjustable wrench.
These materials were evaluated as capable of damaging one Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Pump in Unit 2 and 3 or one or more Reactor Building Spray (BS)
Pump in each unit.
Foreign material described above was removed prior to re-starting the units.
The material was present for an unknown period of time.
Past operability evaluations performed by Oconee Nuclear Station initially concluded that the debris found in Unit 2 was not capable of causing inoperability of any components.
However, subsequent evaluation by the NRC reached a conclusion that reasonable assurance had not been provided to show that the 2B LPI Pump would have remained operable.
A licensee-identified NCV (green finding) was issued, which ONS did not contest.
Inspections on Units 3 and 1 were performed after the NRC finding was issued.
This event is considered to have no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures or personnel injuries associated with this event.
This event is not considered reportable under the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.
A five-year historical search of ONS' corrective action database identified the following related events which were indicative of similar deficiencies in FME control and/or awareness:
- On 10-16-02, during refueling outage 2EOC19, foreign material was discovered during inspection of the Upper Surge Tanks.
The foreign material was determined to have been introduced during maintenance activities performed the previous outage.
- On 2-26-04, Unit 3 tripped due to foreign material in the EHC system.
The material was determined to have been introduced during maintenance activities (filter replacement).
This event was reported under LER 287/2004-01.
" On three separate occasions between March 2004 and July 2004, foreign materials were found in containment contrary to site cleanliness and FME standards.
In each case, the materials were left behind by personnel performing work activities in containment.
On 11-17-05 a nitrogen pressure regulator valve failed due to foreign material in the regulator.
The regulator supplies nitrogen to the air operator on an emergency feedwater control valve.
The debris (fine metal shavings) was determined to have been introduced by the cutting/grinding necessary to remove and replace the regulator.
ONS has heightened its awareness of FME issues over the past two years and made improvements in the FME Program at the site.
The events discussed above are predominantly legacy issues that pre-date this renewed focus.
This is an indication that the corrective actions from our past experiences are having a positive effect on the number of FME events.