RIS 2006-10, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-010 - Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph Iii.G.2 Operator Manual Actions
| ML061650389 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/2006 |
| Revision: | 0 |
| From: | Ho Nieh NRC/NRR/ADRA/DPR |
| To: | |
| Klein A, NRR/DRA, 415-3477 | |
| References | |
| WITS 20060060 RIS-06-010 | |
| Download: ML061650389 (9) | |
1 EGM 98-02, "Enforcement Guidance Memorandum-Disposition of Violations of Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.LRegarding Circuit Failures," (Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML003710123)was incorporated into Section 8.1.7.1 of the NRC Enforcement Manua During the 1980s, many licensees used Thermo-Lag 330-1 as a fire barrier material to satisfy the requirements ofAppendix R, paragraph II In December 1992, the staff issued Generic Letter 92-08, "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers" thatdiscussed issues with the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier materia June 30, 2006NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2006-10REGULATORY EXPECTATIONS WITH APPENDIX R PARAGRAPHIII.G.2 OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who havepermanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
INTENT
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS)to provide licensees with the staff's expectations, schedule and enforcement policy for resolving issues related to withdrawal of the operator manual actions rulemaking and the subsequent termination of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 98-02 It is expected thatrecipients will review the information for applicability and consider actions, as appropriat Nospecific action or written response is required on the part of an addressee.In particular, the information in this RIS should be useful to licensing and engineering staffs atcurrently operating reactors in achieving compliance with paragraph III.G.2 of Title 10 of theCode of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection Program forNuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." This RIS may reduce the numberof exemption requests predicted by the industry in response to the withdrawal of the operator manual actions rulemaking.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In the year 2000, the NRC implemented the Reactor Oversight Process which includedsystematic inspections of licensees' safe shutdown capabilit During these inspections, fireprotection inspectors noticed that many licensees had not upgraded or replaced Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier material2 or had not provided the required separation distance between redundant safe shutdown trains, in order to satisfy the requirements in paragraph III.G.2 ofAppendix R to 10 CFR Part 5 Some licensees compensated for the lack of or degraded fire barriers by relying on operator manual actions which had not been reviewed and approved by the NRC through the 10 CFR 50.12 exemption proces Other licensees misinterpretedparagraph III.G.1 to allow the use of operator manual actions where redundant safe shutdowntrains are in the same fire area in lieu of the means specified in paragraph III. The inspectors found that some licensees relied upon operator manual actions, instead of theoptions specified in paragraph III.G.2, as a permanent solution to the Thermo-Lag 330-1 firebarrier issue without seeking prior staff approva Some licensees claimed that paragraph III.G.1 allowed the use of operator manual actions when redundant trains are in the same fire area and others claimed that operator manual actions are allowed because paragraph III.G.2does not specifically forbid their us However, in 1998 the NRC issued Confirmatory Orders to some licensees to ensure thatadequate progress was made towards implementing corrective actions for Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier Each Order was effective immediately upon issuance and became part of the operating license for each plant involve These Orders remain in effect unless the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, relaxes or rescinds, in writing, any provisions of an Order upon a showing by the licensee of good caus Between 1998 and 2001 the licensees that received the Orders sent NRC letters indicating completion of the ordered Thermo-Lag corrective action To date, none of the Orders issued for Thermo-Lag fire barriers have been relaxed or rescinde Therefore, each Order continues to remain in effec Compliance with the Orders continue to be verified through the reactor oversight proces On November 14, 2001, the staff conducted training on this issue with the regional inspectors. In response to a verbal request from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the staff sent a copy of the lesson plan by letter dated November 29, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML013370302). On January 11, 2002, NEI sent a letter to the NRC claiming the regulations do not prohibit the useof operator manual actions to achieve safe shutdown (ADAMS Accession No. ML020300069).
The staff responded to NEI in a letter on May 16, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML021410026).
As a result of NEI's contention, the Office of the General Counsel reviewed the staff responseto NEI and had no legal objection to the staff positio The Committee To Review Generic Requirements also reviewed the letter and concluded that the staff response did not containnew staff positions (ADAMS Accession No. ML021750218). In 2003, the Commission determined that amending Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 was themost effective and efficient way to give licensees the option to utilize acceptable operatormanual actions in lieu of the separation or barrier requirements in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix On March 7, 2005, the NRC published the proposed rule in the Federal Registerfor comment (70 FR 10901). The proposed rule would have revised paragraph III.G.2 to allowlicensees to implement acceptable operator manual actions in lieu of the separation or barrier requirements after documenting that they met the regulatory acceptance criteri Most of thecomments received opposed the proposed rul Industry stakeholders indicated that the proposed rule would probably lead to a large number of exemption request Consequently, the staff concluded that the rule would not achieve its objective of effectiveness and efficienc
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUE
On March 6, 2006, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (71 FR 11196)withdrawing the proposed rule to allow the use of operator manual actions in lieu of the methods provided in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix Licensees are expected to ensure thattheir facility is in compliance with the licensing basis and with regulatory requirement .0 Compliance Expectations RegulationsParagraph III.G.2 of Appendix R does not list operator manual actions as a means of ensuringthat one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage. Specifically, paragraph III.G.2 ofAppendix R requires that, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation-as a result of hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground-of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hotshutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:(a)separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating, (b)separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet withno intervening combustibles or fire hazards and with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area, and(c)enclosure of cables and equipment in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating and with firedetectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area.Consequently, unless alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is provided or an exemptionfrom paragraph III.G.2 is granted, circuits which could cause maloperation or prevent operationof redundant trains for post-fire safe shutdown and are located in the same fire area must be protected in accordance with paragraph III. In many cases, recent inspections found that amanual action was credited-in lieu of one of the means specified in paragraph III.G.2-toensure a train is free of fire damage when redundant trains were in the same fire are According to the Statements of Consideration for Appendix R, issued on November 19, 1980(45 FR 76602), "Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features are specified rather than thedesign basis fir Three different means for protecting the safe shutdown capability outside ofcontainment are acceptable." This position has been consistent since Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.48(b) became effective onFebruary 19, 198 NRC letter to NEI, dated May 16, 2002, (ADAMS Accession No.ML021410026), presentations in public meetings, proposed operator manual action rulemaking documents, and generic communications such as RIS 2005-30, "Clarification of Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Regulatory Requirements," dated December 20, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML053360069), reiterated this positio Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions in Second TrainAs discussed during a March 1, 2006, public meeting, if one of the redundant trains in the samefire area is free of fire damage by one of the specified means in paragraph III.G.2, then the useof operator manual actions, or other means necessary, to mitigate fire-induced operation or maloperation to the second train may be considered in accordance with the licensee's fire protection program and license condition since paragraph III.G.2 has been satisfie .0 Alternatives to Paragraph III.G.2 Those licensees required to comply with section III.G of Appendix R have other optionsavailable in lieu of complying with paragraph III. .1 Paragraph III.G.3 Paragraph III.G.2 allows the licensee to use the alternative shutdown method described inparagraph III.G.3 of Appendix R if the licensee cannot meet the requirements of paragraphIII. .2 10 CFR 50.48(c)Licensees may adopt the performance-based option in 10 CFR 50.48(c). Paragraph (c) allowsreactor licensees to voluntarily comply with the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection approaches in National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), "Performance- Based Standard For Fire Protection For Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition (with limited exceptions stated in the rule language). Compliance with the performance- based option in 10 CFR 50.48(c) would minimize the need for future exemption requests with respect to operator manual actions. As stated and referenced by the Federal Register (71 FR 19905) on April 18, 2006, if a licenseesubmitted a letter of intent by December 31, 2005, to adopt 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC willexercise enforcement discretion for existing noncompliance that could reasonably be corrected under 10 CFR 50.48(c). For those noncompliances identified during the licensee's transition process, this enforcement discretion policy will be in effect for up to 3 years from the date specified by the licensee in their letter of intent to adopt the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(c),and will continue to be in place, without interruption, until the NRC acts on the licensee'samendment request to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c). During the discretion period licensees are required to maintain their current fire protection program, including maintaining appropriate compensatory measures for identified noncomplianc In addition to the 3-year discretion period, the staff may grant additional extensions to the discretion policy time for a specific plant item(s) with adequate justification (e.g., modification can only be implemented during an outage) on a case-by-case basis. If, after submitting the letter of intent to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and before submitting thelicense amendment request, the licensee decides not to complete the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), the licensee must submit a letter stating their intent to retain their existinglicense basis and withdrawing their letter of intent to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c). Following the licensee's withdrawal from the transition process, the staff, as a matter of practice, will not take enforcement action against any noncompliance that the licensee corrected during the transition process and would, on a case-by-case basis, consider refraining from taking action if reasonable and timely corrective actions are in progress (e.g., an exemption has beensubmitted for NRC review). Noncompliance that the licensee has not corrected as well as noncompliance identified after the date of the above withdrawal letter, will be dispositioned inaccordance with normal enforcement practices. Exemptions From Paragraph III.G.2 for Plants Licensed to Operate Before January 1, 1979The regulations in 10 CFR Part 50.48(b) impose the requirements of paragraph III.G.2 ofAppendix R on plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979 (pre-1979 licensees). As originally issued, 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," allowed licensees to request an exemption from compliance with one or more of the provisions of Appendix R if the licensee justified the exemption on the basis that the required modifications would not enhance fire protection safetyin the facility or that the modifications might be detrimental to overall facility safet The staff's current basis for approving an exemption is provided in 10 CFR 50.12 "SpecificExemptions." In order for the NRC to approve such an exemption request, a licensee wouldhave to identify all relevant credited operator manual actions by fire area or fire scenario. The NRC has reviewed and granted exemption requests for the use of operator manual actionsin lieu of the separation criteria of paragraph III.G.2 where the exemption criteria were met. These exemptions are specific to the licensee and the situation discussed in the exemption. Exemptions granted for specific conditions cannot be applied under other condition Although the rationale for an exemption may appear to be applicable to a similar situation for a second licensee, the staff cautions that NRC review and approval by issuance of an exemption wouldbe necessary for the second license The appropriate regulatory vehicle (in the absence of a rulemaking or plant-specific Order) toprovide dispensation from compliance with fire protection requirements is the issuance of an exemption under 10 CFR Part 50.1 Inspection reports, meeting minutes, and letters from licensees are examples of documents that do not provide dispensation from compliance with applicable fire protection requirement For pre-1979 licensees, a staff decision in a safety evaluation report (SER) that approves theuse of operator manual actions, in lieu of one of the means specified in paragraph III.G.2, doesnot eliminate the need for an exemptio Pre-1979 licensees who have SERs, but not acorresponding exemption, which approve manual actions should request an exemption under 10 CFR Part 50.12, citing the special circumstances of section 50.12(a)(2)(ii), citing the SER as the safety basis, and confirming that the safety basis established in the SER remains vali The staff expects to grant the exemption on these bases without further revie .4 Plants Licensed To Operate on or After January 1, 1979 Since plants licensed to operate on or after January 1, 1979 (post-1979 licensees), are notrequired to meet the requirements of paragraph III.G.2, a staff decision in an SER thatapproves the use of manual operator actions does not require exemption under 10 CFR 50.12.
Post-1979 licensees may be requested to demonstrate, as part of the NRC Reactor OversightProcess, that the use of an operator manual action would not adversely affect the ability toachieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire consistent with their licens RIS 2006-10