ML20140A269
| ML20140A269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/19/2020 |
| From: | William Allen Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| To: | Dawson S, Lehman K, Peterson B, Tursa M Portland General Electric Co, Sargent & Lundy |
| Allen W | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20140A269 (1) | |
Text
NRC FORM 699 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (11-2017)
CONVERSATION RECORD NAME OF PERSON(S)/TITLE CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU DATE OF CONTACT TYPE OF CONVERSATION Portland General Electric: Mark Tursa & Kim Lehman 05/12/2020 E-MAIL Sargent & Lundy: Bob Peterson & Steve Dawson TELEPHONE E-MAIL ADDRESS TELEPHONE NUMBER INCOMING OUTGOING ORGANIZATION DOCKET NUMBER(S)
Portland General Electric (PGE) 72-17 LICENSE NAME AND NUMBER(S) MAIL CONTROL NUMBER(S)
SNM-2509 SUBJECT External Explosion Information Discussion
SUMMARY
AND ACTION REQUIRED (IF ANY)
NRC
Participants:
Chris Allen, Rao Tammara, Kenneth See and Donald Chung The call began at approximately 1:00 P.M. eastern standard time. NRC staff asked if PGE could provide sample input and output files for calculations referenced in the amendment request (ML20083G798). PGE agreed to place both Mathcad files and Microsoft Excel spreadsheets used to evaluate the external explosion hazards discussed in the amendment request into an electronic reading room. NRC staff also inquired if PGE had evaluated if a toxic level of chemicals might reach the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
PGE responded that a toxic gas event had not been evaluated because, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 7 (ML070370123), there are no off-normal or credible accidents that require operator action within a prescribed time period; therefore, a toxic gas event would not affect the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. NRC staff then asked if the heat flux generated by an explosion had been evaluated as part of the analysis. PGE responded that they had not because of the following reasons. For an off-site explosion, the distance to the ISFSI would cause the generated heat flux to dissipate to insignificant levels. If chemicals were released due to an off-site transportation accident, no heat flux would be generated because either the wind conditions would not allow a vapor cloud to arrive at the ISFSI or, the chemical concentration of any vapor cloud arriving at the ISFSI would be below the lower explosive limit. NRC staff also questioned PGE about the probability calculations in the application. After some discussion on this topic, PGE committed to reviewing the logic used in the probability calculations, and the NRC staff committed to reviewing their interpretation of the guidance. The call concluded at approximately 1:45 P.M. eastern standard time.
NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION Chris Allen SIGNATURE DATE OF SIGNATURE 05/19/2020 NRC Form 699 (11-2017) Page 1 of 1