05000237/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Configuration Control in the Unit 2 Containment Pressure Suppression System |
| Description | Green . A finding of very low safety significance and associated non- cited violation of Technical Specification ( TS ) 5.4.1, Procedures, was self -revealed on May 26, 2017, for the licensees failure to maintain configuration control in the Unit 2 containment pressure suppression system. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the instrument air stop valve to the actuator for the Unit 2 torus vent , air operated valve (AOV) 21601 60, open with the react or mode switch in Run (Mode 1) and reactor power approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to maintain configuration control of the Unit 2 containment pressure suppression system was contrary to procedures for the emergency depressurization of containment with the reactor in Mode 1 and was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor, and thus a finding, in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of configuration control with regards to the plants operating equipment alignment while affecting the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage) . The inspectors determined that a Detailed Risk Evaluation was required to be performed based on answering Yes to the Mitigating Systems screening question A.4 in IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At -Power, Exhibit 2. The result of the detailed risk evaluation was a finding of very low safety significance (Green) . This finding has a cross -cutting aspect of Resolution in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not implement appropriate robust barriers to prevent bumping of the 2 1601 60SV in response to previous corrective actions 511878 02 and 2414608 16. Specifically, an identical maintenance induced bumping event resulted in the instrument air stop valve to t he Unit 3 torus main vent AOV 3 1601 60 being unintentionally repositioned closed in November 2014. Licensee corrective actions from that event addressed restraining potentially vulnerable valves prior to maintenance activities as well reassessing which ball valves required permanent robust barrier installation. [P.3] |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2017002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Roach J Wojewoda R Elliott G Edwards L Kozak V Myers J Cameron |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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