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Planned maintenance of the Plant Computer System (PCS) will cause a loss of emergency assessment capability. Beginning February 9, 2016, PCS data will not be available to the following Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) facilities due to planned PCS software modifications: -Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) -Backup EOF -Operations Support Center The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will also be unavailable. The planned maintenance of the PCS is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the duration is expected to be more than 72 hours and the data to the Backup EOF is also affected. CPNPP has compensatory measures in place to ensure timely emergency classification, protective action recommendation and emergency notification, as needed. The PCS modification is expected to be complete by February 18, 2016. A follow-up ENS (Emergency Notification System) communication will be made when the EOF assessment capability is restored. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM RAUL MARTINEZ TO STEVEN VITTO ON 02/18/2016 AT 1541 EST * * *

The planned maintenance of the Comanche Peak Plant Computer System (PCS) that began on February 9, 2016 is complete. Assessment capability in the following facilities was restored effective 1300 (CST) February 18, 2016: -Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) -Backup EOF -Operations Support Center The Emergency Response Data System availability has also been restored. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO(Werner).

On July 13, 2015, planned activities will be performed to upgrade the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Meteorological Towers and its communication equipment. The emergency response data system will be affected. The work will be completed within approximately 5 days. This activity requires the meteorological tower to be out of service greater than 72 hours rendering equipment used for emergency assessment non-functional. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data via Savannah River Site and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information will be relayed via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the upgrade and necessary compensatory actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL MONAHON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2013 EDT ON 7/18/2015 * * *

Vogtle primary and backup Meteorological Towers have been returned to service and functionality of equipment has been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (King).

Planned preventive maintenance will render parts of telephone system and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) nonfunctional. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The maintenance is scheduled to begin on 6/25/2014 at 00:00 (CDT), and is expected to last approximately 5 hours. During this maintenance window, various communication connections will be intermittently interrupted for short periods of time. Affected communication connections include some local telephone company lines, Federal Telephone System, ERDS, the Monticello's NRC office, and automatic ring down lines to the state of Minnesota's Emergency Operations Center. During the planned maintenance window, communications to offsite will be available via radios, cell phones, and satellite communications. This ensures that the plant can adequately communicate with the NRC, state, and local agencies to ensure protection of the health and safety of the general public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the planned telecommunications maintenance. Licensee also notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright and Sherburne County Sheriff dispatchers.

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAMON HESSIG TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1823 EDT ON 06/25/2014 * * *

At 0500 (CDT) on 6/25/2014, planned maintenance on the Monticello telecommunications system was completed. At 1630 (CDT) on 6/25/2014, testing of all telecommunications was completed. All systems are functioning properly. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified that the telecommunications system is functional. The Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright and Sherburne County Sheriff dispatchers have been notified that the telecommunications system is functional. Notified R3DO (Lara).

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At approximately 0800 Mountain Standard Time on December 8, 2013, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) uninterruptable power supply (UPS) from service for a planned replacement. The outage disables the Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) inside the TSC, remote meteorological data display in the emergency response facilities and control rooms, and transmission of plant data to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and to the NRC's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The outage is expected to be completed within five days. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. The outage does not affect the availability of normal power to the TSC or back-up power from the TSC diesel generator. Existing telecommunication systems provided for the emergency response organization (ERO) remain functional to provide the ERO within the TSC and EOF the necessary emergency assessment capabilities, as described in the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The ERFDADS system in each of the three unit control rooms and unit satellite TSCs remain functional and are not affected by the TSC UPS outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and from the National Weather Service. The ERO has been briefed on the effects of the planned TSC UPS outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. PVNGS will inform the NRC after the outage has been completed and the functionality of affected equipment has been restored.

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVE HECKMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1632 EST ON 12/12/13 * * *

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This notification is an update to EN 49616 which provided notification of pre-planned maintenance activities on the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Technical Support Center (TSC) uninterruptable power supply (UPS) that disabled various Emergency Plan (E-Plan) data systems. At approximately 0915 Mountain Standard Time on December 12, 2013, PVNGS restored the affected data systems to service such that the functions of the E-Plan can now be performed without the use of alternate methods. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R4DO (Werner).

At approximately 0934 EDT on Monday, July 15, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) experienced a loss of capability to transmit Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide direction to manually record ERDS data for transmission to the NRC via telephone or fax. Concurrent with the loss of ERDS was a loss of the NRC 'Red Phone' (FTS-2000). The suspected cause of the loss was a damaged fiber optic cable located offsite in Bridgman, Michigan unrelated to CNP. This caused the failure of the internet service provider to CNP. Communications via alternate phone lines and corporate service number remain available and have been tested. CNP has contacted offsite service providers for restoration of service. The estimated time for return to service is 2000 EDT on Monday, July 15, 2013. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of communications capability which includes events that would significantly impair the ability of the licensee to implement the functions of its emergency plans if an emergency were to occur. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE ON 7/15/13 AT 2114 EDT FROM KELLY BAKER TO DONG PARK * * *

At 2050 EDT on Monday, July 15, 2013, DC Cook Operations Department was notified by Information Technology (IT) that the offsite fiber optic cable that was damaged had been repaired. Affected equipment was verified to be working properly, specifically, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data is transmitting and the NRC 'Red Phone' is functional. Communication capability has been restored. The licensee has notified the Senior NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R3DO (Hills).

At 0930 (CST) on January 03, 2013 NextEra Energy Duane Arnold discovered that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was no longer capable of transmitting plant data to the NRC. The loss of ERDS is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1151 (CST) on January 03, 2013 Information Management personnel restored ERDS to working status. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. The licensee has the cause under investigation.

• * * UPDATE AT 2136 EST ON 01/03/13 FROM STEPHEN SPEIRS TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1725 (CST) on January 03, 2013 NextEra Energy Duane Arnold experienced a four minute interruption of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). During this time, ERDS was not capable of transmitting plant data to the NRC. The loss of ERDS is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The interruption of ERDS is related to a previous problem with the system reported under EN #48648. Troubleshooting of ERDS continues to ensure long-term reliability. Additional interruptions of ERDS are possible during this troubleshooting, and a follow-up notification will be made when ERDS reliability is assured. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski), ERDS Group and CAT Group via email.

• * * UPDATE FROM ROB SPADING TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/28/13 AT 1436 EST * * *

Maintenance is complete on the ERDS system. It was tested satisfactorily on 01/15/13 at 1130 CST and returned to fully functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Stone), ERDS Group and CAT Group via email.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant will begin a planned modification of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Process Computers (PPC's) and associated network infrastructure on December 18, 2012. This includes the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) communication with the NRC Operations Center. This work will require the TSC, OSC and subsequently EOF to lose data flow from the plant data network for a period of approximately 36 hours. During this time, the following systems will be impacted for the duration of maintenance: 1. ERDS will be out of service. 2. Plant Data will not reach the TSC and OSC from the plant data network. 3. TSC Computer data transfer to the EOF only will be out of service. 4. Chemistry DAS remote monitoring capability will be lost. 5. Plant parameter data will not be available on the site's LAN network. Once the schedule maintenance starts, the systems (listed above) can be returned to service within 1 hour. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency response personnel will use emergency response procedures (ERPIP 106) to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency Response Facilities. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site. Compensatory measures exist within the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data in the event of an actual Emergency to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN HAYDEN TO S. SANDIN ON 12/20/2012 AT 1035 EST * * *

On 12/20/2012 at 0200 EST, the plant process computer and associated network infrastructure was restored to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).

Cook Nuclear Power Plant will begin a cyber security modification of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Process Computers (PPCs) and associated network infrastructure on Tuesday, November 13, 2012 at 0900 EST. This includes the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) communication with the NRC Operations Center. The entire PPC for each unit will be out of service and unavailable for approximately 6 hours. During that time, the PPC satellite display systems in the Control Rooms, TSC and EOF will be unavailable. After approximately 9 hours, the ERDS will be restored to service along with the satellite display systems in the Control Rooms, TSC and EOF. Compensatory measures exist within the DC Cook Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data in the event of an actual Emergency to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Unavailability of the ERDS and Control Room, TSC and EOF data is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when both units ERDS are fully restored to service. Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPC availability is expected to be restored on Tuesday, November 13, 2012 at 1500 EST. ERDS communication with the NRC Operations Center is expected to be restored on November 13, 2012 at 1800 EST.

• * * UPDATE FROM BRADDOCK LEWIS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1559 EST ON 11/13/12 * * *

The licensee notified the Operations Center that the PPC work was delayed and, as a consequence, ERDS restoration will be delayed. Work on the PPC continues. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner) and ERDS Group (via email).

• * * UPDATE AT 1908 EST ON 11/13/12 FROM GREG KANDA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

ERDS was declared operable at 1815 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner) and ERDS Group (via email).

At 1700 EDT on October 29, 2012, Fermi 2 discovered a failure occurred with a data server within the Process Computer system at 0115 EDT on October 28, 2012. The failure of the data server affects data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC when ERDS is returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE ON 11/9/12 AT 2056 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

On 10/27/2012 at 1415 CDT, the control room was notified of a loss of telephone communications. Reason is unknown at this time. Offsite communications lost includes the state and county ring down lines, the NRC ring down line. The ability to transfer information from the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to offsite agencies is believed not to be available. Satellite phones remain available. At approximately 1500 CDT, the NRC Operations Center was notified via satellite communications of alternate phone numbers to contact the Unit 1 Control Room and that Unit 2 Control Room satellite phone is not available to receive calls. This is a follow up to make the notification of this event to the NRC pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the issue." State and local agencies were notified via alternate means.

• * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS VANFLEET TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0003 EDT ON 10/28/12 * * *

Emergency Notification System has been returned to service. The cause of the loss of communications was a cut fiber optic line. Notified R4DO (Hagar).

At approximately 0800 hours EDT on October 17, 2012, computer engineering personnel will be taking the plant integrated computer system (ICS) out-of-service for planned maintenance. During the time ICS is out-of-service, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be unavailable. The computer outage is scheduled for twelve hours. In the event of an emergency, plant parameter data will be communicated to the facilities through the Status Board Ring Down circuit with back-up by the Private Branch Exchange, Off Premise Exchange, and various redundant intra-facility circuits throughout the emergency facilities. The dose assessment function will be maintained during the out-of-service time period by manual input of data into the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS). The ability to open and maintain an 'open line' using the Emergency Notification System will not be affected and will be the primary means of transferring plant data to the NRC as a contingency until the ERDS can be returned to service. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow-up notification will be made when the maintenance activities are complete and the equipment is restored. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM THOMAS MORSE TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/17/12 AT 2146 EDT * * *

As of 2140 EDT on 10/17/12, the ERDS system was tested and restored to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Orth).

Seabrook personnel determined that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is unavailable due to a malfunction of its process computer. The condition occurred around 0430 EDT today after a plant electrical bus was de-energized and subsequently reenergized during a maintenance activity. The plant is presently in a refueling outage with the reactor vessel defueled. Following repair of the process computer, Seabrook expects to return ERDS to service later today. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency preparedness capabilities, for loss of the ERDS function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1333 EDT ON 10/1/12 * * *

The ERDS system has been returned to service. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Schmidt).

On September 18, 2012, power was removed from SCADA A of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 1 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 1 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization, Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored." The NRC Resident has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM TONY SIROIS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1749 EDT ON 09/20/12 * * *

The Radiation Monitoring System alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications. The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak ERF have been re-established. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller)

On August 29, 2012, power was removed from SCADA B of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 2 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 2 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored. The NRC Resident and Region IV EP Inspectors have been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM ALAN MARZLOFF TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1921 EDT ON 8/31/2012 * * *

This is a follow-up to ENS report number 48247. The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications. The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities have been re-established (as of 1821 CDT). The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R4DO (Azua).

Beginning July 2, 2012, at approximately 0800, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 20 hours. By 0300 on July 3, 2012, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE ON 7/03/12 AT 0113 EDT FROM GROFF TO HUFFMAN * * *

On July 3, 2012, at 01:00, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) has been returned to service. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. Due to equipment problems, the Cyber Security Modification was not installed and the original IPCS configuration was restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified.

• * * UPDATE ON 7/03/12 AT 0556 EDT FROM GROFF TO HUFFMAN * * *

At approximately 02:04 on July 3, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform. IPCS had previously been removed from service on 7/2/12 for a Cyber Security Modification and restored at 0100 on 7/3/12. At 0354, plant personnel were able to reboot IPCS and restore the system to normal with a Prime and Backup CPUs. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified.