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At 0927 EDT on 08/28/2012, it was identified that access to a table H-1 Safe Shutdown Area had been prohibited and that an ALERT had not been declared as required by Surry EPIP-1.01, EAL HA 3.1. At 0900 EDT on 08/27/2012, Electrical Maintenance was performing a surveillance on the Unit 2 Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Low Pressure CO2 System. A high CO2 level was observed using portable gas detection equipment and access to the space was prohibited for a period of approximately 20 minutes. This report is being made in compliance of VPAP-2802, section 6.3.3(h), which states that a one hour report is required if an Emergency Action Level (EAL) is exceeded, the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery, and no other reasons exist for an emergency declaration. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and Virginia Emergency Management Agency.

• * * RETRACTION ON 7/15/13 AT 1342 EDT FROM BARRY GERBER TO DONG PARK * * *

Based upon initial air monitor readings, EN #48239 reported that an oxygen deficient condition existed in a Table H-1 area for approximately 20 minutes. When the initial information was presented to the Shift Manager on 08/28/2012, it was determined that a one-hour report should have been declared in accordance with EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level HA 3.1, which states that an ALERT condition exists if 'access to a Table H-1 area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.' Since the ALERT condition was not recognized on 08/27/2012, a one-hour report was deemed necessary. A root cause evaluation reviewed the oxygen monitor data and determined that the maximum time of oxygen deficiency was approximately 8 minutes. Operator Time Critical Actions were reviewed to determine whether prohibition of access to the Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel for approximately 8 minutes would jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor. No specific references to activities within this area were identified. Therefore, this event was determined not to be an Alert. The root cause evaluation also noted that Operations was notified of the test, administrative control was established for the CO2 Tank shutoff valve, an Electrician was posted in the control room to notify Operations of alarms associated with the test, a fire watch posted, and the test areas were posted and evacuated. The brief period of time the condition existed did not result in a threat to safe plant operation or the health of plant personnel. Therefore, this event was determined not to be an Unusual Event in accordance with EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level HU 3.1, which states, 'report or detection of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases that have or could enter the Owner Controlled Area in amounts that can affect normal plant operations.' This notification is being made to retract the report made on 08/28/12 based on the above discussion. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease).

At 2146 hours on 05/21/04, Unit 2 entered a 30 Hr. clock to Cold Shutdown (CSD) in accordance with T.S.3.0.1 due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being in compliance for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 configuration. Auxiliary Feedwater was declared inoperable at 2146 hours. During post trip recovery, Emergency Procedure, 2-ES-0.1, directed that the six (6) AFW motor operated valves (MOVs) be checked opened after securing the AFW Pumps. This is contrary to the AFW JCO, which requires four (4) MOVs out of six (6) to be closed for AFW to remain Operable. At 0040 hours on 5/22/04 the correct valve alignment in accordance with the JCO was established and the 30 hour TS 3.0.1 clock was exited. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B); any event or condition that results in the Station being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The NRC resident has been notified. The licensee found out about this event today during event investigation. See Surry Unit 2 events 40769, 40768 and 40771.

• * * RETRACTION FROM WOODZELL TO CROUCH ON 05/25/04 @ 2347 EDT * * *

The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: At 1506 hours on 5/22/04, Surry Power Station made an 8-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being aligned in accordance with Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 for 2 hours and 54 minutes following a reactor trip. (Event Number 40770). Upon further analysis, this event was determined not to be immediately reportable. Based on calculations performed by Dominion Nuclear Safety Analysis in Engineering Transmittal ET NAF-04-0045, Rev 0, a risk-based period of time was calculated to allow operations personnel a defined period of time to realign the AFW system in accordance with this JCO. Operators must not exceed 150 hours to restore the acceptable JCO configuration during all modes where AFW is required to be operable. Since the amount of time the system was not in the JCO alignment was less than 150 hours, plant risk increase was maintained less than the limits specified in Regulatory Guide 1.177. This notification is being made to retract the report made on 5/22/04 based on the above discussion. The NRC resident has been notified. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Ayres).