The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance and associated
NCV of
Technical Specification 5.4.1.c for the licensees failure to implement the established
Fire Protection Program procedures which ensure Fire
Barrier Integrity. Specifically, the licensee ran an electrical cable through the doorway of an automatically closing fire door. This was contrary to Procedure DFPP 417501, which requires in part that fire doors must not be blocked open by props or any other material in its closing path. The licensee took immediate actions to restore the fire door, by removing the obstruction and entered the issue into their Corrective Action Program (
CAP). The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it affected the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective since the electrical cable could have prevented the fire door from performing its function. The finding was of very-low safety significance per Task 1.4.3A of
IMC 0609, Appendix F. Specifically, the total combustible loading on both sides of the affected fire door was representative of a fire duration less than 1.
5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, associated with the Training component, because the licensee failed to provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the licensee believed the performance deficiency was caused by the one of the new temporary contractors brought onto the site to work in support of the D2R25 refueling outage. [H.9]
