Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54466 | 8 January 2020 02:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Seismic Assessment Instrumentation | On January 7, 2020, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) experienced an equipment failure that resulted in a loss of the seismic assessment instrumentation. This is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other plant systems were affected. Compensatory measures have been implemented and will remain in place until the seismic system has been restored. The NRC resident has been notified. Licensee received a design basis earthquake alarm, but no other local indication of seismic activity, nor on the U.S. Geological Survey website. Licensee compensatory measures include local readings on seismic instrumentation. | ||
| ENS 54409 | 25 November 2019 16:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | En Revision Imported Date 11/28/2019 | EN Revision Text: TEMPORARY PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SAMPLE CART NON FUNCTIONAL At 1245 PST, on November 23, 2019, the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) was declared non-functional and taken out of service to perform planned preventive maintenance per procedure. The temporary sample cart was placed in service as an alternate method per plant procedures. At 0854 PST, on November 25, 2019, it was discovered that the temporary sample cart had a broken belt. At that time neither the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack nor the temporary sample cart could be returned to service. At 1300 PST, on November 25, 2019, the temporary sample cart was returned to service following repairs. This restored the required compensatory measures for TEA-SR-26. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 2057 PST, on November 26, 2019, it was discovered that the temporary sample cart had lost power and was not in service. At this time, neither TEA-SR-26 nor the temporary sample cart were in service, this was a subsequent failure of the temporary sample cart, and at the time the station had been unsuccessful at restoring a reliable alternate sampling method following the failure that occurred at 0854 PST, on November 25, 2019. At 2350 PST, on November 26, 2019, the temporary sample cart was returned to service following repairs. This restored the required compensatory measures for TEA-SR-26. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified the R4DO (Pick) via email. | ||
| ENS 53775 | 4 December 2018 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability | On 12/4/2018 at 1340 (PST), Columbia entered a planned evolution to replace the seismic monitoring system. Use of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale has been implemented as a compensatory measure per station procedures. The expected duration of the replacement activity will exceed 72 hours, therefore, this is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will remain in place until the seismic system replacement has been completed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51733 | 13 February 2016 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radwaste Building Noble Gas Monitor Out-Of-Service | On 2/10/2016 at 1000 PST, Columbia entered a planned evolution to perform channel functional tests on the RadWaste Building noble gas monitor (WEA-RIS-14). Compensatory measures were implemented per station procedures. The station is experiencing equipment issues and the monitor has not been restored within 72 hours (2/13/2016 at 1000 PST) from the start of the outage. The extended outage of this radiological monitoring instrument is, therefore, being reported as a major loss of radiological assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will remain in place until the WEA instrument is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Note: Reactor Power is 75 percent due to a planned plant downpower for unrelated scheduled work with a planned return to 100 percent at 1900 PST on 2/14/16. | ||
| ENS 51094 | 28 May 2015 05:17:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Area Radiation Monitors Non-Functional During Planned Bus Outage | A planned outage of the Division 2 medium voltage switchgear (SM-8) was initiated at 22:17 PDT on 5/27/15. The bus outage results in all area radiation monitors required for emergency classification being non-functional. Compensatory measure monitoring equipment has been established prior to the loss to provide alternate means of monitoring area radiation levels. The SM-8 outage window is scheduled to last 124 hours. Although the monitoring function is maintained by the compensatory monitoring equipment, the planned loss of area radiation monitors for greater than 72 hours is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51027 | 30 April 2015 01:11:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Rod Position Indicator System (Rpis) Unplanned Outage | At 1811 PDT on 04/29/2015, the station declared the RPIS system inoperable when a Control Room panel alarmed the loss of indication. The cause of the equipment loss is under investigation. This unplanned equipment outage is being conservatively reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other safety equipment has been impacted by this event and the plant continues normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51068 | 3 April 2015 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Radiological Assessment Capability Due to Non-Functional Radiation Monitor | On 4/21/2015, during performance of source check surveillance on the liquid effluent radiation monitor for the Plant Service Water (TSW), a non-radioactive system, it was discovered that the instrument was determined to be nonfunctional. It was determined on 4/25/15 that the failure was due to an incorrect 'as left' setting from testing conducted on 4/3/2015. The instrument was determined to be non-functional from the period 4/03/15 to 4/25/15 when the setting was corrected. On 5/12/15 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the time the instrument was non-functional that this condition constituted a major loss of radiation assessment capability which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. | Service water | |
| ENS 50569 | 23 October 2014 17:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Turbine Building Exhaust Sample Rack Declared Non-Functional | A planned outage for the Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TEA-RIS-13) and the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) for health inspection was initiated at 1046 PDT on 10/23/14. Due to maintenance retests taking longer than expected and in anticipation of possibly exceeding 72 hours for the planned outage, this event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability under regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway during the outage. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. The Resident Inspector will be notified. | ||
| ENS 50380 | 19 August 2014 14:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0733 (PDT), on 08/19/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - low and high range detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50341 | 5 August 2014 00:01:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radwaste Building Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack Declared Nonfunctional | At 1701 hours PDT on August 4, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared nonfunctional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Field team assessment function is unaffected and remains available if required. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 1501 PDT on 8/7/14, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitor sample rack was declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner). | ||
| ENS 50294 | 22 July 2014 13:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack Declared Non-Functional | At 0635 hours PDT on July 22, 2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TEA-RIS-13) and the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1351 PDT on 7/28/2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TES-RIS-13) and Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TES-SR-26) were declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe). | ||
| ENS 50259 | 4 July 2014 09:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Non-Functional | At 0233 PDT on July 4, 2014, TEA-RIS-13 and the Turbine Building process radiation monitoring sample rack were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50182 | 9 June 2014 14:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack Declared Non-Functional | At 0715 hours PDT on June 9, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures were implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1255 PDT on 06/13/2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner). | ||
| ENS 50084 | 3 May 2014 02:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Failure | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1920 (PDT), on 05/02/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Low and High Range Detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Following completion of maintenance activities PRM-RE-1B, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector was returned to operable status at 0810 PDT on 05/08/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Whitten). | ||
| ENS 49841 | 19 February 2014 16:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Primary Containment Oxygen and Hydrogen Monitoring | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0829 (PST), on 2/19/2014 the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 1037 PST on 2/20/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Allen). | Primary containment | |
| ENS 49765 | 27 January 2014 08:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Turbine and Rad Waste Buildings Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Planned Maintenance | At 0045 PST on 1/27/14, the Turbine Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors and the Rad Waste Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared inoperable because of planned maintenance for replacement of the monitors. Compensatory measures have been implemented per station procedures; however, the time required for installation, testing, and acceptance of the new equipment is expected to last several weeks. Therefore, this radiological monitoring equipment outage is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability under regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will be in place throughout the duration of the planned equipment outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1416 PDT on 5/31/14, the Turbine Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared operable, and at 1312 PDT on 6/06/14 the Rad Waste Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared operable after outages due to equipment replacements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Taylor). | ||
| ENS 49702 | 8 January 2014 18:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Non-Functional Area Radiation Monitors | At (1010 PST) on 1/08/14, during performance of a surveillance the power supply for ten area radiation monitors in the Reactor Building was found with voltage out of specification. As a result, the affected area radiation monitors were declared non-functional. This condition represents a major loss of assessment capability and is being reported as such under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted until the power supply is restored. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
The power supply voltage has been restored to specification per applicable station procedures. All affected area radiation monitors have been declared functional. Compensatory measures have been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following: Energy Northwest performed an evaluation for the reported out-of-specification voltage condition for the power supply to several radiation monitors in the Reactor Building. The evaluation concluded that the voltage deviation from the -24 VDC set point was small and within the calculated uncertainty for the instrument, and did not result in equipment failure. Therefore, it was concluded that the radiation monitors were functional and that the reported major loss of assessment capability did not occur. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz). | ||
| ENS 49700 | 7 January 2014 20:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Building Stack Monitor Temporarily Out of Service for Maintenance | At 1210 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor- Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. The monitor is expected to be out of service for approximately 1 hour. Preplanned compensatory actions have been implemented. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1238 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor -Intermediate Range detector was declared functional following scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Emergency Assessment Capability has been restored. Preplanned compensatory actions have been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 allows for not reporting EP equipment outages that are planned (i.e., maintenance) when outage time is not expected to exceed or does not exceed 72 hours, and when there are viable compensatory measures in place. Verification of the Control Room Logs indicates Columbia had viable compensatory measures in place during the maintenance outage and the outage duration was less than 72 hours. Columbia met the conditions in NUREG-1022; therefore, this event did not represent a loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Allen). | ||
| ENS 49661 | 19 December 2013 16:38:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Both Divisions of Primary Containment Oxygen and Hydrogen Atmospheric Monitors Inoperable for Maintenance | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0838 PST on 12/19/2013, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 2114 PST on 12/19/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Lantz). | Primary containment | |
| ENS 49645 | 17 December 2013 19:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Inoperable Due to Scheduled Maintenance on Supporting Equipment | At 1133 PST on December 17, 2013, the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Preplanned compensatory actions have been initiated. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1457 (PST) on December 21, 2013, the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared functional following scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Emergency assessment capability has been restored. Preplanned compensatory actions have been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Werner). | ||
| ENS 49626 | 12 December 2013 12:36:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Both Trains of Primary Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors Out of Service for Maintenance | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0436 (PST), on 12/12/2013 the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Following completion of maintenance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 1150 PST on 12/13/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Walker). | Primary containment | |
| ENS 49603 | 3 December 2013 16:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Non-Functional Due to Scheduled Maintenance | During scheduled maintenance, at approximately 0822 PDT on December 3, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the non-functioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases is available. The additional personnel are pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The planned outage is scheduled for approximately 90 hours.
At 2104 PST on 12/6/13, planned maintenance on the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was complete, the instrument was retested satisfactorily, and the instrument was declared functional. This restored the emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO(Vasquez) and R1DO(Cook). | ||
| ENS 49545 | 17 November 2013 17:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Drywell Sampling Capability | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. At 0955 (PST) on 11/17/2013, it was discovered that the CMS-SR-13 sample valves would not align to allow monitoring the drywell. The redundant sample rack, CMS-SR-14, is already out of service due to an issue with the sample pump, which is currently awaiting replacement parts. The capability to monitor the drywell for H2 and O2 remotely is non-existent if an emergency situation were to arise because of these two issues. The only method currently available to sample the drywall for H2 and O2 is manually via chemistry procedures. This method would be unavailable in accident conditions because the sample point isolation valves isolate on an accident signal (F or A). Even if the sample points were not isolated, the Chemist would be unable to draw a sample safely during an accident due to radiation levels in the Reactor Building and/or H2 and O2 levels in containment. PPM 13.1.1 Table 6 specifies DW/WW (Drywell/Wetwell) hydrogen and oxygen measurements as a method for determining potential loss of Primary Containment. PPM 13.14.11 does not specify an alternative method for the loss of CMS-SR-13 & 14. Based on this information and discussions with Licensing and Emergency Preparedness, the station has determined this issue is a loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 1351 PST on 11/18/13, repairs on CMS-SR-13 were completed, returning the monitor to operable status of being able to sample both the drywell and wetwell for hydrogen and oxygen as required for emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (PROULX). | Primary containment | |
| ENS 49473 | 24 October 2013 17:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Failure of Radwaste Building Effluent Radiation Monitor | At 1035 (PDT) on October 24, 2013, during a channel functional test (CFT), the intermediate radiation effluent monitor on the radwaste building failed an as found range check and was declared inoperable. A single range check was found out of tolerance low. The as found values on the remaining five ranges that the instrument spans were within the acceptance criteria. This monitor is one of three methods of declaring a general emergency due to offsite radiation releases originating in the radwaste building. Lower emergency classification levels are supported by a separate radiation monitor that was not impacted. The failure to complete the CFT on the intermediate range monitor with all ranges yielding satisfactory as found values represents a potential major loss of emergency assessment capability. This issue is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.73(b)(3)(xiii). Efforts are underway to restore the monitor and an update will be made when the monitor is returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The intermediate radiation monitor on the radwaste building has been returned to within tolerance. The radiation monitor has been declared functional at 1558 PDT on 10/26/2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Walker). | Intermediate Range Monitor | |
| ENS 49332 | 9 September 2013 11:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Maintenance on Technical Support Center / Operations Support Center Ventilation | Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for maintenance on the Air Handler (AMA-AH-S1) recirculation fan, outside air duct heater, and thermostat will start at approximately 0400 hours PDT on 09/09/13 and will last approximately 40 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored. * * * UPDATE FROM VERLE KESZLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 0823 EDT ON 9/15/13 * * * Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system is completed. The HVAC system has been returned to service and declared functional at 05:05 PDT on 9/15/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R4DO (Hay). | HVAC | |
| ENS 49328 | 6 September 2013 13:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack Declared Non-Functional | At 0607 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional due to a loss of power to the sample rack. The cause of the loss of power is under investigation. At 0945 hours PDT, auxiliary sampling equipment was installed to collect samples from the associated effluent release pathway. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack is non-functional, field team survey results will be used if required. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Repairs have been completed and the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack has been returned to service and declared functional at 1631 hours PDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Gaddy). | ||
| ENS 49327 | 6 September 2013 05:44:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor Out of Service | At 2244 PDT on September 5, 2013, the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector were declared non-functional due to a failure of the sample rack supply fan. At 0156 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, a temporary sample cart was installed to return the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector to service. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitoring equipment was nonfunctional, a field team survey would have been used if required. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49306 | 24 August 2013 23:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Malfunction of Stack Radiation Monitor Supporting Equipment | At 1614 hours PDT on August, 24, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - High Range and Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detectors were declared non-functional due to a loss of supporting equipment. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the affected monitors to functional status. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the non-functioning Radiation Monitoring Equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases is available. The additional personnel are pre-staged in support of the Radiation Monitoring System outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the Equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Repairs have been completed and both the Intermediate and High Range Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Hagar). | ||
| ENS 49290 | 19 August 2013 17:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Increasing Background Noise in Stack Radiation Monitor Renders It Non-Functional | At 1013 hours PDT on August 19, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector was declared nonfunctional due to increasing background noise. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector remains functional and shows no increase in effluent radioactivity. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the nonfunctioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be available. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the Radiation Monitoring System outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow-up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL STODICK TO PETE SNYDER AT 2028 EDT ON 8/19/13 * * * Initial investigation into the cause of the malfunction of the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector revealed that the condition also affected the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector. Therefore, this monitor has also been declared non-functional as of 1633 hours PDT on August 19, 2013. Compensatory measures remain in effect to provide emergency response capability for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological release through this pathway. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the affected monitors to functional status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).
The cause of the increased background noise for the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor-High Range was due to failing cooling components for the instrumentation, resulting in increased electronic background noise in the instrumentation. There has been no change in the radiation levels at the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).
Repairs have been completed and both the Intermediate and High Range Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Werner). | ||
| ENS 49193 | 16 July 2013 11:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Maintenance on Technical Support Center / Operations Support Center Ventilation | Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for replacement of charcoal filters started at 0430 hours (PDT) on 7/16/13 and will last approximately 37 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored.
This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 49193. Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for replacement of charcoal filters started at 0430 (PDT) on 7/16/13. Difficulty was experienced in system testing that resulted in exceeding the original estimate of 37 hours. Maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed as of 2001 July 19, 2013 and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Miller). | HVAC | |
| ENS 49052 | 19 May 2013 21:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Outage of Radiological and Seismic Monitoring Capability | During Refueling Outage 21, at approximately 0700 PDT on May 20, 2013 the following plant's gaseous effluent radiation monitoring systems and seismic monitoring systems will be removed from service due to a planned power outage: - Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor: Low Range; Intermediate Range; and High Range Detectors. (NOTE: The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors were removed from service as of 1421 PDT on 19 May 2013 (24 hours before the power outage) to allow for a gradual warming up of the sensors) - Rad Waste Building Vent Exhaust Low Range Radiation (Rate Meter) and Exhaust Air Monitor Radiation Indicating Switch - Turbine Building Radiation Indicating Switch and Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch - Seismic Instrument Accelerometers - Seismic Instrument Accelerographs The listed equipment is expected to be re-energized at approximately 1400 PDT on May 22, 2013. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors is expected be operational approximately 48 hours after they are re-energized to allow for sensor cooling requirements to be established. To compensate for the loss of the radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be on shift. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be deployed in accordance with guidance in site procedures and the compensatory measure instructions. To compensate for the loss of the seismic monitoring capability, an entry into the abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' will be made when an earthquake is felt in the control room or when information is received from plant personnel that an earthquake has been felt. Earthquake severity will be estimated in accordance with abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' in lieu of instrumentation being available. Information from the US Geological Survey (USGS), if available, will supplement the estimation of earthquake severity. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Columbia Seismic Instruments (Accelerometers and Accelerographs) were returned to service on May 30, 2013, at 0440 PDT. The Columbia radiation monitoring instruments listed below were returned to service on June 2, 2013, at 1814 PDT: - Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor: Low Range; Intermediate Range; and High Range Detectors - Rad Waste Building Vent Exhaust Low Range Radiation (Rate Meter) and Exhaust Air Monitor Radiation Indicating Switch - Turbine Building Radiation Indicating Switch and Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg). | ||
| ENS 49031 | 14 May 2013 22:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Power Outage at Tsc and Osc | During Refueling Outage 21, at 1502 PDT on 5/14/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility to temporary power during a bus outage impacting the normal facility power supply. The TSC and OSC will be unavailable for use for several hours until temporary power has been established. Established compensatory measures direct ERO members normally responding to either of the two impacted centers to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the bus outage. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when temporary power has been established and the facility is available for use. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM SANDRA CHRISTIANSON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1637 EDT ON 5/15/13 * * * This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 49031. Temporary power has been established to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. Normal power to TSC and OSC is expected to be restored on or about June 2, 2013 at 0600 PDT and will require a similar removal of power to the facility. A separate notification will be made when swapping off of temporary power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hay).
On 5/31/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility from temporary power back to the normal facility power supply. The duration of the power outage will last approximately 90 minutes. The TSC and OSC are unavailable for use during this time for support of emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when normal power has been reestablished and the facility is available for use. Notified the R4DO (Azua).
At 1700 hours (PDT) on 5/31/13, normal power has been reestablished to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Azua). | ||
| ENS 48912 | 10 April 2013 16:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Building Stack Access Door Not Fully Closed | On April 10, 2013, at 0952 (PDT) it was discovered that an access door to the reactor building stack was not fully closed. The door was subsequently closed by operations. On March 16, 2013, the reactor building exhaust flow rate took a step change decrease. Initially the reduction in flow was thought to be a reactor building ventilation damper issue. On April 3, 2013, after walkdown of the reactor building dampers and verification of proper system lineup, the reactor building exhaust flow rate monitor was declared inoperable and a substitute value was used for the exhaust flow rate in accordance with station procedures. Had an actual event involving an offsite release occurred during the time period from March 16, 2013, to April 3, 2013, an inaccurate reactor building exhaust flow rate might have been used to calculate offsite dose. This would only impact dose calculations at lower doses and potentially delay declaration of an Unusual Event. This is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability. At higher dose rates, the reactor building ventilation isolates and Standby Gas Treatment is operated. Standby Gas Treatment flow rate measurement would be unaffected. The intermediate and high range radiation monitors for the reactor building effluent remained fully functional and would have provided an accurate measure of activity concentration. Upon closure of the reactor building stack door, the reactor building exhaust flow rate returned to normal and emergency preparedness assessment capability was restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Building Ventilation | |
| ENS 48170 | 8 August 2012 20:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability | At 1350 PDT on 08-08-2012, during the performance of an annual surveillance, power supply ARM-E/S-603A was discovered to have out of tolerance voltage readings. ARM-E/S-603A was declared non-functional. This resulted in a loss of the ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building, due to the loss of ARM-RIS-1 through 10 (Area Radiation Monitor Radiation Indicating Switches 1 through 10). The loss of ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted to have Health Physics personnel tour the affected areas once per shift to document and trend the radiological conditions. ARM-RIS-1 and 4 thru 10 are used for EAL determinations. ARM-E/S-603A was returned to service at 1524 PDT on 08/08/2012. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48101 | 12 July 2012 20:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Power Supply Problems to Various Area Rad Monitors | At 13:15 PDT on 7-12-2012, during the performance of an annual surveillance, power supply ARM-E/S-603A was discovered to have out of tolerance voltage readings. ARM-E/S-603A was declared non-functional. This resulted in a loss of the ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building, due to the loss of ARM-RIS-1 thru 10 (area radiation monitor radiation indicating switches 1 thru 10). The loss of ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted to have Health Physics personnel tour the affected areas once per shift to document and trend the radiological conditions. ARM-RIS-1 and 4 thru 10 are used for EAL determinations. Work to return the ARM-E/S-603A to service is underway and is a high priority. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47921 | 14 May 2012 10:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out-Of-Service Due to Planned Maintenance | At 0300 PDT on 5-14-2012, planned maintenance was started on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system. The scope of work is to replace the carbon tray gaskets and perform carbon filter testing. The duration of this scheduled maintenance is planned for 26 hours. This condition represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) in that the TSC habitability might not be sustainable during events due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Station procedures provide instructions to relocate the TSC if monitoring during an emergency event indicates habitability cannot be maintained. Compensatory measures are in place to heighten awareness of responsible TSC staff following ERO activation to monitor TSC habitability in accordance with procedures and to consider TSC relocation as necessary as described in the station emergency plan. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 47681 | 21 February 2012 08:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Data Processing Network Failure Impacted Emergency Response Data System | At 0055 PST on 2/21/12, it was discovered that portions of the data processing network (eDNA) had failed. This failure resulted in the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) entering a mode of operation that caused an interruption of the ability of the ERDS transmission capabilities. At approximately 0213 PST on 2/21/12, actions were taken and all transmission capabilities were restored. The total outage time was determined to be 78 minutes. During the period that ERDS was not available, backup communications were available, This is determined to be a partial, but major loss of emergency assessment capability, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)(xiii) as 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portions of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system)'. The cause of the data processing network (eDNA) and ERDS failure is under investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD GARCIA TO PETE SNYDER AT 1950 EDT ON 5/3/12 * * * This event was revisited for a formal reportability assessment and concluded to be not reportable since the capability to transmit data of interest to the NRC was available via the ENS at all times during the ERDS outage. In addition the ERDS system is noted as a supplement to the ENS in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Given the limited duration of the event and availability of ENS for data transmission, no major loss of emergency assessment capability occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 47429 | 10 November 2011 22:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration System During Maintenance | At 1439 PST on 11-10-2011, while performing maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency filtration system, it was discovered that replacement gaskets required to restore the system were undersized and that the system could not be restored. Specifically the replacement gaskets were determined to be too small. All spare gaskets onsite were examined and determined to suffer from the same undersized condition. Prior to discovery of the undersized gaskets, the maintenance plan allowed for prompt system restoration in the event of an emergency. The current lack of a suitable replacement gasket has resulted in a condition which represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) in that TSC habitability might not be sustainable during certain events due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Station procedures provide instructions to relocate the TSC if monitoring during an emergency event indicates that habitability cannot be maintained. Compensatory measures are being developed (while the restoration work is ongoing) to heighten awareness of responsible TSC staff following ERO activation to monitor TSC habitability in accordance with procedures and to consider potential TSC relocation as necessary as described in the station emergency plan. Work is underway to return the TSC filtration system to functional status with a high priority. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance work on the TSC emergency filtration system has been completed. A post functional test has been performed and it has been evaluated that the TSC emergency filtration system's function has been restored as of 1718 PST on 11/12/2011. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R4DO (Hay). | ||
| ENS 47441 | 5 November 2011 20:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability Due to Network Isolation Device Failure | At 12:30 PDT on 11-5-2011, a network isolation device failed, resulting in interruption of the feed of plant data to emergency response facilities as well as loss of Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) transmission capabilities. At approximately 05:00 PST on 11-6-11, actions were initiated to reboot the system and capability was restored at 06:30 PST on 11-6-11. On 11-15-11, the time of the original device failure was identified and it was determined the total outage time was approximately 19 hours (including accounting for the change from daylight to standard time). It was further concluded this represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability. Emergency assessment equipment in the control room was available throughout the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 47343 | 11 October 2011 16:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Response Data System Inoperable | At 0915 on 10-11-2011, Columbia Generating Station's (CGS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) system was taken out of service for planned maintenance activities. Assessment of the ERDS outage considered the anticipated duration of the outage along with the knowledge that the system would not be recoverable within an hour of a declared event (Alert or higher) during this maintenance period. Station personnel concluded the planned maintenance to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' To that end, a call was made to the NRC's Headquarters Operational Office (HOO) at 09:22 PDT on 10-11-2011. Feedback received during that call was that the event was a loggable entry but not recordable and no EN number was assigned. Efforts to fully restore ERDS following the maintenance have not yet been successful and the actual duration of the work has substantially exceeded initial estimates for planned duration. Work is ongoing to restore the system to full capability. Restoration plans include a functional test coordinated with the NRC ERDS center to demonstrate the system performs as required. This follow-up call is made to update the original call placed 10-11-2011 and to affirm that the current lack of a functional ERDS system represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability consistent with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Previously credited compensatory measures remain in effect and rely on existing CGS Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data via the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Members of the CGS Emergency Response Organization have been trained on contingencies required during an Emergency Plan activation with loss of ERDS capability. No other emergency response functions are impacted by this ongoing work. The resident inspector has been briefed. A follow up notification will be made when the maintenance work has been completed.
The licensee returned ERDS to service at 0245 PDT on 10/16/2011. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Whitten). | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 48005 | 17 September 2011 19:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Major Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Degraded Dose Projection | On September 17, 2011, a root cause analysis identified that errors in the dose projection software gain factor associated with the high range stack monitor were introduced in 2000 and had the potential to produce inaccurate dose projection results. The resulting condition could have impacted the ability to accurately assess ongoing releases and determine appropriate protective measures for the public. The gain factors were corrected in October 2011 and dose projection capabilities have been restored. This condition was not originally recognized as being reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the limited nature of the impact to a small portion of the radiological effluent EALs, however, it has been recently determined to be reportable. This late identification of reportability has been entered into our corrective action program. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45671 | 2 February 2010 03:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Unavailable for Planned Hvac Maintenance | At 1913 on 02/01/2010, the Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service for planned maintenance. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Maintenance will include replacement of carbon filter media in the TSC HVAC system. The total duration of the maintenance activities is expected to be approximately 24 hours. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the outage and provided instructions for responding if needed. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by this maintenance work. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when the maintenance work has been completed.
Maintenance was completed and the TSC returned to service at 2328 PST on 02/03/2010. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Gaddy). | HVAC | |
| ENS 45487 | 10 November 2009 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Tsc Due to Planned Mantenance | At 0425 on 11/10/09, the Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service for planned maintenance. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii). Maintenance will include replacement of a heating element in the HVAC system and replacement of an iodine radiation sampling instrument. The total duration of the maintenance activities is expected to be approximately 20 hours. Direction has been provided to the ERO (Emergency Response Officer) that should the TSC need to activated, TSC staff should report to the main control room in accordance with established procedures. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by this maintenance work. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.
Licensee stated that the Technical Support Center (TSC) is now back in service. Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Jeff Clark) | HVAC | |
| ENS 45111 | 1 June 2009 23:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Tsc Air Conditioning Unit Compressor | On 5/20/09, the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning unit compressor failed to restart following refueling outage electrical bus maintenance. On 5/31/09, the compressor was discovered to be shorted to ground. The short renders the air conditioning unit nonfunctional and at 1650 on 6/1/09 the nonfunctional air conditioner was determined to adversely affect TSC habitability based on meteorological conditions. TSC filtration capabilities are not affected by this problem. The nonfunctional air conditioner leaves the TSC in a degraded state; however, the TSC is currently habitable and available for service. Should the TSC need to be activated, habitability of the TSC will be monitored per existing plant procedures. Relocation of the TSC to an alternate location would be performed in accordance with station procedures as necessary to ensure continued TSC functionality. The control room and all other emergency response facilities are unaffected by the TSC chiller outage. Work instructions to repair the chiller are in review and work is expected to commence on June 2nd and proceed with high priority. A follow-up notification will be made when the TSC chiller has been restored. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC resident has been notified.
Repairs to the TSC air conditioning unit have been completed and it has been placed in service. There is no longer any challenge to TSC habitability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R4DO (Cain) notified. | ||
| ENS 41737 | 31 May 2005 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss and Subsequent Restoration of Emergency Response Data System (Erds) | At about 10:00 (PDT) on May 31, 2005, plant personnel discovered that the plant's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was not able to transmit data to the NRC. The problem was discovered during a scheduled test to validate changes to the Columbia Generating Station ERDS data point library. This proposed test included initiating the ERDS and synchronizing to the NRC system. During the initiation of this test, plant personnel discovered that the ERDS was not able to initiate a connection with the NRC system. The ERDS was subsequently returned to service at 17:15 PDT on May 31, 2005. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System |