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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5589713 May 2022 19:24:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: Two gamma monitors on filters associated with the waste water treatment system were discovered to be non-functional during their monthly calibration check. These gamma monitors are designated as an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) and are used to prevent gradual long term accumulations of uranium from exceeding a safe mass. The system has been shut down and will remain down until the required safety function is restored. This condition is being conservatively reported under the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A b(2) due to two Failed IROFS although Framatome believes that the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61 are still met.
ENS 556864 January 2022 10:42:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2The following information was provided by the licensee email: RCW 49.17.062 (1)(a) requires an employer report 'within 24 hours. that 10 or more of their employees at the workplace or worksite in this State have tested positive for the infectious or contagious disease that is the subject of the public health emergency, must report the positive tests to the department in a form prescribed by the department.' On 1/03/2022, at 1615 PST, the Framatome Horn Rapids Road human resources manager notified Washington State Division of Occupational Safety and Health that the Richland Fuel Fabrication site hit that threshold of 10 COVID-19 positive cases. These cases do not appear to be worker-to-worker transmissions of the virus. This notification is being made under the concurrent reporting requirement of 10CFR70 Appendix A concurrent reporting.
ENS 5566620 December 2021 17:26:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2

The following information was provided by Framatome ANP Richland via email: On December 20, 2021, at 0920 PST, Framatome received notification that a sealed source, which had been removed by a waste broker (Qal-Tek), had failed a leak test. The source, an acrylic rod type made in June 1986 and containing at that time 5 mCi of Cs-137, had been stored at Framatome in a shielding pig for many years. Leak tests had been performed on the storage pig as required by Framatome's radioactive materials license, most recently on November 12, 2021. The waste broker performed a confirmatory leak test on the storage pig on November 22, 2021 and removed the source from the Framatome site. All leak tests performed by Framatome and the waste broker indicated that there was less than 0.005 microcurie of removable contamination on the outside of the storage pig. The source was removed from its storage pig at the waste broker's facility in a controlled environment at which point a sample of the bare source indicated a removable beta activity of 0.015 microcurie. Upon discovering the leak, the waste broker placed the leaking source in a sealed container and decontaminated the inside of the storage pig. The source will be sealed with epoxy to prevent any further leak; being already in the waste stream, no further issue is anticipated from the source. This report is furnished to the NRC, concurrent to one sent to the Washington Department of Public Health. The licensee has notified the State and NRC Region IV.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAMES KILLINGBECK TO THOMAS KENDZIA AT 1136 EST ON 12/21/21 * * *

The following information is a synopsis of information received from the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (Agency) via e-mail and phone: The Agency was notified of this event yesterday as it is stated above with the following additional information. The Washington State license for Framatone, Inc. is WN-I0612, Qal-Tek Associates, LLC NRC license is 11-27610-01, cesium-137 source current activity is about 0.0022 curies (2.2 millicuries). The Agency submitted an NRC NMED report for this event yesterday. The Agency was determining if the event met reporting requirements for notification of the NRC Headquarters Operations Center (HOC). Today the Agency determined this event was reportable to the NRC HOC as an Agreement State report since it met the criteria of 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). Washington state incident number WA-21-026 Notified R4DO (O'Keefe), and NMSS Events Notification group (email).

ENS 556349 December 2021 10:00:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2On December 8, 2021 at approximately 0745 PST, an instrument technician was contaminated with uranyl nitrate solution while working on process instrumentation (calibrating a pressure transmitter in the Scrap Uranium Recovery Facility). The individual followed safety protocol by utilizing the emergency wash station and as a precaution was sent for medical evaluation (at Kadlec Regional Medical Center) due to skin exposure to nitric acid. Prior to leaving the site, Framatome Health and Safety Technicians decontaminated the individual to below release limits with the exception of their hands. The individual's hands were placed inside gloves which were secured to their wrists prior to being transported. The worker was transported to an offsite medical facility accompanied by plant health physics personnel. After being evaluated, the individual returned to Framatome where their hands were decontaminated to below release limits and returned to work. The process area where this work was being performed was cleaned and the equipment was secured. The event has been entered into the facility's corrective action system. Framatome is reporting this event consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3). The licensee notified the Washington Department of Health and the NRC R2 Project Manager (Vukovinsky).
ENS 5551712 October 2021 18:41:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2At about 0630 PDT while a process operator was attempting to move a pallet of four plastic 55-gallon drums containing uranium nitrate (UN) solution off of a containment pallet, two drums fell off of the pallet and into the sea-land container where they were stored. One of the drums split and leaked UN solution into the sea-land container contaminating the area within the sea-land container, the forklift, and the asphalt under and adjacent to it. This drum contained approximately (DELETED) of uranium. The uranium concentration in the UN solution was about (DELETED) and approximately half of the drum volume spilled. The operator was surveyed and was found not to have been contaminated nor to have received an acute dose from the spill. The spill is contained to a controlled area and no dose to a member of the public is possible. The area was restricted for decontamination and will remain restricted for over 24 hours. The licensee notified the R2 Fuel Facility Project Inspector.
ENS 5541518 August 2021 12:20:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2RCW 49.17(1)(a) requires an employer report 'within 24 hours.that 10 or more of their employees at the workplace or worksite in this state have tested positive for the infectious or contagious disease that is the subject of the public health emergency, must report the positive tests to the department in a form prescribed by the department.' This is the new Health Emergency Labor Standards Act - HELSA. ESSB 5115.SL On 8/17/2021 the Framatome Horn Rapids Road site hit that threshold of 10 COVID positive cases. These cases do not appear to be worker-to-worker transmissions of the virus. This notification is being made under the concurrent reporting requirement of 10CFR70 Appendix A concurrent reporting. NRC Region will be notified.
ENS 5496221 October 2020 10:14:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2A carpenter working in a clean area (not a radiological controlled area) injured his hand and required medical treatment. The nature of the hand injury requires reporting to the State of Washington Department of Labor and Industry. This concurrent report is being made in compliance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A criteria c) which requires the reporting of any event or situation, related to health and safety for which notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. The licensee also notified the NRC Region 2 office.
ENS 5427312 September 2019 20:08:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2Heeled 30B UF6 Cylinders arrived at Framatome at approximately 1235 (PDT) on September 12, 2019. The cylinders were inspected/surveyed for loose surface contamination at approximately 1335 (PDT). Two cylinders were identified to have greater than 24 dpm/cm2 alpha contamination limit and the 240 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma contamination limit set by DOT (Department of Transportation) and NRC. Each cylinder contained contamination on and around the valve cover. One cylinder contained 250 dpm/cm2 alpha and 2,500 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma, and another 35-40 dpm/cm2 alpha and 2,000 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma. The top of the cylinders have been decontaminated and the valve covers have been removed and bagged. (Title) 10 CFR 20.1906 requires immediate notification of the operations center and carrier in the event of contamination in excess of the limits specified in 49 CFR 173.443 during inspections required by 10 CFR 71.87. There were no exposures to personnel and no contamination was found on the transport vehicle. The licensee is attempting to contact Westinghouse from where the cylinders originated.
ENS 4258518 May 2006 15:26:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2During a regularly scheduled review of the ISA for a process system in the ELO building, the ISA team postulated where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel (55-gallon drum). This system configuration did not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were met. The process system was immediately shut down, the potential for back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel was removed, and the potential for similar accident sequences in this and related process systems was evaluated. This evaluation found one additional system configuration in the same process system where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel. The details of this condition are still undergoing internal investigation. This configuration does not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 are met. The process equipment associated with this scenario is also shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 The material in the identified system sources that is normally in the tanks that could back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel is uranyl nitrate solution with a range of (deleted) g U/liter. However on certain rare occasions, there is the potential for uranyl nitrate solution with up to (deleted) U/liter to be present in these tanks. This is the highest concentration observed by veteran system operators. The 95/95 upper limit of keff for a single 55 gallon drum containing uranyl nitrate solution with (deleted) U/liter, sitting on a 30 cm thick concrete slab and with (deleted) cm of water tight fitted water reflector is approximately (deleted). At (deleted) U/liter the 95/95 upper limit of keff is approximately (deleted). The allowed 95/95 upper limit on keff for normal conditions is (deleted) and (deleted) for abnormal conditions. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Safety significance is low. The potential of accidental nuclear criticality in the as found condition remained unlikely. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: The potential criticality pathway involves having more than (deleted) U/liter uranyl nitrate solution in the system tanks, an improper valve line up and then pumping the solution back through an air powered double diaphragm pump into the 55-gallon drum. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (Mass, Moderation, Geometry Concentration etc.): The controlled parameter on the 55 gallon drum of feed material was concentration. The maximum allowed concentration is (deleted) U/1 UNH solution. ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (Include process limit and % worst case critical mass: The facility is limited by NRC license to an enrichment of (deleted) wt.% U-235. The maximum amount of material that could potentially back flow into the 55-gallon drum is approximately (deleted) liters and the maximum expected concentration would be (deleted) U The normally expected concentration is less than (deleted) U/liter. According to ARH-600 page III.B6-3, the minimum critical spherical mass of UN solution is in excess of (deleted) kg. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The back flow potential was eliminated and the system tagged out of service pending a complete re-analysis of the process system and the establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Related process systems that might have a similar potential were also shut down pending completion of an evaluation to ensure that the same potential does not exist in these areas.
ENS 421852 December 2005 12:50:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 4(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: Jerald S. Holm, Framatome ANP, 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, WA 99354 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: The Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) for Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: The mean bow and standard deviation from recent channel measurements during a Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 (SQ1C14) mid-cycle outage exceed the values in the current database used in licensing analyses for Susquehanna Unit 1. The majority of data acquired at Susquehanna Unit 1 during the mid-cycle outage were in the exposure range of 35 to 45 MWd/kgU. In that range, the new measurements exceed both the mean and the standard deviation of bow from the existing database. Preliminary results from the measurements indicate that the mean from the new data is approximately 60% higher and the standard deviation is approximately 50% higher. The SLMCPR Technical Specification limit for Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 was too low (by about .01) when calculated with the channel bow values from the Framatome ANP channel bow database, since channel bows measured for Cycle 14 exceeded those in the channel bow database. Therefore a safety limit could have been violated. (v) The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on November 15, 2005. (vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14. The other plants supported by Framatome ANP analyses, or using Framatome ANP supplied channels, are not impacted. (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: A new SLMCPR for the remainder of the Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 (denoted Cycle 14a) operation has been provided by Framatome ANP which bounds channel bow experienced during Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14. Susquehanna Unit 1 also applied a conservative interim CPR penalty (.04) during Cycle 14 operation when slow settling of the control blades was encountered. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: In order to assure that other plants are not impacted in the future by unanticipated channel bow, recommended surveillance actions will be provided in January 2006 to all customers using Framatome ANP channels.
ENS 421194 November 2005 14:38:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2BACKGROUND: Framatome ANP routinely vacuum transfers LEU powder into 55-gallon drums for storage in the BLEU facility 55-gallon drum warehouse. A change was implemented recently to also vacuum transfer LEU powder from 45-gallon drums into 55-gallon drums, also for storage in the BLEU facility 55-gallon drum warehouse. EVENT DESCRIPTION: On day shift November 3, 2005 at approximate 2:00 PST, a process operator vacuum transferred LEU powder enriched to (deleted) wt% 235U from a 45-gallon to a 55-gallon drum in the BLEU facility at the Richland site. This transfer was performed according to an approved standard operating procedure (SOP). This was the first such transfer under a recently approved nuclear criticality safety analysis (NCSA) part of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) When the operator was preparing the newly filled 55-gallon drum for transfer to and storage in the warehouse, the Nuclear Inventory Management System (NIMS) would not print a label for the drum. Operations personnel contacted an NCS specialist about this issue. While troubleshooting this problem, the NCS specialist discovered that the LEU powder contained hydrogenous additives. He recognized that the Richland site ISA did not implement IROFS to prevent transfer of powder containing hydrogenous additives from 45-gallon to 55-gallon drums. At this point, the drum was sampled and locked in place pending further evaluation. The 45-gallon to 55-gallon transfer process was also placed out of service pending further evaluation. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: The safety significance of this event is very low. In accordance with the NCSA a 55-gallon drum filled with LEU powder, enriched to (deleted ) 235U with a bulk density of (deleted ) and containing (deleted ) wt% moisture, that is fully reflected by water has a keff of (deleted). A moisture value of (deleted) wt% is required in such a drum to reach a keff of 1.0. The drum involved in this event actually contained 115.4 kg of LEU powder enriched to (deleted) wt% 235U with a bulk density of (deleted) and containing (deleted) total moisture equivalence (moisture and moisture equivalent approved additives determined by follow up laboratory analysis). Based on total moisture equivalent content alone, the material in the drum would have to have more than (deleted) times the limit (deleted) and more than (deleted) times the actual amount (deleted) before criticality could occur in the drum. The actual enrichment and bulk density of the material involved in this event provide additional margin compared to the values required for criticality discussed in the previous paragraph. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Criticality could only occur if moderation control on the material placed in the drum is lost. This could hypothetically occur if powder containing over (deleted) times the allowed limit (deleted) were placed into the drum. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The process parameter controlled in this portion of the process is moderation. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Within the 1SA the NCSA, E04-NCSA-323 version 3.0 accident sequence 1.4.1 description bounds this event. It states, "UO, powder containing greater than (deleted) wt% H2O equivalent is transferred to a 55-gallon drum from the BLEU powder preparation south addback station. Defense 1 for this accident sequence states, 'Moderation control: Any 45-gallon drum of UOX powder that does not have at least two independent determinations that it has (deleted) wt% or less moisture must be stored in a specially designated, locked storage grid to prevent accidental drum movement.' This is IROFS 1105 and was maintained throughout this event. At HRR, per SOP, if a drum contains greater than (deleted) wt% moisture and/or > (greater) wt% moisture equivalent additives, it is locked in a storage location. Only trained key custodians may unlock these storage locations for further processing or handling of the drum, Based on the moisture and moisture equivalent approved additive content of the powder, the drum involved in this event was not such a drum. Defense 2 for this accident sequence states, 'Moderation control: The programmable controller interfaces with NIMS to verify acceptable moisture content before it permits transfer valve to open.' This is IROFS 6002 and was maintained throughout this event for moisture content of the powder. As implemented, this IROFS does not verify that the powder to be transferred contains no hydrogenous additives. However, as an uncredited defense, before permitting the transfer valve to open, NIMS does verify that the powder contains s (deleted) wt% AZS and (deleted) wt% ALS, which is (deleted) wt% moisture equivalent approved additives. Therefore, on a total moisture and moisture equivalent basis, NIMS does verify that the powder contains less than (deleted) wt% total moisture equivalence. This is approximately (deleted) times less than the (deleted) wt% total moisture equivalence required to approach a keff value of (deleted). Defense 3 for this accident sequence states, Moderation control provided by an AEC (active engineered control). An in-line moisture monitor is interlocked to shut off the vacuum blower and stop the rotary valve to prevent a significant amount of Uox powder containing greater than (deleted) wt% H2O from being transferred to the drum. This is IROFS 4704 and was maintained throughout this event for moisture content of the powder. This IROFS, however, will not detect dry hydrogenous additives. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: After discovery of the deficiency, the drum was sampled and locked in place pending further evaluation. The 45-gallon to 55-gallon transfer process was also placed out of service pending further evaluation.
ENS 4201726 September 2005 18:48:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2

A flatbed truck carrying one sea-land container overturned on Horn Rapids Road just outside the plant entrance. The sea-land container is loaded with TNF-11 loaded with uranium oxide powder. Survey results indicate no contamination outside of the container. Sea-land container integrity is visually good. The driver was not injured and no other vehicles were involved. AREVA responded using our own forces. Local law enforcement, state and county officials were notified. There is media interest from three local television stations and the Tri-City Herald.

  • * * UPDATE FROM C. MANNING TO W. GOTT AT 2011 ON 09/26/05 * * *

The container is back on Framatome property.

  • * * UPDATE FROM C. MANNING TO W. GOTT AT 2028 ON 09/26/05 * * *

There has been no written press release. The container is being moved into a warehouse where additional surveys will be conducted. The internals will be inspected in the morning. There is a heavy bulkhead inside the sea-land container and appropriate equipment needs to be staged before opening the container.

ENS 4199818 September 2005 23:49:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2The licensee observed a puddle of water on a blacktop surface in an area outside the Uranium Oxide (UO2) building under conditions where no water would ordinarily be expected. The puddle was characterized as about 4 feet by 8 feet in size. The area was barricaded and samples were taken for analysis. The sample analysis has still not been completed, however, the puddle has evaporated and radiological survey of the blacktop area with a GM tube type probe indicated an on-contact radiological contamination count rate of 4000 CPM (counts per minute). The licensee has covered the blacktop surface with a tarpaulin now that the area is dry and a decontamination plan is under development. The location of the contamination is within the facility's security zone that is not a contamination-controlled area. There was no release or potential of release outside the facility. There was no personnel contamination associated with this event. The licensee believes the contamination is from Uranium but is still awaiting lab results. The source of the contamination is still unknown. The license was performing fire protection deluge testing at approximately the time the puddle was discovered but the connection between this testing and the generation of the contaminated water is not known. The licensee plans to contact the Region.
ENS 414552 March 2005 12:27:00Framatome ANP RichlandNRC Region 2On 01/27/05, Framatome ANP determined that a deviation exists in the interpolation scheme for the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) within a range of fuel bundle flows for several operating plants. The condition could be experienced during startup, shutdown, or for other generally very infrequent reasons with core flows in the 30-45% range. The error has no impact on reactor operation above 45% flow. The defect involves the MCPR operating limit and the monitoring of that limit. The plants where the MCPR operating limit was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3 and Grand Gulf. The plants where the steady state MCPR predicted by the monitoring system was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3, Columbia Generating Station, Grand Gulf, LaSalle Unit 2, and River Bend. All affected plants have been notified. Recommendations for compensatory actions have been provided to those plants (Grand Gulf and River Bend) where the impact of the error is evident for current and future cycle exposures. Compensatory measures have been provided to the affected plants for use until the incore monitoring code can be updated at each plant.