05000266/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Evaluate Operating Experience |
| Description | Green . A finding of very low safety significance was self -revealed f or the failure to follow program description PI AA 102, Operating Experience Program, Revision 3. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate operating experience that applied to Point Beach that identified the potential for cable connectors to disconnect due to machine vibration. PI AA 102, Section 5, Instructions, Step 5.1(3), Screening Operating Experience Items, states, If the initial screening indicates potential applicability to a NextEra Energy nuclear plant, program (including corporate administered programs), policy, process, or procedure; then an evaluation is conducted. Subsequently, a disconnected magnetic speed sensor cable on the G 04 emergency diesel generator caused a failure during a surveillance run attempt. The licensees short -term corrective actions included reconnecting the G 04 emergency diesel generator ( EDG ) magnetic speed senor cable and installing lock -wire to prevent the connector from unintentionally disconnecting. The licensees long- term corrective actions included changing their maintenance procedures to check connector tightness on the diesels periodically. The inspectors determined that the failure to evaluate the external operating experience was contrary to licensee program descript ion PI AA 102 and was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the failure to evaluate operating experience was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued October 7, 2016, to this finding. The inspectors answered Yes to question A within Table 3, Significance Determination Process Appendix Router, and transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G , Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated May 9, 2014 . The in spectors referenced Exhibit 3Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered No to the screening questions. The inspectors did not identify a cross -cutting aspect. The cause of the finding occurred in 2012 and was not reflective of present performance. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2017002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Hartman K Barclay J Steffes G Edwards |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2017002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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