05000334/FIN-2016004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Inoperable A River Water Train |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for FENOCs failure to assure that activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with procedures. Specifically, FENOC failed to follow NOP-OP-1001, Clearance/Tagging Program, and clearance 1W11-30-MNM-002 when removing the clearance for the A bay of the main intake structure. This resulted in disabling the automatic start capability of the standby C river water pump and made the A river water train inoperable and unavailable. FENOCs immediate corrective action was to rack the breaker for the A river water pump to the disconnect position, which cleared the annunciator and restored operability to the A train of river water. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2016-14253. The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, FENOC incorrectly racked the A river water pump breaker onto the 1AE 4160 volts alternating current (VAC) safety bus while the C river water pump was already racked onto the bus. This caused the A train of river water to be inoperable and unavailable because the automatic start capability of the C pump was disabled. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system and/or function, an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or an actual loss of function of one non-technical specification train designated as high safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because the operators did not plan for the possibility of mistakes and did not implement appropriate error-reduction tools [H.12]. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000334/2016004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Burkett J Deboer J Furia J Krafty J Schussler K Carrington R Rolph S Horvitz S Kennedy C Safouri |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2016004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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