14:35 Feb 16, 2017
Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Interlock Failure
This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment airlock and identified that both doors of the airlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the airlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the airlock were open for approximately 5 seconds.
With both doors open, Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 22.214.171.124.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable in accordance with TS 126.96.36.199. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained more negative than -0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock.The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Illinois (NRC Region 3)
|10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material|
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
|Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.68 h-0.0283 days <br />-0.00405 weeks <br />-9.31464e-4 months <br />)|
|Opened:||Mark S. Smith|
13:54 Feb 16, 2017
|NRC Officer:||Steve Sandin|
|Last Updated:||Feb 16, 2017|
|52556 - NRC Website|