| 08-04-2005 | On June 1, 2005, at 21:09, with Oyster Creek at 100% power, an Anticipatory Generator Load Reject scram occurred. During restoration of a transformer by the transmission utility at their substation, a failure of lightning arrestors resulted in a phase-to-phase-to-ground short circuit. This resulted in a grid transient of sufficient magnitude that the Oyster Creek Turbine-Generator sensed a load rejection condition, which resulted in a reactor scram signal. The reactor scrammed and the turbine-generator tripped as expected for this condition. All safety systems performed as expected. The plant was stabilized in the hot shutdown mode.
Corrective actions included completing restart required evaluations, testing and confirmation from the involved transmission utility that conditions in the substation would not result in recurrence of the grid disturbance.
The apparent cause of this event was equipment failure of the lightning arrestors in the transmission utility substation that created a grid disturbance.
There have been several grid disturbances over the life of the plant, including two LERs: LER 2003-003, Actuation of Reactor Protection System Due to a Grid Transient (August 14, 2003). LER 1994-007 was a reactor scram caused by a 230 KV bus section differential relay trip while a switchyard worker was installing a Digital Fault Recorder. |
|---|
LER-2005-002, -,
SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR 05000
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER03 18 2005 2005 - 001 - 01 08 04 2005
05000
9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check alt that apply)
-
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
N - - -20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
_
20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
-20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50 .36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)10. POWER LEVEL
___
-
-20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4)
100 2^0.2203(a)(2)(iv) -50.46(a)(3)(ii) -50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) -73.71(a)(5)
_
-20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) ✓IOTHER
-
-20.2203(a)(2)(vi) J50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below
or in NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Robin Brown, Operations Support Manager - (609) 971-4979
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE
FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX
. - ,
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION
-I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I NO DATE
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. le.. approximatey 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
During a functional test of the 1A2 Local Shutdown Panel (LSP) at 1254 on February 17, 2005, the "A" Control Rod
Drive (CRD) Pump failed to start from the Main Control Room (MCR). The cause of this failure was attributed to
contact high resistance on relay TR-2 in the 1A2 LSP. It was concluded that the high resistance cleared itself during
subsequent relay operation. The relay was then scheduled for future replacement. "A" CRD Pump was successfully
surveilled and returned to service. On March 16, 2005 at 1834, during a regular monthly surveillance, "A" CRD Pump
did not start. Subsequent investigation found the 480 VAC breaker-closing spring was not charged. The closing
spring is recharged by an electric motor immediately after the breaker opens. On March 18, 2005, investigation
revealed a loose terminal wire connection to relay TR-2 within the LSP, which prevented charging of the closing
spring. It is believed this condition existed on February 17, 2005 and should have been corrected. Technical
Specifications (TS) only allow a 7-day out of service time for CRD Pumps resulting in a violation of TS 3.4.D.
Corrective actions included replacing the relay, sending the relay out for failure analysis and performing verification of
closing spring condition on all safety related 480 VAC breakers.
This Supplemental LER is based on determination of the root causes to be a manufacturing deficiency consisting of a
loose connection in the LSP, which caused the closing spring to not recharge, and a failure to detect that the closing
spring was discharged prior to exceeding the Tech Spec out of service allotment.
.
There were no previous similar events at Oyster Creek Generating Station involving a breaker failing to close on
demand due to the closing spring being discharged.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
AmerGen.
AmerGen Energy Company www.exeloncorp.com An Exelon Company
Oyster Creek
US Route 9 South, P.O. Box 388
Forked River, N108731-0388
10 CFR 50.73
2130-05-20139
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555 - 0001
Oyster Creek Generating Station
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16
NRC Docket No. 50-219
Subject:�Licensee Event Report 2005-002-00, Actuation of Reactor Protection
System Due to An Anticipatory Generator Load Reject Caused by Faulted
Lightning Arrestors in a Local Sub-Station
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 2005-002, Revision 0. This event did not affect the
health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event did not result in a safety
system functional failure. Attachment 1 lists the regulatory commitments made in this
LER submittal.
If any further information or assistance is needed, please contact David Fawcett at 609
971-4284.
Sincere) ,r
C. N. Sw nson
Vice Pres! ent, Oyster Creek Generating Station
CNS/DIF
Attachment 1: Summary of Commitments
Enclosure:�NRC Form 366, LER 2005-002-00
cc:�S. J. Collins, Administrator, USNRC Region I
P. S. Tam, USNRC Senior Project Manager, Oyster Creek
R. J. Summers, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
File No. 05041
ATTACHMENT
OCGS Licensee Event Report 2005-002-00
SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS
The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon
Nuclear. (Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or
planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the
NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)
Commitment Committed Date or
"Outage"
In conjunction with the transmission utility, Oyster October 30, 2005
Creek will review the utility's work practices
during this event to determine if improvements in
their substation work control are warranted.
100
NRC FORM 366� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104� EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)=�'- Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process
and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the
Records and FOINPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,�Washington,�DC�20555-0001, or��by�Internet�e-mail�toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) infocollectsenrc.gov,�and to the Desk Officer, Office of
�Information and
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does(See reverse for required number of
not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct ordigits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 - rr 05000 l'. 1.0' 1�OF�.
,
4. TITLE
-----.-ACtiiiii6n of Rea-CtOilpiOte-atiornSiitent DUer to An Anticipatory Genemidi. Load Reject CaUeed by Faulted - -- - - - -:
Lightning Arrestors in a Local Sub-Station� . -�,.•| Docket Number06 01 2005 2005 - 002 - '00 07 29 2005 |
| Event date: |
03-18-2005 |
|---|
| Report date: |
08-04-2005 |
|---|
| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
|---|
| 2192005002R00 - NRC Website |
|
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does(See reverse for required number of not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 05000 219 l 1O OF 3 -
4. TITLE
Supplemental Report to "A" Control Rod Drive Pump Was Returned to Seivice Prioi to Correcting the Cause of Failure Resulting in a Technical Specification Violation , 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE IL OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED -, MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER03 18 2005 2005 - 001 - 01 08 04 2005 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 10 CFR : (Check alt that apply) - 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) N - - -20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) _ 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) _ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) -20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50 .36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)10. POWER LEVEL ___ - -20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 100 2^0.2203(a)(2)(iv) -50.46(a)(3)(ii) -50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) -73.71(a)(5) _ -20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) ✓IOTHER - -20.2203(a)(2)(vi) J50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Robin Brown, Operations Support Manager - (609) 971-4979
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE
FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX
. - , 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION
-I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. le.. approximatey 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) During a functional test of the 1A2 Local Shutdown Panel (LSP) at 1254 on February 17, 2005, the "A" Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump failed to start from the Main Control Room (MCR). The cause of this failure was attributed to contact high resistance on relay TR-2 in the 1A2 LSP. It was concluded that the high resistance cleared itself during subsequent relay operation. The relay was then scheduled for future replacement. "A" CRD Pump was successfully surveilled and returned to service. On March 16, 2005 at 1834, during a regular monthly surveillance, "A" CRD Pump did not start. Subsequent investigation found the 480 VAC breaker-closing spring was not charged. The closing spring is recharged by an electric motor immediately after the breaker opens. On March 18, 2005, investigation revealed a loose terminal wire connection to relay TR-2 within the LSP, which prevented charging of the closing spring. It is believed this condition existed on February 17, 2005 and should have been corrected. Technical Specifications (TS) only allow a 7-day out of service time for CRD Pumps resulting in a violation of TS 3.4.D.
Corrective actions included replacing the relay, sending the relay out for failure analysis and performing verification of closing spring condition on all safety related 480 VAC breakers.
This Supplemental LER is based on determination of the root causes to be a manufacturing deficiency consisting of a loose connection in the LSP, which caused the closing spring to not recharge, and a failure to detect that the closing spring was discharged prior to exceeding the Tech Spec out of service allotment.
.
There were no previous similar events at Oyster Creek Generating Station involving a breaker failing to close on demand due to the closing spring being discharged.
(6-2004)=�'- Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOINPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,�Washington,�DC�20555-0001, or��by�Internet�e-mail�toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) infocollectsenrc.gov,�and to the Desk Officer, Office of �Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does(See reverse for required number of not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct ordigits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 - rr 05000 l'. 1.0' 1�OF�.
,
4. TITLE
.-ACtiiiii6n of Rea-CtOilpiOte-atiornSiitent DUer to An Anticipatory Genemidi. Load Reject CaUeed by Faulted - -- - - - -:
Lightning Arrestors in a Local Sub-Station� . -�,.
- 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR
NO
,
MONTH DAY YEAR
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
05000 06 01 2005 2005�' 002�:00 " 07,�, 26 - 2005 . FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 10 CFR : (Check all that apply) , _ _�� . - - -
- 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) - _N 202201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) _ _ - 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a) (2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) - _ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c) (1)(I) (A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) _ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 1 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)10. POWER LEVEL - _ 20.2203(a) (2) (ii) -50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (v) (A) 73.71(a) (4) - _ _ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3) ii) 50.73(a) (2) (v) (B) 73.71(a) (5) _ 20.2203 (a)(2)(v) -50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a) (2) (v)(C) OTHER�.
_ _ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) -50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a) (2) (v)(D) Specify In Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) � Robin Brown, Operations Support Manager . .-- : ' (609) 971-4979 - - �'
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE .4 FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX .�.
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION
-I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I NO DATE ABSTRACT (Una to 1400 spaces, Le., approzirnatey 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On June 1, 2005, at 21:09, with Oyster Creek at 100% power, an Anticipatory Generator Load Reject scram occurred. During restoration of a transformer by the transmission utility at their substation, a failure of lightning arrestors resulted in a phase-to-phase-to-ground short circuit. This resulted in a grid transient of sufficient magnitude that the Oyster Creek Turbine-Generator sensed a load rejection condition, which resulted in a reactor scram signal. The reactor scrammed and the turbine-generator tripped as expected for this condition. All safety systems performed as expected. The plant was stabilized in the hot shutdown mode.
Corrective actions included completing restart required evaluations, testing and confirmation from the involved transmission utility that conditions in the substation would not result in recurrence of the grid disturbance.
The apparent cause of this event was equipment failure of the lightning arrestors in the transmission utility substation that created a grid disturbance.
There have been several grid disturbances over the life of the plant, including two LERs: LER 2003-003, Actuation of Reactor Protection System Due to a Grid Transient (August 14, 2003). LER 1994-007 was a reactor scram caused by a 230 KV bus section differential relay trip while a switchyard worker was installing a Digital Fault Recorder.
Description of Event
On June 1, 2005, at 21:09, with Oyster Creek at 100% power, an Anticipatory Generator Load Reject scram occurred. Work was being performed by the transmission utility at their substation on a transformer.
When reconnecting the transformer (XFMR) to the grid a phase-to-phase-to-ground fault occurred in 2 lightning arrestors (EIIS-LAR), which subsequently resulted in a significant grid disturbance and loss of approximately 10 -15% of load. This caused the Oyster Creek Main Generator (EDS-TB) to sense a Load Reject. The Turbine and Generator tripped as expected on the reactor scram.
All safety systems performed as expected. The plant was stabilized in the hot shutdown mode.
Analysis of Event:
The scram occurred as a result of an anticipatory scram signal, which prevented any pressure or reactor power excursions. The plant responded as expected for a scram from full power. Other than the scram there were no challenges to any safety systems. Therefore the consequences of this event were minimal.
Actuation of the Reactor Protection System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
Cause of Event:
The apparent cause of this event was failure of lightning arrestors in the transmission utility substation owned and operated by a neighboring utility.
Corrective Actions:
Immediate corrective actions:
Operators took immediate actions in accordance with abnormal operating procedures, and stabilized the plant in hot shutdown pending completion of the post trip review and restart required corrective actions.
The following actions were performed prior to startup:
Oyster Creek Engineering evaluated the magnitude of the grid transient and determined it was sufficient to result in a Generator Load Reject signal.
Long term corrective actions include:
1) In conjunction with the transmission utility, Oyster Creek will review the utility's work practices during this event to determine if improvements in their substation work control are warranted. This will be completed by 10/30/2005.
Additional Information
A. Failed Components:
No plant components failed in this event.
B. Previous similar events:
C. Identification of components referred to in this Licensee Event Report:
Components� IEEE 805 System ID� IEEE 803A Function Lightning arrestor� LAR� 50 Transformer� FK� XFMR Main Generator� TB� GEN
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000219/LER-2005-002 | -,
SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR 05000
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER03 18 2005 2005 - 001 - 01 08 04 2005
05000
9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check alt that apply)
-
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
N - - -20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
_
20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
-20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50 .36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)10. POWER LEVEL
___
-
-20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4)
100 2^0.2203(a)(2)(iv) -50.46(a)(3)(ii) -50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) -73.71(a)(5)
_
-20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) ✓IOTHER
-
-20.2203(a)(2)(vi) J50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below
or in NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Robin Brown, Operations Support Manager - (609) 971-4979
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE
FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX
. - ,
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION
-I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I NO DATE
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. le.. approximatey 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
During a functional test of the 1A2 Local Shutdown Panel (LSP) at 1254 on February 17, 2005, the "A" Control Rod
Drive (CRD) Pump failed to start from the Main Control Room (MCR). The cause of this failure was attributed to
contact high resistance on relay TR-2 in the 1A2 LSP. It was concluded that the high resistance cleared itself during
subsequent relay operation. The relay was then scheduled for future replacement. "A" CRD Pump was successfully
surveilled and returned to service. On March 16, 2005 at 1834, during a regular monthly surveillance, "A" CRD Pump
did not start. Subsequent investigation found the 480 VAC breaker-closing spring was not charged. The closing
spring is recharged by an electric motor immediately after the breaker opens. On March 18, 2005, investigation
revealed a loose terminal wire connection to relay TR-2 within the LSP, which prevented charging of the closing
spring. It is believed this condition existed on February 17, 2005 and should have been corrected. Technical
Specifications (TS) only allow a 7-day out of service time for CRD Pumps resulting in a violation of TS 3.4.D.
Corrective actions included replacing the relay, sending the relay out for failure analysis and performing verification of
closing spring condition on all safety related 480 VAC breakers.
This Supplemental LER is based on determination of the root causes to be a manufacturing deficiency consisting of a
loose connection in the LSP, which caused the closing spring to not recharge, and a failure to detect that the closing
spring was discharged prior to exceeding the Tech Spec out of service allotment.
.
There were no previous similar events at Oyster Creek Generating Station involving a breaker failing to close on
demand due to the closing spring being discharged.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
AmerGen.
AmerGen Energy Company www.exeloncorp.com An Exelon Company
Oyster Creek
US Route 9 South, P.O. Box 388
Forked River, N108731-0388
10 CFR 50.73
2130-05-20139
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555 - 0001
Oyster Creek Generating Station
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16
NRC Docket No. 50-219
Subject:�Licensee Event Report 2005-002-00, Actuation of Reactor Protection
System Due to An Anticipatory Generator Load Reject Caused by Faulted
Lightning Arrestors in a Local Sub-Station
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 2005-002, Revision 0. This event did not affect the
health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event did not result in a safety
system functional failure. Attachment 1 lists the regulatory commitments made in this
LER submittal.
If any further information or assistance is needed, please contact David Fawcett at 609
971-4284.
Sincere) ,r
C. N. Sw nson
Vice Pres! ent, Oyster Creek Generating Station
CNS/DIF
Attachment 1: Summary of Commitments
Enclosure:�NRC Form 366, LER 2005-002-00
cc:�S. J. Collins, Administrator, USNRC Region I
P. S. Tam, USNRC Senior Project Manager, Oyster Creek
R. J. Summers, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
File No. 05041
ATTACHMENT
OCGS Licensee Event Report 2005-002-00
SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS
The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon
Nuclear. (Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or
planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the
NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)
Commitment Committed Date or
"Outage"
In conjunction with the transmission utility, Oyster October 30, 2005
Creek will review the utility's work practices
during this event to determine if improvements in
their substation work control are warranted.
100
NRC FORM 366� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104� EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)=�'- Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process
and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the
Records and FOINPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,�Washington,�DC�20555-0001, or��by�Internet�e-mail�toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) infocollectsenrc.gov,�and to the Desk Officer, Office of
�Information and
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does(See reverse for required number of
not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct ordigits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 - rr 05000 l'. 1.0' 1�OF�.
,
4. TITLE
-----.-ACtiiiii6n of Rea-CtOilpiOte-atiornSiitent DUer to An Anticipatory Genemidi. Load Reject CaUeed by Faulted - -- - - - -:
Lightning Arrestors in a Local Sub-Station� . -�,.• | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
|