05000302/FIN-2009002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Take Timely and Effective Corrective Actions Resulted in a Repeat Failure of a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve due to Magnesium Rotor Oxidation/Corrosion |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for failure to take timely and effective corrective actions to prevent a second failure of a main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) due to corrosion of the valve actuators magnesium rotor. Specifically, corrective actions associated with a similar failure of a MFIV in 2005 were not enhanced when additional information became available through NRC Information Notice (IN) 2006-026, Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor-Operator Valve Actuators. As a result, in December 2008, a MFIV failed to operate due to magnesium rotor degradation. Corrective actions for the failure of FWV- 30 include: installation of a new motor; development and implementation of engineering changes to replace the stations motor-operated valve (MOV) magnesium rotor motors with aluminum rotor motors (when available); ensuring the engineering staff is trained on effective correction action plans; and revision of MOV maintenance procedures to include information obtained from IN 2006-026 prior to the next MOV inspections. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment availability attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and resulted in a MFIV being inoperable for a period of time greater than allowed by ITS. Since the valve would not have performed its safety function for greater than the ITS allowed outage time, a SDP Phase 2 analysis was required. Based upon the Phase 2 results, a regional senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation. The Phase 3 evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). A contributing cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution with an operating experience component (P.2(b)). Specifically, the licensee did not implement and institutionalize, in a timely manner, IN 2006-26 in station procedures and training programs associated with magnesium rotor inspections |
| Site: | Crystal River  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000302/2009002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Reyes T Morrissey S Rose R Aiello D Mas-Penaranda R Berryman J Hamman M Sykes A Alen |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Crystal River - IR 05000302/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Crystal River) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Crystal River)
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