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Paper Entitled, Effectiveness of Early Evacuation of Small Areas,Shelter & Relocation in Reducing Severe Accident Consequences, Presented at Fifth Intl Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety on 840909-13.Related Info Encl

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]Ef7 Reprint from: " Proceedings of the Fif th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety", Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center,Karlsruhe, ,

Federal Republic of Germany, Sept. 9-13,1984.

I Effectiveness of Early Evacuation of Small Areas, Shelter and Relocation in Reducing Severe Accident Consequences James A. Martin, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 p

ABSTRACT _

[.

t il Relatively moderate scale energency response actions by the public can provide substantial reductions in the number and chance of early and continuing health effects in the event of a major release of radionuclides from a nuclear power plant. _

In the event of a core melt accident scenario, early, precau-tionary evacuation of areas within 2 to 3 miles and sheltering [

r elsewhere in the early time frame can substantially reduce the In [

risk of early fatalities--to close to zero in soma cases. -

the further event of an actual major release of radioactivity to the atmosphere, expeditious relocation from highly contam-inated areas would be necessary. This paper will discuss the calculations and emergency response assumptions that lead to

' these insights. Since emergency response is unlikely, the applications of these insights are more likely to be found

• in other areas such as emergency planning, siting and pro-babilistic risk analyses.

Light water nuclear reactor (LWR) risk studies in the United States have con-ventionally assumed evacuation by the public from an area withinThis {0 miles studyof a nuclear power plant in the event of a large accidental release.

has examined the benefits of a protactive action strategy employing an early evacuation of a relatively small crea near the site, plus sheltering by the public in the remaining areas, and relocation from highly contaiminated areas (hot spots) in the intennediate time frame. l release.

The calculations were performed conditional upon a postulated to be characteristic of the most severe accidental releases possible from a u8 g n-o light water reactor and would result from a core melt accid fails early, and material is released directly to the atmosphere in a puff.

Q& The expected frequency of a release gf this nature has been estimated t g g about one per 100,000 reactor-years.

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1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE DECISIONS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS -

PREDETERMINED CONDITIONS FOR PREDETERMINED ACTIONSm James A Martin, Jr. I J l

- INTRODUCTION l One objective of emergency planning should be to make as many protective action de-cisions as possible before emergency situations occur, thereby mininazing the number of l .

decisions that would have to be made in an emergency. Most radiological emergency response l

plans today forego protective action decision making until an incideas is in progress. In contrast, current emergency planning guidance calls for certain key ftspOnse decisions to be made in the planning process. Herein, various facets of this action planning will be explored, radiological bases will be developed from this perspective, the action planning that is feasible in a preincident time frame will be bounded, and the application of the

! decision process will be illustrated by examples. De emphasis will be on public protective action decisions for nuclear power plant accidents, including nonaction decisions as well as

_a_ction decisions made in the planning stage.

Some of the following points will be disconcerting for some readers, at least initially.

The art is developing and is incomple'e. %e emphasis on the provisions of nonradiological, in-plant bases for public protective actions has been found to be especu!!y unsettling for planners more familiar with older recommendations which were based exclusively on off-site monitoring as a precursor to protective action decisions. Their fvA. ace is requested.

Major impediments to the implementation of this art exist at two ends of the protective i action spectrum. At the lower end, health physicists find it difficult to decide today that for some levels of future radiological releases, no protective actions in the public domain would be warranted. Nuclear engineers have little difficulty in this regard; mdeed this aspect meets with favorable response.

At the upper end of the protective action response spectrum, when public evacuation decisions are to be made in the planning process, obstacles to decisions are abundant. Many nuclear engineers believe, in good faith and perhaps correctly, that evar==tions by the public would never be necessary. Health physicists, meteorologists, and radiologice! monitoring specialists are discom '.d here, also, for two reasons: (a) basing plaraed initial protective actions on plant parameters, even in the absence of radiation to be measured in the envi-ronment, is counter to the prevailing " monitor first, then act" planned (postpoced) decision process and (b) under the current concept the facility operators could cause the initiation of l precautionary protective actions, including evacuations, in the public domain. This appears to place the plant operator in the position of possibly usurping the role of public health officials. As will be seen, this is not the case. Rather, under highly resencted circumstances the plant operators would implement protective action Ecisions made earlier, perhapsyears earlier, by plant a_n_d_pu_blic health and safety officials.

He currently developing art leads to very simple, yet not simplistic, unmediate protective action criteria. Under the current scheme, initiation of protective actions in the public domain, because of accidents at nucleat power plants, should be extremely rare. t,if such were should a majo_r ever necessary or desirable, public protective action .hould commence

• Based in part on a prewmarma at the Heahh Physics Society Annual Meeting San Fimmetsco,CA., June 77-July 2,1976.

" The opinions, findings, conclusions, and .---

U .-- of the author do not ===nly reflect omcial polwy of the Nuclear Regulatory Comrmssion.

A

144 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs accident scenano ever develop. It is possible that g4teanird protective actions, including evacuatacas, would be completed at some future time well before public health officials would assemble, or even be aware of a problem, and even in the total absence (postaccident

• assessment) of a major radiological release to the environment. Such occurrences should also be extremely rare to nonexistent.

Thus, under this scheme the public should not he called upon for protective actigns unrw+uarily, perhaps never. But if precautionary prMve action is ever necessary or

', desirable, such action should occur early, well before radiolonical exposures in the envi-i r=~ae would occur. Ti.is is the balance being sought in the following, basic radiation protection bases will be explored first. Examples to

< illustrate the current art will follow.

' PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES w

• One decision aid for radiological emergency planning is a Protective Action Guide (PAG),

which is a projected absorbed dose to individuals in the general population which would

> warrent protective action following a contaminating event. It can be helpful to make such 9 projections for events which are only postulated. One can, for example, estimate the activity that would have to be released to the atmosphere, without a significant wind shift during

[ the release period, to result in doses equal to PAGs offsite. A comparison of these calculated activities and inventories of radionuclides in plant systems can then be made to predetermine those system failures which could possibly lead to PAGs and those that could not, as a g-means to assess the light water nuclear power reactors (LWR) system implications of PAGs.

3 ,

The general approach can be extended easily to other fuel cycle activities and applied to specific sites.

At the outset a few basic perspectives are worth stating explicitly. First, it must be recognized that a Protective Action Guide is not an observable parameter. By its very definition a PAG is a projected dose. There are no projected dose meters or instruments.

PAGs are conceptual guides rath:r than operational tools. Protective actions are undertaken based on observables related to what is occurring at a given time and the rate at which observables are changing. Current emergency planning emphasizes emergency action levels y

in (EALs) rather than the protective action guides on which the EALs are based. EALs are M gnianined observables which should prompt the initiation of specific predetermined in actions should they ever be observed. The actions would not necessarily be protective; they c could be simply notification actions, or assessment, corrective or mobilization actions, dependmg on the predetemuned level or scoping of the threat or problem related to particular y EALs. In fact, for many EALs developed to date it has been predetermined that protective io> actions in the public domain would not be warranted; this is an important emergency man-agement decision made in the planning stage.

'"' - References I to 5 provide vanous protective action guidance for emerEency planners.

" ' Table I lists doses presented in these re,ferences that do or could have the connotation of R being a trigger level for emergency protective action, should they ever be observed. The R British Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) are independent of the pathway from source to individual. The U.S. Federal Radiation Council (FRC) doses are for the milk and food pathways. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) doses are for the extema!

.' gamma and inhalation pathways. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) doses are

al proposed for human food and animal feed. (The FDA also provided EALs for I-131, Cs-not 137, Sr-89, and St-90 for environmental contammation levels). Herein, only the whole body or and thyrrid doses due to atmospheric releases will be considered, and PAGs of 5 and 25

as rem, respectively, will be used as representative of the guidance available. An appropnate sin caveat will acknowledge the important preventive PAG pmposed by the FDA (see footnote nw for Table I).

1 t

145 l Table 1 DOSE COMMITMENT GUIDES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

• EPA litC Brislah IDA*

PAGs FAGS ERIJ FAGS Catagery 1 Whole body 1-5 15 10 0.5-5 5-25 30 30 1.5--15 Thyroid sone Fadnswal tissue - - 30 0.5-5

- 15 10 0.5-5 Marrow

- - 60 0.5-5 Skia (beta)

- - 10 0.5-5 Gonads

- - 30 0.5-5 Lang

- - 30 0.5-5 Other

• Dose u

- = in rem.

• FDA PAGs art for food and agricultural pathwsys. At the lower PAG. milk. producing animals should be removed frorn pasture.

At the higher PAG. milk should be removed from commerce.

Table 2 MINIMUM ACTIVITY INVENTORIES (CURIES) UNDER POOR METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR PAGs OF 5 REM (WB) AND 25 REM (THY)

Searce terna (CIf" w . _ , - N eo Dese Factor

• 25 rum S rum IrenMa'l (Thyrold) tWhole hady) isotope Fathway Cl-see) 115.000 2.2 1 131 Mith 395 630.

tahalation 8280 30.

1-133 Mith 174 440.

Inhalabon 0 033 7.550.000. 1.580.000.

Cloud gamma I

• RemO-sec/m' concentranon<sposure in air. Chikh thyeuid dose conumament factors. Factor for cloud gamma dose taken as ll6 semi. infinite cloud muodel done factor for 0.8 MeV gammas *

• At X/Q' = 10-* sec/m' (e.g. 10 m sticane height. F stabihty. 2 aus med. 2 km downwindL

• Typical annual releases (for compenson):

BWR 100.000 Ci noble gases; I Ci radeiodine.

PWR 200 Ci noble gases; 20 mci radoodme.

PAGs AND ACITVITY REI. EASES Table 2 lists the total activities of noble gases and radioiodines wtuch, if released under extremely adverse atmospheric dispersion conditions, could lead to offsite dose commitments

" of 5 rem whole body or 25 rem thyroid via the external (cloud) gamma, inhalation and milk pathways. For this example a dairy farm was assumed at 2 km downwind from a release point. In application, site-specific calculations would be made. The caMelanal procedure used to derive these inventories is presented and discussed briefly in Appendix A.

I *

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i 146 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs

,i I Table 3 i TYPICAL INVENTORIES FOR A IG00 MW(e) NUCLEAR

, POWER REACTOR 1 leventeeles (cuetes)

Caps

• t a,=as== Feel i

8 x 10' l.4 x 10"

' Core with 0.5-hr decay 3.6 x 10'IAV) 3.8 x 10"(AV)

- Spent fuel storage pool l.3 x 10'(MAX) 1.3 x 10* (MAX) 3,1 x 108 Shippmg eask 2.2 x 10' 2.2 x 10' 2 x 10' Fuel assembly with 3Hisy decay

' 9.3 x 10' PWR waste gas storage tank 5.5 x 10' BwR waste gas decay Ime

. " Gap" is a euphemism for the gas spaces in the fuel pellets and between the b .

fuel pellets and the tube fetaddmg) holdmg the fuel pellets.

e Except for the cloud gamma dose, the semi infinite cloud model* was used for the cal-7

, culations. For the cloud gamma dose under the assumed rneteorological dispersion conditions t (Class F atmospheric dispersion with a ground level release), the semi-infinite cloud dose m

te factor for 0.8 MeV gamma rays was reduced by a factor of 6 to account for the finite extent

• of the cloud

• and the decrease of dose with depth in the body. All other assumptions used are listed in the table. As shown in the table, releases of about 2.2 or 630 Ci of I-131 could lead to doses of 25 rem (thyroid) via the milk and inhalation pathways, respectively. A y release of 1,510,000 Ci of gamma emitters could lead to a 5 rem (whole body) dose via the cloud gamma pathway under the assumed poor dispersion conditions. This presumes that ri no shelter or other protective measures were to be taken and that the exposed individual c was to remain on the centerline of the cloud during its entire passage. For the milk pathway.

dairy animals were presumed to graze uninterrupted on pasture contaminated by the center L of the cloud. These are all very conservative assumptions, such that, for average meteor-ological conditions, considerably greater radioactivity would have to be released for a PAG ej to be exceeded at about 2 km. Inventories of these radionuclides in plant systems which are 2 less than those noted would not induce doses greater than PAGs.

et L

RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORIES IN LWR SYSTEMS n

!! Estimates of inventories in LWR systems were collected for companson to the activities si listed in Table 2. These are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Many of these data were taken r dhetly from tables in References 7 through 10. Those estimated by this author, using data i in these references, are as follows. The activity in a boiling water reactor (BWR) waste gas

,f treatment system (WGTS) was calculated using the condenser off-gas radionuclide mix and iy release rates (2 Ci/see total) presented in Reference 9. It was assumed that no gases escape 31 from the WGTS and the resulting equilibrium activity is listed in Tables 3 and 4. All other data in Table 3 were obtained from Reference 7. In Table 4, the core gap activity was taken tt to be 1% of the total noble gas and radioiodine inventory in Reference 7; this is consistent

with assumptions in Reference 7. The maximum radioiodine activity in the demineralizer in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) after a primary coolant purge (after shutdown) was

c. estimated to be identical to that in the primary coolant with 0.1% being passed to the waste p gas storage tank (WGST). For the noble gases, it was assurned that only 0.1% would rem j

in the demineralizer, with virtually 100% being passed to the WGST. The radioiodine activity listed in Table 4 for the BWR steam line was estimated from measured steam line c ss tration data presented in Reference 10 for four operating BWRs. These data were normalized I i

, > t a Table 4 TYPICAL NOBLE GAS AND HAIDGEN INVENTORIES FOR A 1000 MW(e) NUCLEAR POWER PLANT .

leventeries (cwies) 6== Nehle genes Heissess Care with 0.5-hr decay 3.4 x 10' 7.2 x 17 GAPS (!% Cort) 3.4 x 10' 7.2 x le Spent fuel uorage pool 5.8 x 10* (Av.) 1.8 x 10*(Av.)

4.6 x 10'(W) 5.3 x 10' th)

GAPS 1.7 x 10' (Av.) 9. x l& tAv.)

1.4 x 10'(Max) 2.6 x 10$th)

Fuel assembly with 3<tay decay 4.1 x 10' 2.7 x 10' GAPS 4.1 x 10' 2.7 x 10*

PWR wage gas morage tank 9.5 x 10" 8.

aher pnmary coolant purge PwR demineraluer aher 9.5 x 10' l. x IO*

Pnmary coolant purge BWR sacamtme (10' Itvhr) 10' Cilhr 25 CVhr BWR wnue gas treatment sysaem 5500 0.25 Shipping cask - gap activity 1.7 x 10' (Av.) l ( Av.)

1.4 x le ( h ) 3.4 x 102 (h)

Primary coolant invensones o

to a 1000 MW (electric) power plant. All other system inventories are expected to be less I than those listed in Tables 3 and 4.

LWR SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS OF PAGS By comparing the data in Tables 2 and 4 one can conclude that at a liabt water reactor only the failure of irradiated fuel and fuel cl&dding could lead to off-site doses in excess of

' PAGs via all three pathways considered herein, i.e., the external cloud gamma, inhalation and milk ingestion pathways. Release of the gap activity in one fuel bundle within a few weeks after reactor shutdown could lead to off-site doses in excess of whole body and thyroid PAGs via the inhalation and milk ingestion pathways, but not via the external samma i

pathway. However, spent fuel resides under about 30 ft of water, which can provide very ce relatively innocuous noble gases.

efficient scrubbing of a release.gM@'a$en aross failures of a seleca:d few systems Only thryoid PAGsfco~ulThe e-

~

other than irradiated fuel. The BWR steam line break and the PWR steam generator failure accidents, which may release primary coolant, if not promptly terminated by appropriate corrective action, could lead to a thyroid PAG via the milk pathway. Tyhe iiroTediate protective action in such a case would be to protect milk by temovine =etected ~

I dTa ry herds from pastures in nearby downwind accas.

In this light, only a loss-of-coolant accident (IDCA) with the release of coolant directly I to the annespiere, and dammge to irradiated fuel could lead to off-site doses clearly exceeding

'PAGs. Only in the core of the reactor is there clearly enough energy to provide a driving Iorce necessary to project the requisite activity into the atmosphere in a short time. As discussed in Appendix B the primary coolant (water, steam) would be the principal motive force.

These perspectives are succinctly summarued in Table 5. E.T .p.cy planners can use

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148 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs Table 5 ed ov:

POTENTIAL FOR LWR SYSTEM TO CAUSE A DOSE has EQUALTO A PAG AT 1 MILE OR BEYOND it i (ATMOSPHERIC RELEASES) ma Outd's thrysid FAG l Gemd games 80 '

wheie body Vis Vnn the FAG ($ eges) h amara Sysessa suf the Core fuel UO, X X X ful Gaps X X X be SFSI" UO,(ional)  ? X X Gaps (total) - X X Fuel bundle UO - X X Fuel bundne gaps - X X Primary cooling weier - 7 X VI Other systems is Note: X = N===y inventory cleady availabic d(

? = N===y inventory available on are==== fo

= N~~wy inventory not available. .

g I

• For FDA Emergency PAG of 15 rems. Bodi the PWR and BWR wuse to

' gas trestraens sysicm could occasionally e====aa enough radiosodine for the FDA preventive PAG of 1.5 rems (ihyroid) to be enesedai if is one ra i

p i

' - all released, especulty channg pmods of rainfall.

• spens fuel sierase pool. Relatively cool used fuel scored under 30 m or ,;

9 no. of waner.

d such information timing, type, and extent protective

• . ~

actions appropriatelonhe-postnlated system failure (s). Some proiKh apGiis would be P

warranted based solely on in-plant observables. Although the strict FRC definition of a PAG addresses actions to be takenfollowing a contaminating event, for selected events, e.g., on-l

[

site evidence of major core damage, immediate go: ; . mined protective actions could be

• J) planned to be initiated even before an actual release occurs, if the planners can predetermine Iil

, and agree on the necessary and sufficient conditions.

( i l

PREDETERMINED VS. AD HOC PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 1 i F ,- i

'1 ne distinction between predetermined actions for predetermmed enaditions and ad hoc actions based on what may be observed at some future time is important. De word " initiate," j

• as in " initiate protective actions," is also important. What may be plassed to be initiated f k at some future time based on predetermined action levels can be changed on an ad hoc basis at any time, for good cause. The word " warrant" is also important, as in " initiation of h

predetermined protective action (s) would be warranted." " Warrant" implies a very strong d '

recommendation that is not to be dismissed lightly. But it is not an inevocable command

, I Further, protective actions can be initiated at any tirne based on what is actually occurring, I l , or is perceived to be occumng at the time.

i "r ._

' L .

e DICHOTOMY AND ITS RESOLUTION is Y The foregoing discussion is somewhat dissonant. Apparently, protective action decisions O can be made now, which would be warranted for implementation at some future time. But E _ _ _ _ -

~

s 149 ed kc decisions can be made at any time. Until recently, the second opuon has been overriding in the planning process. Either covertly or overtly, in the past emerIency planners have opted for today's protective action decision to wit: we will appraise each situation as it unfolds at the time and make our protective action decision then. His is a common management decision made in the face of major uncertainties rega to make as many protective action decisions as possible before devents occur, so as to minimize the number of decisions that would have to be made in an emergency. Dere exists to ay sufficient rrdiation protection guidance and knowledge of nuclearf power plants to resolve the apparent dichotomy, remove the major uncertainties, and pmv be discussed in the following two sections. Practical applications will then be discussed.

STOCHASTIC AND NON STOCHASTIC RADIATION EFFECTS Two basic radiation protection objectives are fundamental: in a controlled radiation en-vironment (1), avoid nonstochastic effects, and (2) reducef stochastict effects to a level which

_is as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)."_Nonstochastic radiation ef ects appear a doses generally above 25 to 100 rem for total body irradiation and well above such doses for individual body organs. These effects would be manifest within hours or days after the .

dose is delivered. (Delivery of the dose over a short time is presumed, i.e., in days or less.)

The effects include readily observable changes in blood cell counts 50 at the low end (i.e.,25 to 100 rem whole-body dose), to death within a week to 60 days at the high end (i.e., 0 rads whole-body dose or greater). The 100 to 500 rad range is very narrow on the scale of possible doses, but it would require a truly momentus accident to induce such doses off-site.

Stochastic effects are those for which no dose thresholds for damages are presumed. These damages (effects) would occur randomly throughout the population of late survivors of an exposed population. Usually, the effect does not become manifest until after a delay (latent period) of I to 10 years, or so, and can occur at any time later. Leukemia is an example of this type of effect. The incidence rate of the effect is usually so low compared to

" naturally" occurring effects that it would be extremely difficult or impossible to ascribe an effect in a particular individual to the earlier radiation exposure as a cause-effect rela-tionship. Further, many of the effects may not actually occur at very low doses; they are, tndeed, presumed.

As will be illustrated below, the potential for the induction of nonstochastic effects is limited as a practical matter to the area within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant. Conceptually, such effects are possible beyond 10 miles, but with vanishingly small probability and only by using bizarre assumptions (such as presumptions of disasters without even leisurely emergency response). Stochastic effects, however, have no range (distance) limit under the radiation dose threshold for such effects. Further, stochastic effects are in proportion to the number of people exposed. For most LWRs the product of population and dose (not shown) increases monotonically with distance from the source, with half or more of the population ame immetimes called the collective dose) being accumulated beyond 50 miles in almost allcasejs2 his is true for any release occurring during dry weather. De bulk of the stochastic effects could be accumulated within shorter distances for releases of particulates and water soluble materials during periods of intense precipitation. Such materials could appear in

, surface waters after being washed out of the atmosphere and be transponed long distances (over period s of at least weeks) to ocean waters. At any rate, stochastic effects are far-effects, predominantly, and protective actions in the near field would acidom, if everJm

• ~ mitigating for them. As will be explained below,little,if any, radiation protection guidance mm

I I CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs

. 150 RPG lateri is available to aid the emergency planner with regard to the far field andto no so prede princ criteria have been developed.Thus, basic radiation protection h objectives: avoidsurve nonstoc chastic effects using ALARA, drive the emergency planners' primary attention toitt e near field as a practical matter, i.e.,li dto within about 10 miles uncontrolled contr withi of the workplace, but they are transferrable to the postulated or lconceptua ning ze sour accidental release situation. Indeed, they are transferred in current emergency p anwoul guidance, although seldom explicitly stated as such, T<

use-RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDES AND PROTECTIVE ACTIO The concepts of ALARA and PAGs for unplanned d releases were clarified in the U.

lgated three guidance documents sponsored by the U.S. Federal 1960,Radiation Council an promu as guidance for Federal agencies by Presidents d l s Eisenhower, Kenn 1%I and 1964.2 '* 85 ommended for normal operations involving radioactive materials and with unplanne re ease of radioactivity in quantities of a few to l many multiples of rout actions in the public domain. These thresholds are often i di taken d" as limits. PAGs clear I y were not intended as limits:"If the projected dose exceeds the PAG, protective actionisRa2n cate

. ~

n (emphasis added).2 N Thus, PAGs are trigger levels for action, not limits on doses. Nevertheless,prethe FRC 51 said: "The PAG represents the Council's judgment as il bl to where this (risk vs. Ad benefit ad should be for the conditions most likely to occur. If in a l particular situation, there m is ava a an effective action with low total impact, initiation f iof such i itiation action at a projected dose owe thta the PAG may be justifiable. If onlyhivery l high impact actio remark added.)

N These apparently conflicting directions are fundamental to the problem being a here.

,{ The Radiation Protective Guidance was promulgated "for the guidance of Federa 1

i in activities designed to limit exposun: of members of population groups to radia in the body as a result of their (sic) occurrence in the environment." The Radiano

.u a Guides (RPGs) are expressed as annual dose rates fr fi a

a it bone, and 0.5 remfyear for the bone marrow.In addition, the FRC established a gr o'

of intake of radionuclides:

Action (s) ,

R Range I ct xc Periodic confirmatory surveillance as necessary I '

a il Quantitative surveillance and routine control Evaluation and application of additional control tt III 1 measures as necessary as ir1 Except in a very general sense, the FRC did not specify the meaning of the ld vary Fe ; measures", other than to state that "the character and ii import h as of these actions cou i widely, from those which (would) entail little interference i h aswith usual activ t es, suc l

j monitoring and surveillance, to those iwhich h (would) involve \

i g

151 1

RPG guidance. This was not done until the Protective Action Guide concept was established later by the FRC, ia 1964. As discussed above, it was then that the FRC limited the uncertainty to some extent when it established PAGs which would warrant protective actions The principal thrust of the RPG guidance dealt with situations for which greater than normal surveillance and monitoring would be warranted.

It is necessary to interpolate between the RPG and PAG guidance to discover where control measures including disruption of the public would begin to be warranted. Clearly, within RPG Ranges I and 11, such disruption would not be warransed. Here, controls on the source would be indicated. Clearly, at or above PAG Ievels, prosective (vs. other) actions would be warranted. Thus, Range til marks the demarcation range.

To quantify this range, the FRC pmvided the following ranges of transient intakes for use with respect to the graded scale of actions:

' mad 6emectide masse III(pCvday intake; I.131 0.0001 - 0 00l*

g St.90 0.0002 - 4.002 St89 0 002--0.02

• For small children. For adults, the intake rate would be ten times higher.

For Range II, the daily intake ranges were established as a factor of 10 lower than for Range Ill. Range I encompasses zero intake to the lower limit for Range II.

De upper limits for daily intake for Range 111 of the RPGs can be compared to derived preventive environmental emergency action levels provided by the U.S. Food and Dmg Administration.$ hese action levels are for monitored levels of radioactive contamination in the environme'nt:

Preventive FAG Total intaba in (unonitored varim6te) body Nuclide (pCl/t in snak) (infeat)(pCD l-131 0.015 0.09 St 90 0 009 0.2

{ St-89 0.14 2.6 i

The protective action appropriate at these levels would be to remove grazing dairy herds from contaminated pasture to protect the sensitive milk pathw1ry. Removal of such herds from pasture would cut this pathway at its source, the pasture, and if instituted at an appropriate early time could virtually climinate the necessity for impounding milk supplies a few days later.

Comparison of the FRC Range ill levels and the FDA preventive PAG derived levels shows that protective actions for the milk pathway would not be warranted until the FRC Range III levels were exceeded by a considerable factor, i.e., of the order of a factor of 10 l

or more (This assumes a nominal intake rate of I ( of milk per day.) Thus, an interpolation l

between the RPGs and the PAGs clearly indicates that throughout the RPG ranges, fmm I through til, contmls on sources would be indicated actions. Protective actions would not be warranted until contamination levels well exceed the Radiation Pmtection Guides. This conclusion is a logical interpolation of existing Federal guidance, however, and cannot be

'I attributed directly to a Federal body.

j 6

.i 6 C

152 CRC Handbook of hianagement of Radiation Protection Programs UNFINISHED BUSINESS (PAGs) th

- P' Before turning to the practical application of these radiological protection concepts in the emergeccy planning (vs. response) phase, it is well to consider explicitly two important pr ,

aspects of the emergency planning problem which are not discussed in current protective rei be ,

action guidance. First, neither the total area nor the total population that might be affected by an accidental release is addressed in cunent guidance. This is unfortunate. th '

Clearly, what might be reasonably achievable over a small area or by a small number _of ac persons might be extremely difficult or practically impossible to achieve over a large area as ,

or by a large number of persons. If one. farm is ever contaminated so a low level (e.g., FRC i Range 111), protective (preventive) action might well be prudent under ALARA. If a whole Pr '

state or region of the U.S. were to be contaminated at the same level, removal of all grazing pr-

! dairy herds from pasture could be very disruptive. Such contamination could occur because pl.

of atmospheric weapons fallout, for example. it

! As a result, current emergency planning throughout the world is incomplete as regards 5 definitive plans for controls over the very large areas that could be contaminated by a major rru nuclear power plant accident, or by weapons fallout. De planning for the food pathways ai

. today is limited to predetermined conditions for surveillance and monitoring and the estab- pri lishment of control points. It is weak in addressing the major problems that would be th.

associated with the disruption of large areas of commerce by the institution of protective elk and preventive actions on a massive scale. ho his problem awaits resolution. In the meantime, ad hoc rather than predetermined actions rei would be instituted if the need ever arises. In essence, decision-makers are forced to decide un

, today to delay some major projective action decisions regarding the far field until later. su ne second problem regards the method or approach of the use of PAGs in the planning th.

process. De focus on projected doses is nearsighted, at best, in the planrung stage. De of result is the prevalence of plans for environrnental monitoring as a pecursor to protective

' actions, regardless of the magnitude of an accident. In such cases the plan,ers avoid protective is i ~ action _ decisions in the planning stage. Such decisions are lett for the s*sponse stage. De in result is a ostent, fundamental weakness: little is added to the provisions _ for safety since or

,monitorina and ad hoc decisiens would surely be performed in a response situation even in ye

the absence of a special plan to do so. an l

l1 his problem may have its source in the FRC definition of a PAG, which concludes with Al the phrase "... following a contaminating event." For many enacern1 cases the phrase -

may be appropnate. But for some easily visualized cases it is inappropnate. For example, for fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, there is no a priori need to plan to await ,

t, actual contammation of grazing herds in the eastern U.S. before fallout anives from the

, west, especially where rainfall is intercepted. Grazing dairy herds could well be removed so from pasture beforehand. Such a minimal protective action could be planned for appropriate a cases, especially when stored feed is abundant. At this time no such decision has been made f ,

y beforehand. Rather, the planning decision is to monitor first and act later. ,

,; his problem is even more visible for the case of plans for responses to accidents at er nuclear power plants. In this case, the potential problems are well known, the locations of da u the plants are known, and the necemry conditions for the potential for PAGs to be exceedni la

are also known. Yet, many plant, federal, state, and local agency emerEency plans call for protective action decisions to be made solely on an ad hoc basis, based on projected doses g, y and radiological monitoring information at the time. $

ne emphasis on environrnental monitorina as a precursor to protective action has its

>r y' place, i.e. for <=ller accidents.'*.But, for a major accident involving core melt.h should be an extremely rare event, the reactor containment should isolate the event from

, , the outside world, so there should be little or no radioactivity emananng from the plant into .

l ini

153 the environment at the time, or ever, perhaps. Based on the prevalent current concept, projected doses would be less than PAGs; thus, no p6ctective action would be indicated.

Yet, by hypothesis, the core would be meltias

• a grave prospect. By prevalent concepts, protective action would not be indicated unless the containment failed widt the possible release of large amounts of radioactivity to the environment in a puff. Pateady, this would be somewhat late for protective actions to be initiated. His is a direct resuk of the use of the literal definition of the PAG, the reluctance of planners to psJm.idne when protective actions would be warranted (and unwarranted), and the emphasis on radiological monitoring as a precursor to protective action.

Rat the latter position is untenable for LWRs can be illustrated by a very sunple example.

Presume that the U.S.E.P.A whole body PAG of 5 rems would be the engger level for protective action during an emergency, which it is touted to be in most LWR emergen:y plans. For argument's sake, rske this absolutely literally. Operationally, during an emergency it would require a measured oose rate of the order of I rem /hr projected to be sustained for 5 hr for the PAG to be exceeded, or 5 rems /hr projected to be susttined for I hr, or 500 mrem /hr project =1 to be sustained for 10 hr, or a similar combination. All of this without a projected wind shift during the projected release period. Using the exarnpic inventories, presented earlier, required to induce a PAG at 2 km (1.25 miles) downwind, it is obvious that at least rnegacuries per hour of radioactivity would have to be in the effinent stream at the source, projected to be sustained for hours. On a normal day, scores of snegacuries per hour would have to be in the effluent stream. In brief, there would have to be an accidental release of ominous proportion befne protective action would be recommended to the public, under this concept. Although such a response scenario is conceivable, a plas to respond in such a manner is not a prudent plan, it provides little in the way of gpotential benefit for the public over and above what would surely occur without a plan. In short,it is not much of a plan. ,

...cy planners As will be explaia~i in next y, at this time the attention of v. -

is being focused otr'predeterrr.i planbtitions that should and shoedd nor prompt th initiation of predeterminederdective actions offsite, As will be seen, under sin operators at 'the plant w%1d become the implementers of protective action decisions made b.v years earlier by planners. His "act first, monitor later" concept was desm succinct!

and to the point by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure Appendix C to NCRP Report No. 55;"

MILK CONTROL f y NM 4~ <> yjY g*

radsauon exposure to mit unus sesulung frorn a 2 t'<=amneasures to avoid milk contamannunn amt the an accident if they are to be effectrue. The protective nuclear facility accident mua be imia===adimmediantly actions to be considered require breakingh ~1* wtuch contarnmaana spreads menefy. the pasture-cow-milk. man pathsay.

Since the posential for accidental radiation exposure of the populauon through milk snay esammi for many miles I from the accident site; and since the snagnitude of exposure through milk may be 400-700 emus greaser than f

l through inhalauon. the need far appropnane (earty) protective action is of paramount importa dairy farmers in the (likely) affected land area are alened immediately and insenacted by the appropnase stase and l

' local officials to move their caule from pasture to sacred feed. This breaks the cycle of transammmea of radaosctivwy contaminanon at the root and must be accomphshed immedsagely.

Within 48-72 hours, contaminased land areas can be idenoried by ground and amal surwas . Only those i

farmers in contanunaaed land areas would be requaed to keep their cattle ce stored feed. Ttss atmously reduces j

1 the pouibihty of fluid nulk contaminauon . " The parendwocal words were added by shas ashor. J t ' his eminently rmaanble "act first. monitor later" plan to protect the milk pathway

,1 -

s

'!

• core meh should be disunguished from fuel inck. core inanmais (sieet, silver, zer -=1 have aiuch lowce sonening and melting pones than uraniurn oside fuel.

i eu

^ &

I f

' CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs 154 1

i Table 6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME t

Plant Ofbdee agency

• Perasee acties action f Cnnes I Awareness i Nersation or Noortance unusual event Staney I Mobdize plant Alen

't resources Full mobdization Mobilize and Site area emergency enform pubis

'I Full mobdization Recommend General emergency p,coeiermined

v. proeective ac.

1 I - tions off. site il

] illustrates the simplicity, practicality and potential efficienc ' '

g thrust of current emergency planning.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME-PREDETERMINED AC FOR PREDETERMINED PLANT CONDITIONS y Based in part on the foregoing concepts, a four-levelldemergency classification sc ti. currently being implemented for nuclear power plants. Each The class of emergency wou o

8" require predetermined types of actions appropriate ta the i ,

[,' area emergency, and (4) general emergency.

b, his nomenclature is standard in the U.S. industry to assure the commonly underst import of an emergency classification, i.e., the very names scope the extent o of an emergency and predetermmed actions.He operator examples of predetermined events are presented in Tab iir i gency action levels) which would indicate the presence of 4

xe declare an d

{ of the predetermined action levels, or within 15 min of an a will pause to study Tables 6 and 7.)

De general emergency is the only class for which protective actions in the pubh have been predetermined.Jndeed, it has been predetennined that him iatiliredete are protective actions woul(nor)e warranted for the lower clas

~

~

occur.

General emergencies would be called for a core melt or for plant conditions clearl to core ngl! A core melt condition should be obvious to the operwors. j For conditions

~

cleanly leading to core melt, no unusual ld be radiological indi would be warranted, as planned years earlier. For example, a i general emergency wou called should physical control of a nuclear power plant ever d be lost to intruders _. In case no unusual plant paramJe rs need be present, radi a

155 Table 7 FOUR LEVEL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SCIIEME Emerrscy dama Ciens .: .; - r + l ititl :e dits a Unusual Events are in progress or have oc- Loss of off-site power er on-sne ac power event cwred which indcase the poten- capabihty. ,

sial degradation of the level of Fire lasting more than 10 mun.

safety of the plant. No radioactive Secunty threat or attempial sabotage.

releases requinns off site re- Contaminated patient transported to hospital.

I Radiological emuent techacal specificatons sponses expected.

i execeded.

Reactor scram funplanned shuidown).

Alert Events are in process or have oc- Increase in radiation levels in-plant by a factor of curved which involve an actual or 1003.

PAential substantial degradaron Complete loss of any functson needed for plant of the level of safety of the plant. cold shutdown.

Any radmactive teleases expected Fire potentially affecting safety systems.

to be small fractions of EPA PAG Ongoing secunty m..y. :.

exposure levels. Loss of all on-site de power.

Pnmary coolant leak rase grenser than 50 gal / min.

High radaological effluent release rate (>5Ci/

sec).

Site area Events are in progress or have oc- Fire compromising the functaons of safety emergenry curred which invol-e actual or systems.

likely snajrv failures of plant Loss of all vital on-sne de power for more than functens needed for the potec- 15 min.

tion of the public. Any releases Loss of off-site power and loss of on-site ac not expected to exceed EPA Pro- power for more than 15 mun.

tective Action Guide exposure Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) greater than levels except possibly near the makeup pump capacity.

sate boundary Degraoed core with possible loss of coolable geometry.

Evacuation of plant control room and control of shutdown sysaems not established from local sta-taons in 25 rrun General Events are in progress or have oc- Loss of physical control of the facility.

emergency curred which involve actual or Any major internal or enternal event which could

imminent substantial core degra- cause massive common damage to plant safety j dation or core melt. systems (e 3.. major uncontrolled fires in safety systems; major earthquakes).

Loss of two of ihree fissaaefroduct barners with clear potential fue loss of dse third.

Entremely high levels of radiation in containment (e g.,10.000 R/hr or greener).

For pressurued water reacsors (PWRs)

Small and large LOCAs with failure of emer-

) i gency core coohng system (ECCS).

I ! Loss of feedwater and condcesate systems fol-I - lowed by loss of emergency feedwater.

l Containment isolation and failure of contain-

. rnent heat removal sysaems for several hours.

For boiling waner tractors (BWRs)

Transient with failure no control reactor power (e.g., failee to SCRAM).

LOCA with ECCS failure.

Reactor shundown (e g., SCRAM) but decay l , heat removal sysaems fail to functon for sev-eral hours.

c-- -. - _t_-_-- ___ . _ . - _ _ . _ - _ _ . _ _ _ ____ _ , _ - _ . - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ M

l 156 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs Table 7 (continued)

FOUR LEVEL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME These cumple initiatins cond tio= are nos EALs. EALs are the predetennined obsembles anociated with the initiating conddaans.

• These are specific predetermined examples only, presensed as sids in scoping pouMe events and associased ernergency classes. Other condaions rmay occur for which the 6%,aplant opersnors aws decide an emergency clan on an ad hoc basis. essing these examples as guides. p Other A -- 4 conditions can be developed as warranied

[

plant aspects.) The plant could well be operatine normally. i.e.,

' now.

~ Patently, general emergencies should be extremely rare events. Indeed, they should never occur. Concommitantly, initiation of predetermined protective actions should never occur.

Conversely, should a general emergency ever be declared, such would be an event of grave i g [r

• b y* import and world-wide notoriety. Precaut anury 4y evacuation of a from the very declarattataf the general emergency. Yet, so long as the coiEminment s remains intact, little or no contamination of the environment would occur, a la the infamous accident p[ at Dree Mile Island. De predetermined initial protective actions for this class are precau-tionary in intent. Predetermined evacuation and shelter scenarios for the general emergency class are elaborated on below,

,; . he radiation protection basis for the General Emergency class is very simple. As shown

• above, if a reactor core is not damaged or threatened, protective action guides should not

" be exceeded in the near term and the immediate initiation of predetermined protective actions

"* would not be wa'rranted. If a reactor core is damaged at some future time, the operators would have 15 min to correct and control the situation; if they could not, the planners say today that the situation then would be so grave that predetermined precautionary protec actions would be warranted. We are unwilling to plan to await coincident containment

• failure Early initiation of protective action is planned, well before an actual major release.

" Yet the action level is so high it should never be reached.

De importance of the operator in this scheme cannot be overemphasized. Re operators thev rse always present. Dey must scope their putAcm. De operators

~

are first on the -a P

are instructeliTand protected 9by emergency operating

~

mdc;cimined procedures by_pht which they are charged

• to follow. De . action levels for general emergencies have been management and asced to by state and local agencies before the event. De state and

~ agencies agree to the predetermmed action levels and yicdctermined actions, also lo the event. Ind-i, the planners and decision-makers who made the initial decisions may no

". longer be in evidence or in positions of authorirv at the time. De plans are laid with the

• understanding that protective actions off. site (will not be initiated without grave cause)an I will be ini[ ate 6artyJi.e., well before a major release) for sufficient cause.

he other thrWmergency classes have equally well founded bases.De unusual event I class was developed in response to numerous state and local agency requests to receive

'[,

~

information regarding unusual conditions at a plant before these come to the attention of

"' the media (and then the public). To minimize even the appearance of "not knowing what is going on" and to assure the exercise of emergency organization notification schemes, the f un=ut event "ci,.crgency" class was established. For this class, notifications of various g presclected individuals is the pudctermined action. His d be recommended to the public for events in this class. This has been decided now.

"' he alert emergency class would require additional stafYing of on-site emergency centers as the predetermined action. De purpose of this emergency class is very simple: source

~

a-

v 157 control. For this class, events threatening irradiated fuel would be in progress which the operators could not control within 15 min of their awareness, and which would involve significant degradation of plant systems needed for control ofirradiated fuel. Radiation levels could be normal. An uncontrolled fire in plant secondary safety systems would be an example for this class. The immediate predetermined actions would require the addition of a number of preselected individuals of various expertise to the plant staff within about 30 min of the alert declaration. Dis assures (but does not guarantee) that a variety of skills would be called to the plant, or made available, in a timely fashion to help control whatever situation occurs, of the noted type. State and local agencies would also be notified for this class; simple awareness is all that would be required of them for this class. No piblic notifications are planned for thi. class.

De site area emergency class would require the staffing of both on-site and off site _

emergency centers _. A high level of emergency preparedness is predicated. Radiation levels

~may be normal. An uncontrolled fire in a primary plant safety system is an example of an event which could trigger this class. If radiation levels were or could be elevated, radiological monitoring teams would be dispatched both on-site and off site. Notification of the public would not be mandatory, but could commence in order to control rumors that might be caused by the planned high level of activity (not necessarily radioactivity) in the area, as by interception of shortwave radio signals, for example. If radioactivity in small to moderate levels is actually released, low impact protective actions may be instituted but on an ad hoc rather than a predetermined basis, based predominantly on environmental monitoring data.

Removal of dairy herds from pasture in nearby areas to protect milk may be recommended, for example, especially where rainfall would be intercepted. his class corresponds closely to the classical emerge se p His predetermined, response)mergency action scheme conforms in both letter and spirit to the basic raw y,Gection guidance discussed abo _ve.

SHELTER AND EVACUATION PLANS The wwkiertriined psmive action scheme for a general emergency calls for graded scales o(timing and s sizepof off site areas that would be affected. laitially, persons in all areas within 10 miles of plant would be notified to take shelter as available, shut windows and doors, and listen to radio and television for further instructions. Prompt notification means must be m place continuously, and periodically exercised, to assure the capability to provide the initial notification of the public within 15 min of the general emergency dec-laration." Dese means include administrative and physical rneans. (These prompt notifi-cation means should not be confused with the early notification scheme.)

It should be noted that this is not a " hair trigger" scheme,30 min could elapse between the onset of extensive core damage and the notification of the public. These 30 min would

'be available for assessment and corrective actions by the operators and reduction of the emergency class. If, in 30 min from the onset of the action levels, the conditions for a general emergency were to persist, predetermined notificauons of the public for protective actions would be initiated. These 30 min are not provided by design, however; rather, the planning recognizes that it would require such elapsed times to carry out various necessary actions by plant and notification officials.

With these comments as background, the oredetermined immediase and early evacuation and shelter plans" can be scoped succinctly as follows:

d

1. _lf irradiated fuel is not damaged, no public notife'mwould be warrante .

2. If spent (used) fuel is damaged, no immediata(predeterminedWtive ' > actions offsite would tgwarran

- a-

t 158 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Progranss

3. if_significant core damage, or the clear threat thereof, occurs (c.E., ten to thirty percent cladding failure), the public within about 2 miles should be instrucam! to evacuate where possible as a precautionary measure., All other persons would be instructed to femmin in available shelter. (At a few highly ~ congested, high population density sites, only those persons within the 2-mile radius might receive the earfiest notification, although provisions for the waming capability would extend for about 10 miles.")

4. After the immediate notifications of the public, if the operators cannot assure that the situation is under control, persons within 5 miles would be instr'.et to evacuate,

' when feasible before a major puff remase. If control is assuredly established, all persons "beyond 2 miles would be instructed to reinain in available shelter.

If a m ior puff

• release of radioactivity actually occurs, the following instructions f 5.

should be provided to the public; those evacuating should continue; thrse in shelters yF h should remain in shelters; those stalled in traffic should take the best sL'her available. g 4 g

( in addition, radiological monitoring teams, aided by meteorological proyections, would g . ,

t locate and identify areas of high contamination left in the wake of the puff. Areas of /

-- rainfalls and calms should be identified quickly. Immediate evacuations. where at all [27 p.,

' possible, of areas of identified high contamination would be recommended. Television would be very helpful in this situation. Evacuation in directions perpen6cular to the puff traverse should be recommended, where possible, as this would sequire the least m amount of time.'"

l nese would be the immediat[prEermingdctions. After these actions were accom-plished, the designated emergencFres'p5hsiio~ rganizations would proceed on an ad hoc basis

~

iising information available at the time. Note that actions I. 2, and 3 weald be initiated Elely on the operators assessment, as predetermined. he other steps would require more complex _ and coordinated emergency responses. In all but extremely rare circumstances, step 3 should be completed well before the necessary coordinations could be reasonably l P 4&

1 j

SHELTER AND EVACUATION DISTANCES cf opeeteWJC pe ^ ~

De basis for the predetermined evacuation and shelterM informed judgment. 2I;;1, g "

here is no ruiding formula or equation. In the remaindchrf t!!Ts'section various facets of the considerations that led to these distances will be explored, but the foRowing is not to

1. N l

,be taken as a classical argumect of proof.

For core melt accidents at nuclear power plants, the potentials for stochastic and nonsto-

["k ,

l

! chastic radiation effects in individuals can be illustrated using Figures I through 3. In Figure I the qualitative relationship between dose and distance for an atmospheric acicase is shown.

he upper curve in Figure I shows the theoretical relative reduction in done with downwind distance (not necessarily line-of sight distance). De lower curve shows the relationship as g_

it most often occurs as a practical matter. Dese curves are normalized to a distance of 0.5 mile, which is the average distance from a LWR to the site property line. As illustrated in Figure _l, there is a major reduction in dose potential between 0.5 and 2 miles, with a smaller i

, j dose reduction potential between 2 and 5 miles. His reduction is due to atruaspheric dilution.

At all but a very few nucten power plant sites, there are relatively fes persons within 2 I

w ~

s .

_ miles of the olant. His area is included in what are called the " Exclusion Area" and the

' "lew Population Zone'_' required by the siting regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-F! mission. Except in the most unusual circumstances there should be few impediments to l ~Or imjDcdtalc.cyacuations of these areas. De coincidence of a core melt and senous impediments to a speedy egress of such small areas should be extremely rare to nonexistent. In the rare

• All hfe cresiening releases =cadd be puff releases. See Appendit B for a discusnan of anger m cident sequences 1

' . 5 .

IS9 a l l l 0 -

0.8 -

~

l E /

0.4 -

' - 8 ,

CONSERVATIVE tr23 thtORE REAUSTICI 0.2 .

t t t x -

0 2 3 4 5

0.5 1 DISTA7eCE tmteal F1GURE I. Dose potential as a function of distance along actual track of a puff. A ground level release is assumed. The lower curve is a II

3selatsomship.

M=:

u 16' .

N  :

8 b 5  :

I 8 502 --

E  :

D ,

u - M '

W{ }

9 l

,r I 0J Radha se aree

1. [

t i e ietill e e e a t t al e e e e e e til er ese emecuenan smamma t a e i t tti j

t$ 10' 10: gos in s X. EARLY FATALmES FIGURE 2. Illustration of the potential for reshaction of early fatahties ammanung early evacuation within vanous distances. A major e. ,fd selease and shchenug beyond the nosed distances for 4 hr aher the passage of a puff was assumed case where the low population zone (1.PZ) does not extend to 2 miles, the predetermined imrpediate evacuation area could be limited to the LPZ, with shelter elsewhere.' Shelter

'

• C Regutauons allow a staged (by areal public nottricataos scherne "

HQ CRC Nandbook of Manageneent of Radiation Protection Programs W: ~

nasi.

52 x y

*' ; U 2.0 g .

5 g Igr  :

~

3 l gs ,

~.

I t t i t teil e i s t a t eil i a e l eitt II j. t e e e t s t el W to' W W io8 X. EAALY puumies re es Illustraban of she ponenual for reducuan of early injuries aamammag earty 3 FIGURE 3.

evacuabon within various distances. A snajor atmosphenc release and sheleenas beyond the eI acted distances for 4 hr after the pauage of a puff was assumed jy should be more efficacious in high ppulation density areas, as compared to low population

$r; density areas.

oc De Potential for avoidance of nonstochastic effects in the event of a major nuclear power th plant accident is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. De assumptions made far the calculated results in these figures were: population density of 1000 persons / square mile (a very high tu density); sheltering for 4 hr after passage of a puff by the population outside various early ng i evacuation zones; carly evacuation (before a release) by persor s within vanous distances of a

yi the plarm and the propulsion of major fractions of the inventxy of radionuchdes in the core s< i . of a 1000-MW -electric reactor (highest power level) into the atmosphere, at ground level, ss } in a puff, with very short warning time (I hr). The calculations were made using the gc,

' Consequences of Reactor Accidents Code (CRAC) developed for the Nuclear Regulatory 2

! Commission.22 22 i

ne sensitivity tested in these calculations was the probability and numbers of early

,r fatalities and injuries as a function of the distances within which carty evacuations were 3, ,

conducted. De reruits are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

,, As illustrated in Figure 2, for even this extreme accident early evacuations of areas within n, 2 miles of a plant would substantially reduce the chance of an early fatality. As discussed au further below, early fatalities at the longer ranges would be caused by a coincident rainfall.

., As illustrated in Figure 3. carly evacuation within 2 miles would reduce the probability m of an early injury by a factor of nearly ten as compared to the immediate shelter assumption.

to j Early evacuation of areas within 5 miles reduces this relative probability by a factor of fifty.

But, at one. third of the LWR sites in the U.S. the number of residents within 5 miles is large,10,000 to 100.0003* Evacuation by such large numbers of persons is infrecuent (see below) and would be very disruptive, and could require a few hours to accomplish. At these

~

r sites, especially, any eet.c.csiaal evacuation action levels for the five mile radius must

,, be syy.vysiately qualified, as they are in 4 and 5 above.

i ,

4 l

s 161 e . ,

/

\

p j g 4 -

==

~

y

' i _ o. .. y s -

._ o e = =om .

's i 9 1 i

- owca ,

o Theoretical full wi&hs of puffs at l% of snaximum concentrauon vs Asn.nce flGt:P.E 4.

along out of puff.

Two observations are helpful to the planner in this regard. First, all of the calev'ated early injuries beyond 2 miles (illustrated in Figure 3) resulted from rainfall situations and were due to the high ground level dose rates resulting from heavy deposition a f radionuclides on the gmund after plume (puff) passage.'2J2 Second, th. area of heavy coatamination would not be wide. thwmally, it would be possible to wah out'of the contananated area in a d reasonably shut time: This potential is illustrated in IIgure 4 in which the full width of a puff is shown as a function of distance along it's track, for tv.o atw$-ic dispersion i conditions. For reference, the width of a 22.5* sector (1/16 of a circle, corresponding to the  %

width of sectors for the sixteen cardinal compass directions, N, NME, IE, etc.) is also p

shown in the figurt. ' '

As illustrated in Figure 4, at 5 miles the " footprint" of a puff slyld be less than 2 miles wide. At 10 miles along the trajectory, the width would be less tt 114 miles. In either case, y

the averste person normally could walk easily out of a highly cot tt n nated area in a relatively

^d short time (an hour or so). Interestingly, given early warning and gest,inspractions, a person e 4 could walk away crots. wind fmm plumes and avoid plume et ures estirely.*' but this would be an idealized case most often. However, in those instets when the plume could be seen (see Appendir. D), walking away from a plume could occur as at natural reaction for some persons. '

Thus, evacuation of contaminated areas between 2 red 5 miles should le quite feasible normally for most persons in the vicinity of at least two-thirds of the T.uR sites in the U.S. AA At the remaining sites sheltering in the area between aheut 2 and 5 mitei smight be preferred as a pr* ermined measure until after nasuoc of a puff, after which puple in highly /[#

MM' Y

contaminated areas could be requested or ordered to leave. Shelter factors should be more substantial in highly congested areas. Early identification of areas of calms and precipitation would be extremely important in the event of an actual major release; there is no practical limit on the distance to which such effects could be manifest.

PERSPECTIVES ON EVACUA* DON A few perspectives regarding evacuations of historical record are noteworthy. Ferergency evacuations by tieaad= of persons are not uncommon indeed, in the U.S. sizeable evac.

- 1 t

162 CRC Handl&i af Afanagewent of Radiation Protection Programs untions occur with a ftstmv of f/w ek to O days." Noteworthy is the fact that injuries $r and deaths due to the evact.atbns, per se,#hre rare; historically, a risk of about jone d4, '/m death per million per5or.s movingjs oherved,." Trauma and fright are normally observed,

, gp but T

panic is rare.h Widespremi parh_b5 not been observed in evacuations. p*fhOften, more tire.

isgumed by av* vities in coming to a decisions to order an evacuation than t>v tts evacuees leaving an area. Iv=3, the latter observation was one of the orincipal motivating f*'p I f'acton fo the deveby, int oTpredetermined action criteria. ding evacu-

_ Precautionary evacuations are common."," Some cryptic information :egar

' ations which occurrec aunng the period March 1976 through June 1978 is presented in Table

8. These were compiled from news clippings by this author. De observation that no deaths

! or injuries due to the evacuations, per se, is often made in news accounts. Other compilations confirm these general observations." Coincidentally. as this is being written (December

' 14,1982) 17,000 evacuees are returning to a "5 mile area" (sic, CBS News) in the southem U.S. and 5000 persons are leaving an area in the westem U.S. No injuries were observed j in the forn er incident, at leut._De 17,000 evacuees live near a nuclear power plant currently i under censtruedon; the plant was not the cause of the evacuation.

! The dynamics of the evacuation process can be complicated. Analyses of the process most 5 often center on roads, intersections, and queueing theory. But the complications should not y hide the facts of the matter. De pio:ess of leaving an area is common. A helpful perspective

, on the matter can be obtained by perusal of the information in Figure 5, which illustrates

{g road capacities using the three assumptions noted in the figure caption. Curve A in this figure is for the case of the National Safety Council safe driving admonition: maintain a 2-m see separation time between vehicles. As illustrated in Figure 5. road capacitics exceed 1000 E. vehicles /hr/ lane at speeds as low as 10 mph. In fact, using the 2-sec rule, speeds over 10

$ j mph add httle to the road capacity. A capacity of 2090 vehic!cs/hrilane is common in a ,

heavy traffic situation (see curve C of Figure 5).

From this perspective, one can easily understad the observation noted in a U.S.E.P.A.

g study" that evacuations of up to 15,000 persons /hr/ road have been observed in evacuations

' b.y large numbers of persons (the average occupancy per vehicle was observed to be four).

It is t!so understandable why many thousands of tmva have been observed to evacuate p an area in a few hours or less. De emptying of a sports stadium is a common examplen)

,; It has long been known 2

• >' that waming time and motivation of the public are the(key Al clements of a successfulevscustics . Provisions in an emergency plan for reductionof ' wamg Jj times and for strong motivating mswctions are the key elements of an evacuation plan.  !

j I Extremely inclement weather, e.g., a hesvy snowfall on the roads, would present a severe 8 Jj impediment to evacuation, or coa.se (.we the following section3n entrapment scenarios).

Such major impediments to evacuation could be identified quite easily at any time and a i

contingency immediate shelter recommendation wouW be the obvious choice at such a time.

f Ilowever, in the light of the fact that the public, itself, would implement either an evacuation rst shelter plan. the provisions for early and prompt waming and motivation same in either case. In essence, the public protects itself in an emergency, y Mwould be the by and large.

lves from '

F i Regardless of what one would want members of the public to do to protecht ll them. And th(cartier they would told,l the [s#)b:tter, in a

' th

,s

, s_orncething they could not sense, one would have to tebe {

{ to a notification plan?.as does a shelter plan._

e- ,

une Ima; noie regardmg the maner or roads: to empty something, the funnels must be .

kept open. Much attention is often paid ta the intricacies of road networks within areas to be evacuated. This is a myopic viewpoint. De important roads are those leading from the N

N

• The distuxtion between carty evacuauon and relocanon is aceed. Early evacuauon shamid be planned a> cccur in low population areas erfore senous exposure to a puff. Relocauon would be a haer prosecove ( acuon to

%i l educe empowres in localued heavily contanunaaed areas. .

I

'" 4

p 8 ,1 Table 8 SELECTED EVACUATIONS OF RECORD i

Number at j persons Incidessa News date Tasme Place l.500 Tank car conssaning panonous pas ruptured.

4/26n8 Bowling Greer Ay. ,

1.000 Chemical espknion - train wreck.

5/1508 No.cogdoche- n 600.000 Earthquake.

6/2108 11 p m. Salonika. Oc .n 3.000 Rail car gas leak istyrene gest.

6/30r78 Deurehen l a. ,

1.500 30-car derailmens - tank car c'aploded Ephmphorous). I 4/848 Browmon. Neb.

Pmeville. Ky. 2.000 Liquid pmpane tank car leak. l 4/808 Fire as chemstal plant - sonic fumes.

p.m. Kingeurg. Ind. 2.500 4/ Ins Chemical plant emplosion - totic chlanne gas. l p m. Steubenville. Ohio 2.000 3/15n8 lawcticide tank at chesmcal plant esploded.

Day Vick4urg, Mns. 1.200  ;

3/8n8 IN10 galliquifmf pmpane spill.

Galas. Va. 200 3/2n8 250 Ruptured railway car - chlorine pas - wind shift ansed.

2/27n8 Youngwown. Fla.  ;

2.000 Derailed tank car esplosion - volatile propane 2/27ns Waverly. Tenn. .

500 trak frorn fuel tank initrogen tetronidel.

l/28/78 a.m. Damascus. Ark.

32 11.000 gal acetaldehyde spill.

1/1708 a m. Pond Eddy Pa.  ;

800 Chemical freighs train crue.

12/2907 Goldonne. La.

1.000 Tank car ca.rying propane gas supeured.

11'29/77 3 a.m. Norfolk Neb.

771 Propane gas leak from tant rar.

11/28/77 Night Battle Creek. Neb.

Manon, la. 1.000 Tank car carrying propane pas rupeured 11/8/77 Noon Tonic fumes - unknown origin.

St. Marys. Kan. 600 1915n7 Gas fumes - clementary school.

Chananoops. Tenn. 809 i

IWl307 Day poisonous chlonne gas leak - frosn chemkal plant.

i Day Muffand. Mich. 2.000 148/77 B lernensary achiud - cartam seinnnakte leak.

Day Kansas City Ma. Ini) 10/4/77 l

Berryville. Ark. 2.600 Fire - fertiliser warehouse - ammonia and nitric artd.

9/19/77 3 a m. Railroad car derailed - ethylene oside.

9 p.m. Watwks. fil. 2.000 i 9/5/77 '

Rockwood. Tenn. S.200 Chemical truck wreck.

7/1307 3 p.m. Rail car leaked chlanne gas.

3 a.m. Insernational Falls. 2.000 I S/17/77 Minn.

10.000 Chlorine gas leak - chemical plant.

12/1106 3 p.m. Baton Rouge. La.

Censerville. III. 500 Tonic furnes releseed - 2 tank cars. Chloro =ulfonic acid and ""

' S/29n6 sulfune acid.

l W

~

~

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i CRC Handbcok of Management of Radiation Protection Progrens 164 l -

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,a 10 3 30 WEMICLE SPEEO.Winise d Itane of flow of vekseles per lane of road, tA) 2 saca-,. sepershon of g simme;(B)

FIGURE 5.

sepension distance of I vehicle leng W10 mph of speed, and (C) sepersnan d vehicle lengtW20 mph of speed. Average vehicle length of 16 ft asswned the area to be evacuated would_

periphery to open areas. Bottlenecks and +=d ebe the major roadway impe helpful to stop trafficTntent on entering from distances two to five times the radius of the

~

area to be evacuated. Only about 330 vehicles can occupy one lanc-mile of road.

information is not presented to make a case for the cavalier treatment of evacuauons. =>>ch T1h Evacuations should not be ordered without trave cause. However. niven erave e=nie as a core melt at a nuclear power plant, trauma and fright in the public domain wouldJ exgwW and WestmaA=hle, but broadcast panic would not be expected _. The expeditious movement by un to at least many -d-s~d of persons should be slow-risk _ activity. Contrary, "

ifalse impressions by many radiological emergency planners are a serious 6-i-: iment to th .

development of evacuation criteria _and plans.

o ENTRAPMENT SCENARIOS i cccy management scheme Objections to this predetermined protective action and ew=is can be raised. indeed, it is not perfect. There is no guarantee that all penons would receive exposures at levels as low as reasonably achievable givenll their particular situations a times. Evacuation is not a panacea. In retrospect, after an accidental release, it could we be determined that some persons left a perfectly safe area only to have arrived at an unsafe area during transit. 'the special case of interceptmg and traveling with a puff is discussed

in some detail in Appendix C. Many such scenanos can be readily m='ind for which the p. A;crir.ined action scherne would not be the best, or an available, w However, coincidences of core melt and ==iar impediments to speedy egress of sinall areas by most

. people should be extremely rare.a Exa=dient shelter of some so assistance would be provided during an emergency for which evacuanon would be warranted.

g- m

- m l

-O o ,

h o

w D / ': -

d 166 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Proeection Programs Entrapment scenanos are simple to postulate _. A major release of radioactivity without l

warning is conceptually possible, as a major earthquake which causes a reactor accident. A

, 'd, and is

,a major snow and ice storm coincident with a major LWR accident can be p e possible. In these cases, many people could be harmed. For the most_gLeisuch scenarios e- are entrapment by definition: by postulate there is no way out. These pomitaan are most

• disturbing to those who seek absolute guarantees of safety, no matter what the circumstances I 7, Absolute guarantees are not available and are not given._Rather these action plans are of the nature of alimited warranty hey have been devised based on an extensive background i I ~of radiation protection concepts and practices, Itnowledge of plant systems, investigations o of thousands of potential accident scenarios, and abundant information tegarding the response ad of the public in threatening situations. Dey call for early, normally feasible protective

[

actions. Dey offer an excellent chance for avoidance of unnecessary disruption of the public, for avoidance of nonstochastic radiation effects, and for maintaining stochastic effects to y reasonably achievable levels, even under major nuclear power plant accident conditions.

b hey meet the primary objectives of an ernergency response plan.

ac j

SUMMARY

/

De management of emergency preparedness for the nuclear power industry centers around

.. the concept of predetermined actions to be initiated for predetermined conditions. De

• predetermined conditions and actions are embodied in four scoping emergency classes. De

" plant operators would have 15 min to contml predetemuned situations after they become aware of them, or officially declare the appropriate emergency class. For plant conditions htl '

which exclude the clear potential for core melt, notification, assembly, and corrective actions '

e are predetermined. For actual or imminent core melt conditions immediate precautionary

• evacuations of nearby areas are planned, even in the absence of effluent radiametivity. The ,

• ' latte be extre I rare to nonexistent events. Immediate protective actions are determi , to beamwarrant , for $ncore meitivents. After the initiation of the pre-

[k -

w.anuMJ actions, augiiiimteil staff would proceed as necessary hawd on actual conditions at the time. His is an "act first, monitor later" scheme for major accidents and a " monitor Pe -

first, act later" scheme for lesser accidents.

Under this scheme the plant operators would be the key individuals in the initial phase 01 an emergency response. His is appropriate. Dose first on the scene unust scope the

$ magnitude of a problem. By predetermining the actions appropriate for d pi nmined con- i m j sai i citions, the ernergency planners have provided the operators with the v.nhoney and respon-L ; sibility to implement a graded scale of predetermmed actions appic .r rn, a wide spectrum v I

cc l of predetermined possibilities. Appmpnate actions should be initiah earlylnder diis scheme.

j For slowly developing events, the early availability of expert assistance for abe site should a '

assuage a deteriorating situation before it becomes senous For situations which would rul < threaten the public, the predetermined acten levels should pmmpt the initiation of feasible f protective actions by the public carly, well before a release occurs, to provide the nearby d '

public with time for an appropriate protective response. i Ris scheme is not perfect. But it was developed on a rational, logical basis after carefully i en considering fundamental radiation protect on guidance, aplying a good deal of common j R< sense, and with the recognition that timeliness would be the essence of a respomr. to an a P emergency. ne requirements for appropnate. early and predetermined resporises of a graded

_ scale, provide a high degree of assurance that eim&sy responses, at licenwe, federal, state and local levels 4ill be timely and in proportion to the levels of the threat at the time.

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M7 REFERENCES

1. Federal Radiation Council. Background manenal for the development of redsson premaction standants, seport No. 5 (July 19641 and 7 (May 1%3) USGPO. Supennsendent ==r andum for the of Documents. Washington D C.

2. Federal Radiation Council, Radiation protection guidance for federal agencies president. Ed Arg.. 64-8590. 12056. August 22. 1964.

3. Medical Research Council. Criaena for controlling radwion dames to the public ther acculental escape of

• redsosctive enamenal. Her Majesty's Stationary Ofrece. lendon. Sepeember 1974.

4. U.S. Environmental Pronection Agency. Manual of proerctson action guides and pronacave actions for nuclear incidents. EPA-520/ t.75 001. Office of Radiation Programs. Washington. D.C.. Seperuiber 1975. revised July 1979.

5. U.S. Food and Dmg Administration /Depriment of Health and Human Services. Acc=lemi contamination of human food and at:imal feeds - rmernendations for staae and local agencies. red Arg. 43,242.

December 15.1973. 47, 205. October 22, 8982. 47073.

% Meterology and Atornic Energy - 1968. D. Stade. Ed.. (a ti. pp. 329

6. U.S. Anomic Emergy C-and 347). Availatnhry: NTIS. Spnggfield. Ya. 22161.

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiuson, Reactor Safety Study. Appendia V. WASH.1400lNUREG.75 sol 41.

October 1975. Availatmlery: NTls. Spnngrield. VA. 22161.

S. Dyer. N. C. and Santaa. J. L. PWR Wasae gas treatment system done evaluations ander upset conditions

- final report. Aerojet Nuclear Co. Idaho Falls. Idaho. June 1975

9. Dyer. N. C.. hhh R. J., Kales. E. W., and Basses. J. E., BWR Wasse gas testment system done evaluatsons under upset conditions. Aerojet Nuclear Co.. Idaho Falls. Idaho. May 1974.

10. Patstier. C. A., Resuhs of independent measurements of radioactivity in proceu synerms and emuents at boihng weser seacsors. Environmental Programs Branch USNRC. Washington. D.C.. May 1973 II. lasernational Commauson on Radiological Prosection. Arrommendations of she internanonof Conunission on Aadaological Prorcenon - Radiosion Proverrios. ICRP No. 26. Pergamon Preu. New York. January 17.1977.

12. U.S. Nuclear Regulasory Comminion. Technical guidance for siting ensens development. NUREGCR 2239. USNRC. Washington. D.C.. December 1982.

13. U.S. Nuclear Regulasory Comminion and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. planmng basis for the development of ssene said local sm.; . ..; redsological emergency response plans is aspport of hght water nuclear power giants. NUREG.03%; EPA 520v173416. USNRC .A 'Washington.

= for the D.C.. December 1978.

14. Federal RMisum Council Radiation prosection guidance for fa12ral agencies -

President. Fed. Reg.. 60-4539. 4402 4403. May is.1960.

15. Federal R4===i Council. Radiation protection guidance for federal agencies - anemorandum for the President fed. Art.. 26. 9057-905g. September 26.1%I.

16. Martin. Jr.. J. A., Perspectives on the role of radiological monitoring in an emergency. Trans. Am. Nurt.

. Soc., 34, 727-729. June.1980.

17. National Council on Radiatson Protection and Measurements. Prosection of the thyroid gland in the event of releases of radioiodine. NCRP Report No 55. August 1977.

18. U.S. Nuclear Regulanory Comminion and U.S. Federal Emergency Managenrese Agency. Cneena for preparation and evaluation of redsological emergency response plans and preparedness in support of nu power plants. NUREG4654/ FEM 4Rff l. Revision 1. November 1980 (a t>. Appendia I.)

19. Nuclear Regulatory Comminion. Emergency planning - final regulations. Fed. Arg., 45.162. August 19.1980.

20. Martin. Jr., J. A.. Doses while travelhng under well established plumes.Wrefsh P6vs. J., 32. 305--307 Apnl.1977.

21. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10 (Energy). Part 100 - Reactor site cneeria. USNRC. Washington, D.C.

22. U.S. Nuclear Regulaeory Commission. Overview of the reactor safety study cr=ar==* model. NUREG.

0340. USNRC. Washington. D.C. June 1977.

23. Personal communk*=, Den Albert and Dave AkMeh. Sandia National Labonnones. Albuquerque.N.M.

24. U.S. Nuclear Regulanary Commiuion. Demographic statistics pettaining to nuclear power reactor sites.

NUREG4343. USNRC Washington D.C.. October 1979.

25. U.S. Environmental Proeection Agency. Evacuation rists - an evaluation. EPA-520v674 002. Omce of R=t*== Programs. USEPA. Washington. O C., June 1974.

26. Hamet. C. O.. Seetley J. H., and Quinn. F. M. Mininat:ga- lemons in large scale evacu===. NUS

^

8 Corporataan. Rockville. MD. la 1982 Hazardnus Manenals Spills Conference (Pine-lings). Apnl 19-27 1982. 3. Landwigson. Ed. Avail: Governmenu etitutes. Inc. 966 Hungerford Drive. Rockville. MD 20850.

rin,-aw 1982.

1 1 4

168 CRC Handbook of Management of Radsatum Protection Programs

27. Cast, K. S. and Schweitase, M., Prosectsve actens as a factor in power reactor siung. Omk EJge National Lalmsory. Oak Reige. TN. draft October 1982.

28. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, a perspectsve ceau** planning. TR.77. U.S. Fodsul Emergency

.1--4 Agency. Washington, D C. December 1972.

29. Perry, R. W., LJudse, M. K., and Grasse M. R., E ermanon Mannias in Emergency Manate= car.

g D.C. Henkh & Co.. hainston. MA 1981. IOIIO*

30. Knps G. A.,imhvidual and societal effects of Mme and wartime nuclear Ae. in Proceedmgs relati(*

of a Sypmposium: The Control of Fvpr="4 of the Pubic to lonidng Radmion in the Evem of Accident or Anack. Apnl 1981. National Coimcil on Ita&ar== Proeecten and Measurements. N MD. i where dose a nuclid relatio where point i Thus, or, mc be ESC sec, as In t.

which volum Thus, to a lo from Ass to obt Here, in Tat for the selecti calcul listed thantl I. t

s. .

l

2. t

3.

• a

. . - _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ .O f

M9 APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS ne radionuclide inventories listed in Table 2 in the main text were derived insing the ,

following approach: Dose rate (D) is related to radionuclide concestratson (X) by the relationship:

(I) 6 . (X)(DRF) where DRF is an appropriate dose rate factor. De state of the art today of environmental dose and pathway models is such that dose rate ractors are tabulated for important radio.

nuclides, body organs and pathways. For atmospheric releases x is derived fmm the relationship:

(2)

X " (X /Q')(Q')

where X I Q' is the aeolian dilution factor, the ratio of concentration (x) of a pollutant at a point downwind of a release occurring at a rate Q'. Then, (3) b = (X /Q')(Q')(DRF)

Thus, dose rate D is proportional to release rate. / Q'. X Q', may be obtamed frorn gWa3 -

or, more easily, from graphical displays.' A consqtent set of units for these parameters must be used, of course. One consistent set would be D in radi /sec. X n cunes/m', Q' in curies /

sec, and DRF in rad /sec per curie /m'.

In these units, x/Q' is in sec/m'. It is helpful to picture the inverse of x/Q', i.e.,XQ'/ ,

which has units of m'/sec, i.e., a volumetric flow rate. If a pollutant is mixed with a large volume of fresh air (high flow rate, or high m'/sec), then xtQ' is smali, and vice versa.

Rus, x/Q' is simply a measure of dilution. Good mixing of a pollutant with fresh air leads to a low x/Q'. Values of / X Q' are in the range 10-* to 10-* sec/m' between I and 10 miles l.

from a ground level release.'

Assuming that xtQ' is constant over the penod of release, Equation 3 can be integrated to obtain an equation for the total does (D):

(4)

D = (X /Q')(Q)(DRF)

Here, total dose, D, is proportional to total Curies released, Q. he values of Q tabulated in Table 2 in the main text were derived by simply equating D to a protective action guide for the pathway of interest, assuming a particularly/ adverse X Q' (i.e.,10-* sec/m'), and

' selecting a tabulated DRF appropriate for the particular pathway of interest. Q was then calculated using the last equation, above. De DRFs used to derive the Qs in Table 2 are listed in Table 2. Although Other tabulations may provide slightly different values of DFRs i

' than those used herein, the principal insight would not change significantly.

REFERENCES

1. U.S. Ascanic Emergy Comminion. Final enenessessal samement numencal guides to meet the cmente

" WASH 1258. Vot. 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulanary Counmisason. Waalungeon.

"as low as pr=me=Me ,

D.C.,1973

2. U.S. Nuclear Regulanary Comnunion Regulseory Guide 1.109. U.S.N.R.C. Washmgion. D.C.,1977.

3. Turner, D. B. Workbook of :=- '-t desperssoa essunanes. AP.26 U.S. EmWat Prosecuon a

Agency, Office of Air Programs, Research Triangle Part. N.C., sevised 1970.

i *:

e CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protectwn Progrens 119 '

t APPENDIX B'"

t LWR ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES SPECTRUM-RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS AND Possible releases of radioactive materials from light water nuclear power I reactors (LW range from the routine and benign to the catastrophic [ an TMlthe latter types of accidents were not expliettly considered in the AEC and NRC lic g

process. Since TMI, the potential for the high (off-site) j co De demarcation is the current explicit consideration of those accidents which include m or massive containment failures.

he pmblem, of course, is the enormous amount of volatile rad onctive species prese in the core of an operating LWR and the power in the decay heat (after shutdown) ava ,

to drive this material from the core into the environment. Shutdown decay heat is of the e order of 3 to 5% of full power during the first hour after shutdown. l driving For a 3300 megawatt-

, thermal (MWT) reactor, initial decay heat is an impressive 150 MWT, a substantia force if not controlled (vaporization of water at a rate ofl ilabouti 1000 gal / min could remov g this decay heat and protect the core, by the way). De in-core activities of vo at e spec es are impressive also. The bi!! ion, or so, curies of these species ('/, hr after shutdown) c be broken down roughly as follows: 300 million (M) Ci of noble gases; 600 M Ci of

,( radioiodines; 130 M Ci of tellurium-132: 30 M Ci of ruthenium-106;20 M Ci of radiocesi

. and a host of other radioisotopes in substantial abundance Dese are the ' potential ra l,

sarrce terms.

It is instructive to compare these inventories to the activity required to be released to r induce doses ectual to Protective Action Guides. For a X/Q' of 10-* sec/m', ,i the followi

.e table can be constructed e Organ /pethway PAG (rema) Q (curies) 1.500.000 Whole body /cnoud (esterna!) garnas 5

600 (1 131) Thyroid /mhalanon by cinid 25 E 20-131) Thymidlair-penure. cow-nutk-ingesnom by cinld 15 a j c hus, a release of only very small fractions of the core inventory would ]be retal to 0 result in doses exceeding PAGs in the near fic!d off-site. However, only j irradiated g

primary cooling water contain the requisite inventories g j y site, only the reactor core, the spent fuel storage pool, and the prunary  ; water sh 1 concern and a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or the significant threat thereof would t te necessary precursor to protective action off-site. De fuel in the fuel storage  ;

1 pool i

]

s, start with, or course, so the primary concem from a PAG pe $

a a preventive PAG of 1.5 rem for the milk pathway, for w i f

d 1-131 from the waste gas storage tank at a PWR site, or the effluent treatrrent l system a

, f i = "Cansquence Scenanos sud Sensitivnies", and " Release t ii

• Combmes Mr. Mania's two Wortshop r.; l

3 naraciensues fmen a spectrum of Accidents"

%g of the Wcetshop on 1 J f- ! Aspects of Duergency Re-

• • Reprint frorn NURECR&32. ' 1 - 3, 1981. Menlo Part. CA. August 1982. U. .S Nuclear il sponse Plans br Nuclese Power Plants. Dec.

5 Regulasary C "m Washington. D.C.

-)

E ,

171 BWR, could result in pasture contaminaten leading to such a PAG, especially during a period of precipitation.

The masses of various materials that could be involved in a core melt accident may be

• of interest also:

H,0 2 x 10'kg t>O, 10' kg Zr (clad) 2.0 x 10' kg Sa (clad) 300 kg Fe (structure) 2.5 x 10'(in care) 2.5 x 10' kg teore + bonorn structure)

I is kg Cs 255 kg Ba. Sr. Mo 416 kg Zr (fission product) 276 kg Rs.Rh.Pd.Te 318 kg and smaller masses of other radionuclides. (Silver in control rods is receiving increased attention currently because of its low melting point and volatility at high temperatures).

Many chemical forms of these materials would be present in a core melt scenario; gases, vapors, particulates, soluble, and insoluble forms are possible in many combinations. 'Ihe radioiodines and :esiums are of special concem because of volatility and high consequence potential. (Noble gases are relatively innocuous). A noteworthy complicating factor in this regard is the decay chain Te, I, Xe, Cs, Ba,12; a halide (I) decays into a noble gas (Xe),

which decays into an alkali metal (Cs). The mart-r is extremely complicated, but an important current consensus is that in an aqueous environment, even at high wmperatures, I and Cs would exist as I and Cs* ions dissolved in water and in a dry system I, would be the dominant form of iodine. Many interesting reactions involving steel, paint, hydrogen, lu-bricants (oils), steam..and high temperatures which produce organic iodines (e.g. gaseous CH 31) have also been noted. If released to the atmosphere, CH 3 1 could desm.pe in sunlight to form I,, however; the phenomenon has been observed, but little is known about it.

The distribution of particle sizes is also of interest. Very little hard data is available in this regard. What is known can be succinctly stated: insoluble materials rapidly agglomerate to diameters in the range 0.5 to 2. m, with log-nonnal distributions of geometric standard deviation in the range 1.5 to 1.8. In an aqueous (steam) environment in a contamment these particles act as condensation nuclei for the formation of water droplets, the sizes of which are in the range 10 to 20 pm. Settling of larEer droplets acts to cap the size. This information pertains to intact containments and the atmosphere within a steamy containment. Interest-ingly, fog and a definite violet tinge has been observed at high I, concentrat ons in such an envircament. Very little is known in the reactor community regarding the particle size distributions that would be evident in the atmosphere in failed containment scenarios. Evap-oration of droplets of hot water released (blown out) to the atmosphere would leave residual particles of speculative sire but probably less than several microns. For intact containments, only very small (submicron) sized particles would be released to the atmosphere; most likely, only the noble gases would be released in significant abundance, over a long term, a la the TMI accient.

Before prrreeding to a discussion of major accident sequences and consequences thereof, it is worthwhile, even necessary, to establish a perspective regarding their probability or likelihood. Succinctly, the likelihood is very low for a single reactor and for the industry in any year. 'Ihe calculated probability per reactor year projected over the lifetime of the cur.ent industry is also low, but there is a large uncertainty in the current estimates. The current status is illustrated in Figure 1, in which release fractions of the core inventory for various accidents are plotted against the calculated probability of such releases. The data points displayed are taken from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and are illustrative

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173 only since they may or may not truly represent the cunent industry, post-TMl fixes. The following comments on this data and its importance are a fair representation of the cunent estimates. nonetheless. It is obvious from the figure that the probabilities of major release fractions are at or below about 2 x 10-5/ reactor year. It ir extremely difncult to cope with such small numbers. Assuming 100 reactors of current vintage operating for 40 years each (the cunent industry), and a probability of a major release of 2 x 10-5/reacsor year, the probability of a major release during the life of such an industry would be 0.06, or 12:1 against such an occurrence. This is a not uncomfortable prospect. Unfortuamely, the un-certainty in the basic probability estimate is very large, off-times quoted as at least an order of magnitude either way. Thus, the calcuinted chance of a major release in the U.S. over the life of the industry is in the range between virtual certainty and at least 100:1 agair.st.

This estimate does not include considerations of sabotage and certain extemal events, e.g.,

l I

massive earthquakes, it is also worth noting that the large release fractions (0.1 to 0.8) of the core inventory as presented in Figure I have been strongly attacked as being unrealistically high. Consid-I erable efforts are underway at this time (ca. carly 1982) to assess the poecntial release fractions more realistically. For scoping purposes,it is merely noted here that certain potential release fractions can hardly increase significantly (from, e.g.,0.8) and that a reduction by a factor of ten to twenty woukt virtually eliminate the chance of early death and injury as consequences of LWR accidents, assuming only a modicum of leisurely protective actions

! off. site.

Catastrophic decompression of a containment would result in the release of large amounts of water, at least, at sonic velocities (choked flow). Depending on the location of the break and the initial trajectory of the release (up or down), plume rise up to 600 m, or so, is possible, but the range 10 to 200 m is more likely. Release rates as high as 2 x 105 g/sec (H,0) have been estimated, it is not known whether or not the water would flash to vapor in the aur-yha, or agglomerate into drops large enough to settle out. Mass loadings could 5

be as high as 20 g (H 2 O)/m (air) at a mile or so, i.e., at the saturation point at STP. (A deep sea fog contains I to 32 g H O/m' air). Explosive decompress'xm would me spectacular, or course. The leading puff release could last from minutes to tens of minuses, depending h of water primarily on the magnitude of the driving pressure and reservoir. The puff t could contain anywhere from very little of the core inventory to major fractions of the core inventory of radionuclides, depending on the accident sequence (loss of water before or after core damage or melt).

Patently, if a containment does not fait catastrophically, longer duration releases (a la TMI) would result. These releases would be gases and vapors, predominantly. However, daughter products of the noble gases and condensible vapors would be attacted to atmos-pheric panicles, most likely in the subnueron range (0.1 pm or less) where the hvailable number density and surface area (for condensation) is highest. These daughter products are .

relatively short lived (40-min half. life, or less, e.g., Rb-88 and Cs-138). The capture of these paniculate daughter products in air samplers could prove misleading to the unwary.

Many containment failure / core melt scenanos can be postulated, but four sequences en-compass the various possibilities:

1. Core melt / melt-through of basemat

2. Core melt / containment failure by overpressure

3. Containment failure by overpressure / core melt

, 4. Containment bypass / core melt The first two of these are notonous. The first is the " china syndrome" accident where the core melts through the concrete base and enters the ground. Pressure reliefis via tunneling of water, steam, etc. to the surface, with a ground level release, or only a small plurne rise.

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ET4 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protec' tion Programs be held his would be a dirty release and should be obvious. There is a good chance, however, that Part of1 only invisible noble gases would percolate to the surface. Time delays after melting of the for wh,i l core through the steel pressure vessel to the basemat could range from hours to days, and bowev(

never in some cases. Failure of containment heat ternoval systems during this sequence rem, rr could (would in small containments) result in containment fracture, or catastrophic failure collecti 2

resulting in a rapid blowdown. A I ft hole, e.g., a 2' x 6' crack, would result in a Pe0Pl c blowdown (blowout) in a '/ hr 2 or less. Operability of containment sprays and fihers would 100 m influence (reduce) releases to the environment, but the results would be messy, moretheless, subseg because of flashing of steam and water aerosols carrying radioactivity. A very large (200 cem. -

l m) visible plume rise could result if the release were to be directed upward. Ramout from formar

}

the plume (puff) is possible. Substantial deposition near the source and a moderate plume CFRE rise could result for a downward directed release. Major fractures below the water line would CFRI release the largest fraction of the available activity (curies). The smaller the crack or opening requin above the water line the larger the resulting ratio of noble gas to other species of materials, dose (

and the slower the release. In general, the less watc $ .! E f!=shed or otherwise projected excell to the atmosphere, the greater should be the ratio of noble gases to other species, and the wwld less the consequences off-site. be fie he last two sequences listed above would involve containment failure before core melt. result Both would involve major losses of low activity coolant to the atmosphere initially, but with large possibly significant differences in off-site consequences due to the different potentials for find ,i

' internal scrubbing via natural processes. he third sequence could result from a failure to G,is scram (trip, shut off) the reactor upon contamment isolation, the dumping of larEe amounts there d of power into the containment (more than the containment heat removal sysaems could Cons handle), and containment failure due to overpressure. The resulting massive loads could be re

.' l

" cause a massive LOCA, or LOCAs, and core melt. Relatively large fractions of the radio, radia

$ active materials released from the core could remain in containment deposited on various and c i surfaces because of the relatively lower driving force (i.e., loss of pressure before melt). C"I' Major releases at ground level could result, nevertheless, but less than that produced when Inth e a strong driving force exists on radioactive material per se. respc

• %e fourth scenario is called the interfacing systems LOCA, or Event V in the Reactor II.C

^ Safety Study where it was first identified. In this scenario the primary cooling water blows 50"O down via a failure in isolation valves separating the 2000 psi primary system (PWR, BWR th e

- pressure is 1000 psi) and a low p essure system (e.g., RHR system at 100 psig). This S

% blowdown by-passes containment entirely. There is enough potential energy to actually M5 b

"I destroy the auxiliary building if released in a short time ('/2 hr or less). The core then melts, C0"'

8L releasing materials at a rate proportional to volatility (i.e., in sequence, noble gases, iodines, Ana and cesiums, etc. with some mixing). It is currently assumed that because of the high heat app

• these volatiles escape to the atmosphere without significant plateout in the plumbing. There is a possibility being investigated, that the driving forces for these volatiles would not be sufficient to prevent substantial plateout, resulting in a smaller (yet substantial) source term.

Vapors released to the atmosphere would eventually condense on atmospheric particles (and possibly some core matter). This would be a short duration, also spectacular, accident with n potentially very high consequences because of the short (no) waming time before release.

Although the initial blowdown could result in a moderate plume rise of the relatively low

• activity water, the high activity releases could be near or at ground level. Since the iden-tification of this sequence, quality assurance on the interfacing systems has been intensified a so reduce its likelihood substantially.

. t-n Many other types of accidents can occur, of course, but unless irradiated fuelis camaged. /

-t' radiation exposures off-site should be well below that necessary to induce a dose for which there would be a detectable radiation effect in the human body..As noted above, PAGs -

should not be exceeded unless damage to irradiated fuel or a lhCA occurs. Nevertheless.

ti '

• emergencies may well be declared for non-IACA or fuel damage accidents, hearmgs may 1

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175 l

be held, fines assessed, and reports written in response to such accidents of lesser importance.

Part of the record may be an assessment of doses and contamination levels in the environment, for which meteorological information will be used, at least in part. It must be recognized, however, tht.t for such events the collective (population) dose, i.e., the man-am, or person-rem, may well be the prime issue. Latent cancers and genetic effects are functions of the collective dose, it is important to recognize that such doses occur predominantly where the people are, which is predominantly far from the source cf the release, often between 20 and 100 miles from the source. Thus, regional meterology during the penod of release and subsequent transport, rather than site meteorology, would be the prime meteorological con-ccm. Site meteorology during the penod of release would be used, in part, to assess con-formance with pertinent regulations regarding doses at or near the site hr===tary, i.e.,10 CFR Part 20, Appendix 1 to 10 CFR Part 50,10 CFR Part 100 (NRC Regulations), and 40 CFR Part 190 (EPA Regulation). For such assessments, numerous dosimeters are currently required in the site environs to provide a direct measurement of external (cloud) gamma l

' dose (and " shine" dose). Air samplers are also required in the environs, but there is an excellent chance that any release would miss these fixed samplers. Many small accidents ,

would result in puff releases, and would be long gone before portable air samplers could l be fielded. Thus, site meteorology would be important to assess inhalation exposures nearby resulting from small releases. Since small accidental releases are virtually certain, whereas large releases are speculative, it may well be the case that the site meteorological data will find its most important use in demonstrating that pertinent regulations are not violated.

l Given an accidental release in-plant or on-site, which results in a release no the atmosphere, l

there may or may not be a measured release or release rate available (i.e., a source term).

Consequences of noncore-melt accidents will be discussed first. Most releases in-plant should be released, if at all, through engineered safety features (e.g., filters) and past or through radiation detectors. Two aids would be available in this case: source terms should be small l

and dominated by noble gases, and a measured release rate would be available. An exception could occur if the source of a release is aged spent fuel in the spent fuel storage pool (SFSP).

' I in this case weak gamma and beta emitting longer-lived noble gases (Xe-133 and Kr-85, I respectively) could be mixed in roughly equal proportions (curies) with other volatile species (1, Cs) and a source term may not be known, especially in older LWRs. Normally, if a source term has been measured, that release can be assumed (at least initially) to have passed through engineered safety features, lacking any evidence to the contrary.

Some smaller accidents could result in a release that by-passes monitored release paths.

Most of the potentially more serious noncore-melt accidents would fall in this category. 'Ihe consequences of such accidents are assessed using very conservative assumptions in Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for all but the very oldest LWRs. A typical table in an SAR could appear as follows:

Done (rem) i at 2206 se*

Duration whale lefrguest of rulesse Thyroid body scru.=n 2 hr 0.1 0.1 Radioacuve wasic system failure 1.0 2 hr 13

+ Steam generator tube ruprure*

Fuel bandling accident 2 hr 2.5 W Limiting fautu*

• 2 hr M l .0 Main sacam tee break 1.2 2 hr 85 Large-break LOCA

. m * % distance each yields the hishe58 rad'*l* sic 81 d 'e f 11 wins the y=='M accident.

• Dese presume some fuel faihees as part of the scenario I

i

e 116 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Proeretion Programs is' -

Table 1 CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT EXPOSURE FATHWAYS TO LATENT I CANCER FATALITIES FOR A PWR.2 RELEASE CATEGORY" l .

Percentages E

0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 I I External cloud 0.2 0.1 se 8 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.2 6 3 inhalation from 0.5 4 cloud 3 2 7 0.7 0.9 3 le 16 Emiernal ground t<7 days) 68 8 28 3 4 Il 66 External ground 12 t>7 days) 2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 3 lahalation of re. 0.2 1 suspended contaminuson 3 I I I 9 10

Ingeuson of con. 2 1 j

taminased foods ,,;

,i 5 6 16 000 100 Subsoials 18 16 39 j

8

• Encept thyroid cancer, which is calculased separasely.

Such information could be used to scope the potential consequences, recognizing the extreme conservatisms in the assumptions and calculations performed before the fact. The various assumptions are listed in SARs. One conservatism, the use of the ** semi-infinite" dose factor for extemal (cloud) gamma whole body dose is noteworthy. 'the use of this dose I

' model tends to overestimate the whole body dose by a factor of 5 to 20 for the meterological conditions assurned during the release period (e.g., Pasquill Class F stability, I m/sec wind

• speed). Consequences of accidents of this ilk would involve the inhalation and contamination pathways predominantly. From a meterological standpoint, the trajectory of such releases, ground level puffs for the most part, would be of paramount concern, mosdy for the initial direction of site and off-site radiological survey terms. Diffusion should be of secondary concern initially, since the lack of a source term would prohibit an accurate dose calculation.

(Although this is certainly true, guesstimates of dose would undoubtedly be made to satisfy craving appetites. For such gross estimates visual observation of local weather conditions }

should suffice to estimate the stability class at the time and precalculated doses and dose "

rates for vanous scenanos would be useful assessment sids).

~ Consequences of releases of major fractions of the core inventory of volatile radioactive

- species to the atmosphere would be severe, widespread, far-reaching and long lasting. From a meterological and protective action standpoint, it is extremely important to recognize the E

' high worth of the ground contamination pathways as compared to the cloud (external) gamma and inhalation pathways. An appreciation of this perspective can be gained by a perusal of

.I, the information displayed in Figure 2 and Table 1. Figure 2 illustrates the calculated con-i:1 tribution of various nuclides to whole body dose, by three major pathways at a range of '

.a 1 '/, mile, for one postulated core melt scenario (the BWR-1 release from the Reactor Safety ni .i Study). Average whole body dose contributions are displayed, as calculated for 91 different weather sequences. The time scale on the honzontal axis pertams to the inhalation pathway Mi only, and merely indacates that the whole body dose aher inhalation moanannically increases iI sl i somewhat over a period of time as the radioactive matenal in the body releases its energy.

It i The important meteorological perspective is that the contributions of done via the three t: r pathways (inhalation, cloud (external) gamma, and ground contanunation) are about equal

(1/3 each) on the average at short range for these scenanos. This is for a 4 hr exposure to i

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ground contamination. Patently, the longer the ground exposure, the larger of the ground contamination pathway.The relative i illustratedimportance of deposition f releases of mixed chemical species,Reactor increases with dist organs and pathways for another postulated acciden h pathways. Even for the immediatei period h of plume (pu 1

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ground pathways dominate the insult because of the long exposure times involved.

i Intercept of precipitation and plume (puff) traverse could increase the relative worth of FIGtn

- time ground pathways for a mixed species release. After the composition of the source term lo. =

and ar and the release trajectory, precipitation could well be the next most important parameter of concem in an actual release situation. As illustrated in Figures 3,4, and 5, precipitation within 10 miles of a release point could dominate the magnitude of the consequences, as as a

'l compared to many other meterological variables. (Res s Although not shown explicitly in any of these displays, the coincidence of a major mixed Fr i species release, precipitation, a calm and a major populated area would induce among the quer a highest consequences in accident / release scenarios, in terms of the number of persons affected frorr s' and the value of the property damaged. Calms at the point of a release could be beneficial. quer h A calm after some traverse at nominal wind speeds (5 to 10 mph) could result in high per i u consequences. In some respects, a calm downwind of a release, or precipitation, could be in ti b beneficial, e.g., if they occur in unpopulated areas. But precipitation along the plume traverse oftl

> has the clear potential for contammatmg surface and ground water, as well as surfaces. for i Surface waters could carry contamination hundreds of miles from a release point, requiring, ont 6

• Accideas in which it is precipuaung (rain or snow) m the mart of release.

• ** Accidents in which it is act precipitaing (rain or snow) a the uan of release.

• *** Sharl&ng facw for airborne redsonuclides = 1.0. Shiel&ng factor for radionuclides deposited on gand =

'o r 0.7. l< lay esposure to thhdes om ground.

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• and low wind" conditions cais at the start of the release. Prosecsed doses are for en individualloaned outdoors?"

and are condaional on a PWR "asmosphenc" selease tPWR I.5).

1 as a mimmum, sequential shutdown of water intake pumps at municipalities downstream.

(Restart of pumps after a short period might well be possible for a slug impact).

From an overall perspective standpoint, the insensitivities of certain important conse-l quences to annual average meteorology is worth noting. To examine this maner, hourly data l from 29 weather stations across the U.S. were used for consequence calcahoons. Conse-quences were calculated assuming a mix of major release core melt scenarios (10-* to 10-5 l

! per reactor year probabilities). 'Ihe results are summarued in the three figsacs in Figure 6.

In these figures, the magnitudes of the c@A'ad consequences are displayed as a function l

of the probability of a consequence of certain magnitude. The calculations were performed for two sites: the heavily populated Indian Point site about 35 miles north of New York City on the Hudson River, and the Diablo Canyon site near Santa Barbara, California, for which

• Accidents in which the w,adspeed is greener than 10 nyh as the start of release.

" Acendeau in which the windipeed is neu chan 5 mph an che sun of release.

"* Shieldsag factor for taborne redsonuclides = 1.0. Shielding factor for radionuct, des W on ground =

0.7.1 day exposise to red onuet. des on ground.

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• and night." Projected doses are for en individual locaned a=*ianrs."* and are n=ds= mat on a PWR

• • atmosphenc" selease (PWit 13).

there are no residents within 5 miles of the site. As is readily apparent from the Indian Point figures, the results of the early death and latent cancer fatality calculations are particularly insensitive to weather sequences except at the low probability, higher consequence portx>ns N of the curves. Because of the lack of residents close to Diablo Canyon the conditional probability of an early death is much lower than that at Indian Point, by two orders of magnitude, in fact. Since the chance of an early death beyond 5 miles is low to begin with, the Diablo Canyon results are in many ways an amplification of the tails of the Indian Point figures, where low probability coincidences of population, calms, and precipitation (as well as the source term) govern the results. Note that the conditional probabilmies in the figures should be reduced by a factor between 10-* and IO'S to arrive at an absolute probability estimate. 'Ihese are indeed low probabilities. As displayed in the latent cancer figure, different meterological sequences produce very little differences in latent cancer pmshetion, as noted

• E

• Accidents in wtuch the release starts between 7fl0 a.m. and 700 p.m.

" Accidents in which the release starts between 7.00 p.m. and 7A10 a m.

N *" Shielding factor for arborne oudsonuclides = 1.0. Shiel&ng factor for radionuclides 4ponned on ground =

0.7. twisy exposise to rMides on ground.

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I above. The same result pertains for chronic releases; annual collective! dose depends R alm g j solely on curies released and total population, and has little the people are.

f i"

Dus, consequences depend predominantly on theiimagnitude i e of a release andi the rel j

,u trajectory dudng transport, and wherej the people are loca a

,p of an emergency, the meteorological information of importance would be seather pro ec- ,

/u re 4 tions, for the most part, rather than the site meterological D j informa

• 'I few accident sequences or scenarios for which it would be possible to project or calc

[ a near-field dose (one objective), i.e., a source term would be available. Otherwise,

n. dose and dose rate objectives would be accomplished by utilizing near-field l dosime

.4:

IC augmented by data collected by monitoring s H is teams. To s i

to be used, also supplemented by data from mobile radiological monsonng team .

.[ would not be a short term need, however,

,. ,3, Finally, certam aspects of the hourly wind roce arxi accident and peceective L action se-on i quences during the TM1 accident a.t worth discussion. Figure l 7 p.a the ho l

- -rr . .

183 vector as measured at the site during the first day. Because of a computer crash, this data was not obtained until several days after the accident even though verbal reports from the site were obtained throughout the time period. Note that the wind direction at the site varied continually for over 12 hr before becoming steady during the night. The variability of direction is characteristic of the light (wispy) winds during the day. It is especially noteworthy . U-  ;

that between 7:30 a.m. and 8%)0 a.m. warnings of imminent evacuations to the west of the i site were made by the State (PA). At 8:10 a.m. this preparedness was reduced to a standby  !

notice because dose rate measurements to the west were "only" I mR/hr. His was just at [/

y  ;

the time the core was uncovered by several feet, or so! Further, even had an evacuation to the west of the site been initiated at 81)0 a.m., or so, by 9:00 a.m. the wind had shifted to #jf the north!_As_noted by the NRC Special Inquiry Group, the evacuation of the low Population M Zone (2.5 radius area surrounding the site) should have been completed based on in-plant g77 /M observations, as was set forth in the emergency plans, and as emphasized in current NRC gg emergency planning guidance. His is especially noteworthy because the current NRC pro- p tective action guidance is based on two imminently reasonable guidelines: do not plan to send people outside if heavily laden plumes are in the area, and do not plan to await an .,

actual major release to the atmosphere before recommending protective actions to people, nese two fundamentals underlie the Emergency Action Level and predetermmed protective action concepts developed before and since the TMI accident. From a dose projection /

meterological standpoint, this means that the plans are laid with the explicit understanding,

! that projected doses would most likely not be known or very low wherepresective action' , O4 weld be recommended. His fundamental perspective limits both dose projection and rr.et-crological needs for short-term, short-rante protective action decisions. Dese needs would hav: to be satisfied for longer term, longer range projections, however. During TMl, the eva:uation recommendation which did~ occur was made predom'mantly on the basis of in-plant uncertainties and public concem as compared to dose projections (and meterology).

De assessment of projected health effects, calculated the first day and reponed days and we:ks later, did utilize site and regional meterological data to buttress the off-site dosirnetry data. His sequence is virtually planned for the future, albeit with (hopefully) better coor-diration and more timely actions and results, if needed REFERENCES Reactor Safety Snady WASH-1400 (NUREG-754)l4) USNRC, October 1975 (n b. Appendia VI. Calculation of reactor acculent consequences).

WaE, I. B., et al., Overview of the Reactor Safe'y Sandy r%== Model. NUREG4340. USNRC, June 1977.

Tedmcal basis for estimaung fission product behavior channs t.WR acculents. NUREG4772, USNRC. June 1981.

Adrich D. C., et al., Sandia Nauonal Laborasones. Examination of offsite radaological emergency protective measures for nuclear reactor accidents involving core melt. NUREGCR.Il31 USNRC, June 1978.

Ahlrich. D. C., Impact of dispersion parameters ce calculased reactor accident consequences. SAND 79-2081, Sandia Nanonal Laboratones. Albuquerque. N.M., November 1979.

Martis, J. A., Jr., Perspectives on the roie of tw6 gent monitanns in an emergency, Trans. Am. Nasel. Soc.,

e n cat for iting seria ve nent UEGCR.2239. USNRC, in peparanos. January 1982, (estimased avasiainlity date May 1982).

Illuierd R. K. and Celesman, L. F., Nanaral trarupost effects on fission product behavior is the containment syuems esperiment. BNWl-1457. Banelle Memonal lasutute Pacific Northwest taboratones Rachland. WA.,

i December 1970.

Huclear acronols in reactor safety. Nuclear Emergy Agencyorgaruzation for Economac Co Operanon and Devel-l upment. 2. rue Andrd-Pascal. 75775 Pans Cedes 16. France. (in english) June 1979.

Pr-alamps of the CSNI Specialists Meetang on Nuclear Aciosols in Reactor Safety NUREGCR.1724. USNRC,

, Washington D C. (in english), October 1980.

Deemis, R., Ed., HaMbook on Aerosols. TID-26608. NT15. U.S. Dept. Commerce, Spnngfield. V.A. 1976.

?

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194 CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Proention Programs APPENDIX C  :

DOSES WHILE TRAVELING WITH A PUFF i

Under the guidance discu in the main text of this chapter a precautionary evacuation j

i of areas within 2 to 3 miles of a LWR would be recommended before contamment failure for a core melt accident sequence. It is possible that some persons could be outsade traveling _ ]

should a major puff release occur while they are in transit. This Appendix will provide some I

insight on the relative worth of traveling while caught in a puff, as compared to the case where a person remains stationary and is exposed to the full puff.

he analysis will emphasize the worst case of actually being caught in a plume. Rus, it is prBumed that the planned emergency response scenario does not work for some reason

• As a point of reference, only 6 min is required to travel 3 miles at a nominal country speed _

of 30 mph. De implicauons of this statement are obvious. In this light, the following might be W. bed as an elegant analysis of trivia, but some interesting insights are obtainedm Two

~ cases are considered: traveling downwind with a puff and traveling upwind ib.gh a puff.

TRAVELING DOWNWIND WITH A PUFF l-From the equations in Reference 20 of the main text the following equation can be developed for the case of a person traveling downwind with a puff when the dose rate is proportional to inverse distance squared (reahstic, conservative case):

puff .

D. = D//w consc where: rois the distance from the starting point to the release point; D. is the dose rate at n

much ro: D. is the dose accumulated while traveling downwind in this unfortunate manner, and at mc w is the speed of travel.

dose Note that the traveler's speed is equal to the wind speed. If the wind speed is less than areas w a person can outrun a puff and the equauon does not hold. If one starts earlier than tir: f,arthi release or at the instant of release, and travels faster than the wind speed (noannal 5 to 10 mph) the dose can be avoided altogether, if the puff does not follow the road, doses would be lower than that indicated by the equauon. If one is overtaken by the puff, which passes over the traveler, the traveler would be exposed to a lower dose than the sf ahnnary person '

A?

at the closer distance, and to a lower dose than calculated here. If the release is of long soun duration, the person traveling would be exposed to only a fraction of the release as compared give.

to the stahonary person. In the nNed reference it is shown that doses while traveling at a moderate speed across a puff would be less than if tne were to travel downwind with a puff. Rus, this analysis is on the worst case side and pertains generally to a very unlikely evacuauon scenario. It could pertam to a valley. situation with an unfortunate delay in warning and time, however, Now, the stationary person at to would be exposed to a dose D, given by:

D = D' T

, Whi where T is the duranon of the puff. His person would also be exposed to ground contam-

, L

, l dist snahon, but this dose will be ignored here. Dus, i /

Hus, DA, = r/(wT) a ben

[ 20 i der-T is speculative, of course, and would be difficult to predict during an c..w..cy, much less ahead of time. Under the puff assumpoon,let T = 0.5 hr, which is the shonest duration f on I. .

f

l 185  !

l Table I TRAVELING TO STATIONARY DOSE RATIOS (TRAVEL DOWNWIND WITH A PUFF)*

• Tr w. speed-Starths h 5 mph it aph 30 unph 30emph

r. tmass) 1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.07 2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.17 3 I.2 0.6 0.3 0 20 4 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.27 I

5 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.33 Puff dunman assummed to be 0.5 br.1.mager duration releases will decrease the calculased done to the traveler.

• Expos,se to ground - --- by the stationary traveler is neglected. Inclusion of this would reduce the raisos shown ,

in she table.

• Traveler's speed esanned equal to the wind speed. and starting tinue ma* equal to the tune shes she pufT reaches or . (Nom-I inal wind speed is 5 to 10 mph.)

puff estimated in the Reactor Safety Study for a core melt accident.1his will tend to conservatively maximize the ratio.

The results using these assumptions are shovm in Table 1. The dose ratios are generally l

much less than one for persons starting at close range (ro less than 3 miles) and traveling at moderate speed. The trends in the data comport with intuition: traveling faster lowers the dose to the traveler and leaving nearby areas provides relatively greater benefit than leaving areas further away. Interestingly, traveling at slow speeds with the puff, from distances further away, could conceivably be worse than staying in place.

TRAVELING UPWIND IbTO A PUFF Assuming that dose rate increases with inverse distance squared as one approaches the source, it can be shown that the dose accumubed while traveling upwind into a puff is given by:

D., = D / (r, - r,V(r,w) and the ratio of this dose to D. is:

D.JD, = r/r - r,y(wr,T)

Where r, is the closest distance of approach to the source let T = 0.5 hr, as before, and r, = 0.5 mile, which is a nominal LWR site boundary distance. Then the calculated ratio D,JD, is given in Table 2 for some example conditions.

As shown in Table 2, traveling from long distances toward the source would be far from ,

beneficial under the assumed conditions. (But recall, the time required to travel 5 miles at 20 mDh is only 10 min. This re-emphasizes the extremely pessimistic =<sumrmians used to derive the ratios in Table 2. This also maha<i= the potential value of anfearly)waming).

On the other hand, even traveling into a puff could be beneficial for personYsfarting from lg -

l

• • ^ .. h.

v jm_ , .

IM CRC Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs Table 2 i I TRAVELING TO STATIONARY DOSE ,

" RATIOS (TRAVELING UPWIND INTO A PUFP Traveler's speed

' Starting h

r. Immes) 5 emph M mph 30 amph M mph t 0.4 0.2 0.l 0.07 st 2 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.4

-' 9.0 4.5 3.0 o' 5

s

• Puff duration = 0.5 hr. Saec boundary distance = 0.5 mile.

I Travel starts when puff reaches ro. No gnmnd contammation ,

I exposures.

• Rano not calculased, the travel time would be longer than the a

' puff duration and the equauon does not hold for this case.

i I -

. short range and traveling at moderate country speeds, as compared to staying in place and

' being exposed to the full puff and any ground contamination.

Y 3brief. it would be better to 20 rapidly through a puff than to stay in place and be ff

_ exposed to all of it. And the greater the warning time, the better.

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{w ;cg y ;p y ;w:Q,;p.BM y 5pmay T yy @hygg.4yg 5 F.;Q;e g @yg, g;d.F W AUG 9 1979 NOTE FOR: Brian K. Grimes James R. Miller FROM: Jim Martin

SUBJECT:

ACTION LEVELS You're going to be talking about action levels, so I though you should see some that have been accepted. These are attached. Note the following:

1.

Action levels are observables. Protective Action Guides (PAGs) are not observables. (PAGs are projected doses - but we have no anticipitory dosimeters.)

2. Action levels are predetermined conditions for which sps:ific notifications and actions should be initiated.

3. Ad hoc actions can always be taken by those at the scene. The action levels are essentially " stops", i.e. if you ever see these, quit arguing and start doing specific things.

4. Since action levels are predetermined stops on navel pondering, they are usually set rather high for the action contemplated, i.e.

we're point.

willing to allow trained people to do their thing - up to a

5. To avoid overreacting to fast transients, a persistence (e.g. five minutes) should be assigned to the action levels, especially where very disruptive actions are contemplated.

I have also attached a sample Emergency Classification / Notification /

Predetermined Action scheme from the Zimmer docket. It's a good illustration of a succinct summary of such a scheme that should be acceptable.

Jim Martin Attachments: As stated cc: R. W. Houston L. Soffer R. Priebe -

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12.9.3.4 Local Government Salem County Sheriff and local Civil In the event o_f an emergency, the #

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%- Defense Director could be called upon for assistance. The County Sher d74 working with the local author'ities, could provide assistance to evacua'

$3 -

E population in the area should evacuation become necessary. The local Civil Defense Agency could also provide men and equipment.

a:

In the event of the declaration of a Class 1 LOCA (see P. 12.9-40), t EM Delaware Division of Emergency Planning and Operations and/or Lower 13

+ w, M Alloways Creek Twp. (depending on meteorological conditio'ns) would bc

notified directly by PSE&G in the absence of evidence of positive and definite State response within 20 minutes of State notificati.on by PSE

-2 ..:

c

. ~J This notification scheme will be tested annually.

M '

95 Radiation Management i Corporation-Philadelphia, Pa./

-G 12.9.3.5 i /

7f5 t f i.53 A me(ical assist,anc planhasbeendeveloped(g,in cooperati)n.with Radiz Atd * -

\y j

W Manas ement Corpora on. This corporat ion cani provide assi $tance in si.2 l \ \

eva: t ation and management of radig incidents. A fullr qualified dy and'homplet facil( ties are available4b6r on'-sfte aid,.' transportation

'N i .' $

%s thelx\signatedbos \ ital, and the subspquentstreatment ofSpersonnel wi-g -de

\t involving 1 radioactive materijals. y v -

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.x  : compan es for the expressed purpose of providing the,nopessary person

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_i and fac lities to. meet the needs of a'ny radiatio'n incidefit. The

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q personnel on the pe\rmanent staff facilities are provided'at the hospi j!. .

M, of the University of Pennsylvania and at the

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'.Procodures to cover a spectrum of accidents.in which~ normal radiation monitoring is unavailabic (e.g. , out o f se rvice. c r of f;9st, ale high) .

~'

The following accidents are considered as parPo'f 4he Salem Emergency ,

g- ,-

Implementation Procedures: @

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.c Case I LOCA A LOCA assuming severe core damage - fu6k mel, ting '(Regulatory Gu'ide 1.4 assumptions) 100% of the noble gases and 25% of the ' iodines contained in the core are assumed released to the containment.. Th[ containment initially .

leaks at the maximum design leak rate. -

As predetermined, this hypothetical case would' correspond to a State Condition Code 4 emergency. Indication of the following conditions, sustained for a 5 minute period, in the Control Room, would result in declaration of a Condition Code 4 emergency:

Containment dose rate of 750 R/hr or greater and any two of the following _

conditions: 1) Containment pressure equal to or greater than 25 psig, 2)

Containment temperature equal to or greater than 200oF, and 3) ECCS injection signal.

Case II LOCA ,

, l l

Primary coolant leaks at a rate fast enough to increase the temperature of I the core to the point where there is damage to the fuel rods. For this case, , it is assumed that all the gap activity (the gaseous contained between the fuel and fuel rod) is released to the containment. The containment is assumed to initially leak at the maximum design leak rate. In this -

accident, it is up to the Senior shif t Supervisor or Emergency Duty Of ficer to assure that there has been no fuel molting. If there is any qucntion, a Case I LOCA should be assumed.

12.9-40

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-Procodur-en to cover a spectrum of accidents in which normal radiation j  !

monitoring is unavailable (e.g. , out of service or of f scale high) .

The following accidents are considered as par.P o'f -the Salem Emergency Implementation Procedures: , 1

, l l

Case I LOCA A LOCA assuming severe core damage - fuel .mel, a ting '(Regulatory Gu'ide 1.4 assumptions) 100% of the noble gases and 25% of the ' iodines contained in the

~

core are assumed released to the containment. The containment initially leaks at the maximum design leak rate. - -

As predetermined, this hypothetical case would correspond 'to a State Condition Code 4 emergency. Indication of the following conditions, sustained for a 5 minute period, in the Control Room, would result in declaration of a Condition Code 4 emergency:

Containment dose rate of 750 R/hr or greater and any two of the following conditions: 1) Containment pressure equal to or greater than 25 psig, 2)

=

Containment temperature equal to or greater than 2000F, and 3) ECCS injection si g Case II LOCA . ,

Primary coolant leaks at a rate fast enough to increase the temperature of the core to the point where there is damage to the fuel rods. .

For this case, it is assumed that all the gap activity (the gaseous contained betweer the fuel and fuel rod) 'is released to the containment. The containment is ,

assumed to initially leak at the maximum design leak rate. In this -

cccident, it is up to the Senior shift Supervisor or Emergency Duty Officer to assure that there has been no fuel molting. If there is any question, a Case I LOCA should be assumed. . , _

12.9-40

%* Re'nponne icvel for l'MERGENCY PAG gg *gg[

The response levels equivalent to th6 EMERG WCY PAG cro presented for both inf ants arid adults, in order to permit use of either level and thus, l'nsure a ficxible approach to taking action in cases where exposure of the most sensitive portion of the population (infants and pregnant women) can be prevented. o Peak Activity 131I 137Cs 90Sr 89Sr .

Infant Adult- In f ant Adult Infant Ad ult In f ant Adult 1.8 3.6 0 . 0,5 0.18 1.2 40 ,

Mi3 k, or Water 0.08 1.3 uCI par liter 9 6 12 2 8 60 2000 Pasturc3 uCi per 0.6 squa m w ter bR/hr at 1 it 0.18 0.48 0.15 0.55 8.0 267.0 cbove pestarc* 0.008** 0.12 The states of New Jersey and Delaware have developed detailed PIPAGs which include field monitoring and condemnation procedures. Ex-corpts from these plans are included as Figures 12.9-3, 12.9-10 and 12.9-12.

In order to keep this discussion in proper perspective, the levels l of radiciodine concentrations in milk requiring notification of the NRC are 3.5 pCi/l as per current technical specifications. The sampling frequency required by these technical specifications is one or two weeks based on last analysis.

Y ln 012.23-5 P78 62 44 l

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-Implementation of emergency procedures -fo),. lowing detection 3.d and assessment of these accident situations"i~s~the respon-sibility of the station operations 'The GSEP discusses

@24 it; 3 nec.essary records and protective acstaff.

each of the five categories of incidents.

tion'-[ associated with p 8 ,-

M Based upon Regulatory Guide 1.101 categor'ization of emergencies M as incorporated into Commonwealth's GSEP terminology, the-w.a following classification of accidents 3s defined for La Salle,*

g ,

N A 'eneral Emergency Accident Class G

hM An accident beyond the DBA-LOCA, with multiple gross failures

553 of protective systems and engineered safety features, which 355 results in severe damage to the nuclear fuel such that~appre-2,5, ciable quantities of fission products are likely to be released d offsite. (This non-credible accident, which is outside the *

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• scope of the FSAR, is defined here simply to comply with

/

the NRC's request for a " GENERAL EMERGENCY" class accident.

hh

.An There are no logical examples for this accide.nt classification).

m g+

-y Offsite Emergency Accident Class s .

l .

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W.c The DBA-LOCA accident'is postulated for purposes of design -

3 for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems; such design of ECCS W prevents' damage to the fuel in the core due to the LOCA igy . accident. Should a DBA-LOCA actually occur, with accompanying 233 failures of the protective systems or engineered safety F-g

• features, that results in sufficient damage to the nuclear fuel then measurable quantities of fission products may M R be released to the environs near the station. This would constitute on offsite emergency. A separah e'xample of S2 an offsite emergency is a transportation f.Y. .4 dent involving iss .

radioactive spent fuel which is spilled thus resulting in -

a potential hazard to the public.

. w.,

?" Other events which fall within the design bases for the plant, as defined in FSAR Chapter 15.0, are classed in the M(h* following manner.

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, The basis for declaring an OFFSITE EMERGENCY is a Realist.ic Dose Projection (RDP) for

( IN A the offsite population. The public protective actions are recommended by Commonwealth f[$ H i '. Edison to local and state governmental agencies responsible for public health matters. 4.5 j The decision to declare an OFFSITE EMERGENCY is made on the basis of La Salle Station i h;Q control room instrument readings at or above the designated threshold levels indicated ,; 6 .*

below.

] j i]

D BASIS RDP DECLARATION THRESHOLD RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE A!'TIONS rl -

PROJECTED DOSE TO THE PROVIDED BY CECO TO STATE / LOCAL i

l-]

', OFFSITE POPULATION L .9 VIA CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES A

.{

'1. Whole Body Dose 1. 3 < Q/u < 30 where u (mph) is 1. Seek shelter and* await j . , mean windspeed at elevation y further instructions. ' lI'k i 0.1 < RDP < 1 REM of release point and Q(Ci/sec)

• j IfJ is from station vent stack 2.

Monitor environmental radia- l

}p

2. Thyroid Dose monitor.* tion levels in receptor bE VI

.i y 0.5 < RDP < 5 REM

- 2.

Drywell or gross gamma moni-sectors . - 'b g..

[. .

tor reading > 200 R/hr but 3 .- Consider evacuation based 4*5 ;;! ,

< 100 0 R/h r - upon confirmatory field envi- '

th:,. . .pluss

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ronmental radiation levels. %yo5" Wq ]

[)! any two confirming readings as follows: 4. Control ingress and egress "

%p.s ;~ .

~

a. .high pressure vessel pres- t affected areas. - q

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g sure > 1071 psig 5.

.!i[:$ ' Consider immediate removal of -

l h58 high dywell pressure ' grazing dairy herds from pasture 6 i b.

c.

low r

a water level to protect milk in situations involving significant Iodine s

/}f l4 j, 2

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< 12.5 inches .

releases.

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" GENERAL EMERGENCY ',

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Tho basis for declaring a GENERAL D1ERGENCY, is a Realistic Doce Projection (RDP) for the offsite .. I. , , yi G,  : r population accompanied by either a high O/u from the station vent stack and metro tower instru- l <

1" !E; V fS m::nts, or by a simulataneous occurrence of a high drywell radiation monitor reading and two confirmatory process irdicators of unusual conditions with the reactor or primary containment.

The public protective actions are reccmmended by Commoncealth Edison to local and state govarnmental agencies responsible for public health matters.

i ]jid]J j Qlijff g r

d h)j y l ' it; .y DASIS RDP DECLARATION THRESHOLD s RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE 'M ACTION

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PROVIDED BY CECO TO v RDP TO OFFSITE VIA CONTROL ROOM STATE / LOCAL

'# ?.M $' .5 POPULAY!O!! g) f l .

INSTRUMENTS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ' '

M(W,Q

, ((N p.

l. Whole Body Dosc ' '

1. 08 > 30 from the station ve'nt stack A. Inhalation Pathway { , ,k)y [Nk?

monDor and local metro as previously 1. Evacuate people from l 'lA N. p &-

RDP 11 Rat defined; affected area (s).

e $. P: Q

2. Thyroid Dose # 2. Control egress and d! d'1 i ingress to affected RDP 1 5 REM

2. Drywell gross gamma monitor reading 1 1000 R/hr area (s).

3. Monitor environmen-

{..(('$,).4.$

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y!

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,,, eg.. )ggp, g '.

tal radiation levels. '

plus ,

B. Milk Pathway -

le ;h* , . .

any two confirming readings as follows:

1. Withdraw milk from ip. .i: ; i consumption. :n h Qp?

s. high react.or vessel pressure 1 1250 psig 2. Monitor environmental '

q! F s ,,

radiation levels. m;

b. high drywell pressure

c. low reactor: Water level 1 25 psig

< -149 inches

3. Establish milk sampling program and maintain

y:y g

s {k'k . '

d. high wetwell'cir temp. [ 200

• F until MPC limits are mot.

.ig

,g( [j [. r.g'

4. Consider immediate re-  !

9m moval of grazing dairy . b h.../; .

".. ... herds from pasture to I.fik,S"A

. s.

" protect milk in situa - - - - -

tions involving signi- -

. t } hNE ficant Iodine releases. . .N !! . I '

1 ;9.,., b. -&

A Q . ? '~ Ny MF  ::inY hW.[h - l mg.%:enrr:n.cm.;

C L. :

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. - ^ -: ..u,

'5 SWW

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. . . U..Q.:2...?

=Q:_s*WN;.fm+_ , ~-4 , _.:,._. W..& .'::[W.W.b'.h. . '*_ y.m.L,...

al.. .,

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4 s .

& [ EMBER 197'8 QUESTION 432.8 /,

[' .

3 g.- , "Per item (2) in Section 4.1.4co;t the Guide your .. -

/ plan

'd:

.should reference the contamina' tion levels in Section IV e

of the Illinois Radiological Assista'nce Plan (10-75).

in addition your plans should..specifys the external gamma l ray dose rate reading that would be observed three feet above-a pasture possibly contamin.ated with radioiodines, ga at which you would recommend 'tihat; grazing dairy ani'mals

.be removed from pasture feed. The'use of.the dose factor 4

p' .- Table E-6 in Regulatory Guide 1.109 and the factor 0.09 )

PCi/l (milk) per pCi m (pasture). would,be acceptable." '

.s -

hh '

NIMpg/h

RESPONSE

ygg g*g [ [6[

$5 For contamination levels in drinking water and milk, Common-

• y

% wealth Edison follows the guidance of Section IV, Illinois Radiological Assistance Plan (10-75). For fission products

w; .(less than 1 week old) in water, the Illinois suggested safe 02 levels are as follows

SEI4

}} Basis Concentration I 10-day consumption 3 x 10-3 Ci/ml (See GSEP Table 4.2-1)

$* 30-day consumption 1 x 10-3 pCi/ml 60 M

g For Iodine-131 in milk, the Illinois suggested safe levels g

ME are as follows:

10-day consumption -4 gi 1 x 10 pCi/ml 30-day consumption -5 -

3 x 10 pCi/ml c.;

et These yield an integrated thyroid dose to a newborn child M of 5 rem'and 6.3 ram, respectively. These integrated valves gW are also used in assessing other pathways.

At present, EPIP's addressing surface contamination provido hN M guidance these data fortomaking contamination radiation levels measurementg),(mR/hr),

(pci/m and calculating converting

'g a

the projected dose (mR) to persons in the contaminated area should no protective action be taken. These radiation measure- --

{gs ment data may then be used by responsible governmental agencies to formulate decisions as they deem necessary to protect the h: health and safety of the public.

.w .

,The Guide" refers to Regulatory Guide 1.101, Annex A (March 1977).

l99 ..3 ,

r= r.*

.c

R, M., i Ak&, m  ? 0 s ~

y y ;- y ,:; &,.~t.cp . m .. X..; m ,. M. Ax. , ,,Q S ; 5. m %. e :, 1 , i.. E . J ,.$ ? ? t e $ 5 5. , y ....

, .*.. .manc. C:b y.u.s . . m~m.% .:m wcs.;.yw;;w,-nm~g.~ W e y.=. w y x

i

.:. ..y

-.: u.2. i.___Q_jf_& n'y

• Hw. L g:p -x-_

- .} _ ; _ .; %_D.wy; y. .= ~-;',;g

- . .~. -

,. * , =;

, ;. -.x ;;.  :~.-.4.:

.;; .yg;m_.,;_::W - :;;f; .: .=~ p+.+p.;;;g s. ;3;. .-.: ;w..<m,,.y,.,:;~m.... ,~?m: m s,. ;.;.w y y .r.l d y. R : : .q. f a;;; m - v h.; x K?.:QssQ, .~ M&'.QQ3:g~ ;.i;;

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J.::

' LSCS-FSAR AMENDMENT 38 PN$ ,

SEPTEMBER 1978

.yy.f. . * <

M N At present, Commonwealth Edison recommends removal of dairy animals from pasture based on measurements of the I-131 content i

of pasture grass, assuming that all of the radiation counts in the I-131 gamma ray energy " window" are from I-131. The conversion factor used for this purpose is 0.15 pCi/l per pCi/kg of grass (wet weight) where 0.15 pCi/l is the maximum concentration in milk for an acute release. If this concen-M* tration were reached the integral dose would be 0.01 mrem.

Thus for .a small child to receive 5000 mrem, the child would have to drink contaminated milk containing 0.08 pCi/1 at maximum for the duration of the contamination period. To reach this a milk concentration and ysing the suggested convergion factor q$ct uj of 0.09 pCi/l per pCi/m would require 0.83 pC1/m to be present on the grass, or approximately 2.1 Ci/m of 3-131 M I-131 total on the ground, including grass. Since I-131 of com-

• M

~S prises approximately 10% of the total activity on the ground D at 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after a release of mixed fission producgs from the core,

j-3 the total ground activity would be 21 UCi/m . This g activity meter height.

will cause an exposure rate of 0.13 mR/hr at 1 s* - J mg t@yi .Thus, should the exponura r**- =*1 ma *- h- Mh * =* 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

@M .w _ post-release reach 0.13 mR/hr over a pasture then a recommanda-

30. tion wvula De maae to appropriate governmenen1 acont-fes to y take some protective accion, sucn as removing the dairy animals

. 75.

from pasture or aiverting

~

one milk from public consumption.

aw gus e -

15 N.

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se'ts of graphs, covering stability classes A through G are

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nizd e... included in EPIP-1. No graphs-of each set are to be used

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y.;::::. if the amount of activity released is known or estimated.

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For the case of the LOCA the third graph (Fig. 4.3) would F

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n.-3 be~used which relates the Reactor Containment High Range Gamma f

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RADIOLOGICAL'. RESPONSE A. ' , . ,

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-VEPC0 STATION EllERCENCY -

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, 1;;IIT!! EMERGENCY -DIRECTOR  ;;

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% Action Levels for Declarina General, Site or Station Emergenev hs 4.6 e

'fq$$ CencralEmergencywillbelect.kre'whhn'of'fsiteProtective. .

iBi Action Cuides (whole body dosy!,2 rem, thyroid 12 rem) iire likely q - - - . . , , , g~

to be exceeded due to a direct radiation hazard or an inhalation

-~  : hazard. For the purpose of this Plan, should a General g -

.:.w th Emergency be declared, Radlological Respons'e Level " Red" will ME be initiated with local and state agencies. Similarly a Site .

. g ,. @

Ed .

Emergency and Response Level " Yellow" will be decla,rsd for off M ,

~

site d >ses exceeding 0.5 ren whole body or 3 rem thyroid. 'A

\

4#2!

t minimum level " Yellow" results in a calculated child thyroid dose of 11 rem at the site boundary via the Cow-Milk pathway.

T**li. *

%. t

!. 5. Hence appropriate protective measures, other ,-

than evacuation can

~ *. n. w .s o p u; 4 :, p , 7.;,,q.;4 p , l j ,

g::!

be put int,o cf feet through an organized effort under Level Yellow 4 -

I I' 4 to prevent exceeding the 12 rem thyroid Protective Action Guide. -

k*,  ?--

A Station Encr,ancy will be declared when on site doses could s."

1 i t

%. e

g i ,\ exceed 0.2 ;em whole body or 2 rem thyroid, in addition the

~

j ( N <

position of Energency Director will exist since the Director has

,- [ ,{* Q'

' the authority to order the on site evacuation. A Station Emer-h*

• p% . y Wp y gency can be declared with doses less than those above but with N i , ,,h an Emergency Co-ordinator instead of Director as the responsible q

s v2n person. . ,.

gj.', .a g ,

m.

3g: ;-

( ,

0 g Operating personnel will use a set of graphs to determine emor-Esi . .

\ gency classification based on the preceeding action levels. Tg g j M  ; kK ,

graphs will be keyed to the particular atmosphere stability class

-,ing at that time as determined by meteorological instrument-I i exist -

• igures 4-1 through 3 ation available in the control room.

e.

a :.-.t- w 2 = u :rm-

.- =. . ~ . u ' c , , m- - - -

-- .- u.w e w,:f;1< 'm- C CLASSIF i__-

/1/fd {

} gyndMe l Q g f9f/'C~ ffWMrf emisffE/0,.600HM N M W Q CLASS A h/N8 CLASS B

l. Definition 1. Definition

a. Produces or threatens to produce airborne nEin ,

Release which exceeds A (or is not monitored), i occupied area .21 (MPC); x (PF);, where PC but site boundary whole body dose is i 500 mrem values are given in RCS No'. 2, Table 3; an PF and thyroid dose is 15 rem during first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

i i

values are given in RCS No. 2, Table 2.

b. Is contained within the plant structures or is 2. Significance released at a monitored release point at a ra e May require on-site protective measures but should which is less than the maximum allowable rete se rate given in ETS. not require offjte protective measures. oflA

"" " ~ j#*

!. Significance

3. identification -

Handled by plant personnel, no protective measures Accident is Class B if it is not monitored or exceedt release values for Class A, but most reliable avaliable I required beyond the area immediately affected, measurements or estimates meet the following criteria:

a. Site boundary y dose rate 120 mR/hr j

l. Identification .

. Site boundary 1-131 conG 110-7 pCi/cc j

a. Retcase Rate NOTE: The values given in a. and b. above can persist

' Exceeds the instantaneous release rate limits for ' l for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the dose criteria arc exceeded. 1 noble gas and 1-131 contained in Section 2.4 of If the duration of these values is shorter than j the Environmental Tech. Specs. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, proportionately higher values can be used. ;

b. Local Airborne Sample c. Total Release (Q, curies)

1) -y ParticulateWithTg < 2 hrs (Unidentified) 1) Noble Gas X (pCi/cc) 210-6 x (PFp ) Q S(11.8) (X/ 1800

~ (PF)p = protection factor for particulates g g , gg egg applicable to types of respirators dilution factor for being worn by persons in the area 800 m - ~

(from RCS No. 2, Tabic 2). If the meteorological computer is inoperabic,

2) p-y ParticulateWithTg > 2 hrs (Unidentified) use (X/ 1800 = 5.3 x 10-4 sec/m3 e- .-

X(pCi/cc) 210-9 x (PFp) ' (desi0n basis case), which gives: O S 22000 Ci

3) CharcoalSampleWithT3 > 2 hrs (Unidentified) gg ,

, , ,m , gag X(pCi/cc) 2 (4x10-9)(PFy ) Q 1(5.8 x 10-3)[(X/ 1 80 ' WN' '

(PF)y = protection factor for vapors and gases -

If the meteorological computer is inoperable, applicable to types of respirators use (X/ 1800 = 5.3 x 10-4 sec/m3 VD , -

being worn by persons in the area which gives: O & 11 Ci.@

(from RCS No. 2, Table 2). NOTE: If release rate is known from plant vent

. monitors, multiply the release rate by t,he

, ~ , duration of the release (be sure the units are Action -

J.; . .% .

'7 c nsistent) to obtain the total curie release. j/

l

X 2 ,. ~ . . . . :. . . l N =.L ,: 2;.1.. :AYYM C ~. '

~

" L . w . C :..... .T l I -; Y' \

CLASSIFY ACCIDENT

. l

. CLASS B ,. CLASS C hiinition 1. Definition -

leicase which exceeds A (or is not monitored), Release which exceeds B, but 10,000 meter (outer

>ut site boundary whole body dose is i 500 mrem edge of LPZ) whole body dose is 1500 mrem and and thyroid dose is 15 rem during first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. thyroid dose is 15 rem during first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. .

l significance .

2. Significance '

9tay require on-site protective measures but should Will require on-site protective measures and

= tot require off site protective measures. require off-site-

' dentification 3. Identification Tccident is Class B if it is not monitored or exceeds - Accident is Class C if it exceeds blass B, but most clease values for Class A, but most reliable available reliable available measurements or estimates meet neasurements or estimates meet the following criteria: the following criteria:

. Site boundary 7 dose rate 120 mR/hr a. 7 Dose Rate Measurements

). Site boundary 1-131 cone 110-7 pCi/cc 1) 10,000 meter i 20 mR/hr VOTE: The values given in a. and b. above can persist 2) Site boundary i 600 mR/hr for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the dose criteria are exceeded. b.1-131 Concentration if the duration of these values is shorter than 1) 10,000 meter i 10-7 pCi/cc 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, proportionately higher values can be used.

2) Site boundary S.3 x 10-6 pCi/cc

. Total Release (Q, curies) -

NOTE: The values g.iven in a. and b. above can pers.is t

1) Noble Gas . for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the dose criteria are exceeded.'

O 1(11.8) + (X/Q)gon if the duration of these values is shorter than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, proportionately higher values can be used.

where: (X/ 1800 = downwind centerline

c. Total Reichse (0, curies) dilution factor for ~

800 m . 1) Noble Gas ,

if the meteorological computer is inoperable, Q & (11.8) 4-(X/dli ofoo use (X/ 1800 = 5.3 x 10-4 sec/m3 where: (X/Q)toooo = downwind centerline (design basis case), which gives: O 5 22000 Ci .

dilution factor for

2) 1-131  ?~ -

10000 m g

, O i(5.8 x 10-3) + (X/ 1 800 if the meteorological computer is inoperable,

. . If the meteorological computer is inoperable, e use (X/0) 0000 = 2.2 x 10-5 sec/m3 e~use (X/ Is = 5.3 x 10-4 sec/m3 , (design basis case),which gives: O 5 500,000 Ci.

which gi s: O 11 Ca. 2) 1-131 g 7 .

NOTE: If release rate is known fr m plant vent O & (5.8 x 10-3) 1 (X/d)1ooo 7 f:'

3,, monitors, multiply the release rate by the . If the meteorological computer is inoparable,

, duration of the release (be sure the units are 3.. f

p . consistent) to obtain the t stal curic retcase. .

.use (X/ )10000 = 2.2 x 10-5 sec/m ,$3 which gives: Q 1250 Ci. , .1 y%uw., ,

...e 'i.

If release rate is known from plant vent f ..

'Acti::n G,,J , ,e f f. ,. NOTE::G Q* l monitors, multiply the releas '

See Part 3B j.ph.w g .M, , .f . 3.j '

, F.SMyy-fl$ duration of the release (be sure the'Eunit

s. g n v'y awf?

YYk & ' ' ' ' '

s'

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h 4. Act.w io y .

,m' x -

,,, 1 ."c ' ' .

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wJscEWMM mW ' n:

c.

~ ;yxgcy y.

g. yJQR

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~

~

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4T V V CLASS C CLASS D initi::n -

1. Definition ease which exceeds B, but 10,000 meter (outer Any release which exceeds Class'C. ,

e of LPZ) whole body dose is 1500 mrem and roid dose is 15 rem during first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 2. Significance

, Reautres immediate evacuation of non essential plant i 11ficanca j - -

site personnel and immediate evacuation of LPZ in l

1 require on-site protective measures and downwind direction.

utra off-site nreh measures.

~

T gentification ntification a. Exceeds dose rate and/or releasecriteria for Class C.

Ident is Class C if it exceeds Class B, but most f b. For LOCA able available measurements or estimates meet 1) Containment pressure greater than limit line i following criteria: . from Figure 1 of Attachment 2.

)

2) Containment isolation not achieved in y Dose Rate Measurements

1) 10,000 meter i 20 mR/hr < 15 minutes (Attachment 2).

2) Site boundary i GOO mR/hr ' -

3) Less than the minimum required ECCS and 1-131 Concentration containment cooling systems functioned

1) 10,000 meter : 10-7 pCi/cc properly (Attachment 2).

2) Site boundary S.3 x 10-6 pCi/cc 4) Containment radiation ~dic~e6ds the

)TE: The values given in a. and b. above can persist "100% Gap Release" limit line on applicable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the dose criteria are exceeded. Figures 2,3,4 of Attachment 2. /

if the duration of these values is shorter than M

'24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. proportionately higher values can be used. f Tdtal Release (0, curies) 4. Action See Part 3D. V l 1)' Noble Gas

!. $ y.

- O S (11.8) + (X/ 110000

/ /g " "C U

where: (x/Q)ioooo = downwind centerline dilution factor for // kp ,

O'lf. I / 9

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[/j i

2) 1-131 Y-M l g <,. ,

h , ,b L s Q &(5.8 x 10-3)1(X/ )i0000 . e

• (. If the meteorological computer is inoperable, 4[Ik/O -N h.7

[,1use (X/d)100 n = 2.2 x_10-5 sec/m3, .-

";W ." ' .:ti.y:" Vip

" # " ~.%' #

.$.which gives: 125'O Ci.  ; r2 .N NOTE: If release ta e as nown frcm plant vent t.* monitors, multiply the re dSe rate by the 1 d ~

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ATTACK'FilT 2 (Cont. )

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M E. TITLE:? ^ RELEASE OF AIRBORNEPROCEDURE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS R-2 Q;

994 ; y4@,.v.,

n: .,&p, ; ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont.)

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. . TITLE: RELEASE OF AIRBORilE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS .

PART 3D .

_F0LLOWUP ACTI0 tis FOR CLASS D RELEASE . 1 1

1. Evacuate Site Personnel . .

a. As soon as' the accident has been classified as D by any of the means I given in Part 2, evacuate all nonessential site personnel in accordance with instructions given in General Appendix 5.

b. Evacuate site personnel engaged in recovery actions'if it appears that

. they will exceed the dose criteria given in 6 below.

2. Evacuate Members of the Public From the Downwind LPZ

~

As soon as the accident has been classified as D by any of the means given in Part 2, notify the Sheriff and recomuend immediate evacuation of the LPZ in tae downwind direction. In the case of a potential Clas_s_D release. it is not necessary to delay evacuation of the LPZ until the confirming off-site monitoring results are obtained.

If evacuation is required, the'following rule of thumb can be applied to determine the area which should be evacuated first. On a map, draw an arrow pointing in the downwind direction. Evacuate the 22.5* sector through which this arrow passes and 22.5* sector on either side of the downwind sector (a total of 67.5*) to the outer boundary of the LPZ.

3. _ Perform Off-Site Monito' ring ,

a.* General A Class D release is of sufficient magnitude that some off-site protective measures beyond the LPZ, such as evacuation or long term impoundment of foodstuffs, may be required. Therefore, an off-site mon'itoring program should be established for the following purposes: , ,

1) Initially the -

areas (if any) program should thebe directed toward identifying those located beyond LPZ where personnel evacuation may be necessary to prevent persons from exceeding the recominended evacu-ation criteria doses of 500 mrem whole body and/or 5 rem thyroid.  :;

,., . .a.

2) Once any immediate evacualifon is accomplished, the' program should be set up to determine the need (if any) for long term decontamination or impoundment of foodstuffs, which might be desirable even .in areas

. where prompt~ personnel evacuation was

_^m.

notg required.

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agencies.'.w.q u'

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• G '4) ',The program should provide the'dat 'to.~ answer questions to alla

'ublic concerns.'

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TITI.E: RELEASE OF AIRBORNE RADI0 ACTIVE fMTERIALS

, PART 3D (Cont.) .

b. Methods and. Procedures Monitoring techniques and procedures are conta[ned in Attachment 7 to -

this procedure. -

~

c. Exposure Guidelines -

As a minimum, the off-site monitoring program should identify (including verification of predictions based upon curie release calculations) the following:

1) The extent of the areas where the direct inhalation thyroid dose,

• • or the thyroid dose which could be received by consumntion of con-taminated foodstuffs, might exceed the recommended general public evacuation criterion of 5 rem. As discussed above, ltie first emphasis should be on determining the region where evacuation may be necessary due to inhalation dose. The area where foodstuff

' contamination may be a problem will exceed in size the area of ,

inhalation concern, and can be determined as a followup measure after any required evacuation is accomplished. -

A thyroid dose of 5 rem could result from any of the following exposures to I-131 (note that if I-131 dose only represents a fraction of the total iodine dose, the following values will have to be reduced accordingly as discussed in Attachment 5):

a) Integrated exposure of a dairy pasture to 1.8x10-8 pCi-hr/cm3

. will produce an initial ground deposition of 0.32 pCi/m2, which in turn will produce peak milk levels of =0.04 pCi/ liter approx-imately 2 days later, decreasing to zero over the next 3 weeks.

, .This exposure will produce the 5 rem dose (based upon a 6 month

. old child) via the grass-cow-milk-thyroid chain if milk from this source is consumed.

• x x;-

.. - x. .. , , , .i. l, b) Integratedexposureofrangelanhuponwhichfeedfreerangehens to a cloud of 2.2x10-7 pCi-hr/cm3 , corresponding to an initial

+

, deposition of 4 pCi/m2 . This could produce 5 rem over the next yp m&, $. %p.,,,,m .. 3 weeks due to the consumption of eggs.

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,  ?

j c) Integrated exposure of . farmland to a cloud of 6x10-7 pCi-hr/cm3, N "V '

corresponding to an initial deposition of 10 pCi/m2, would produce ,j the dose over the next three weeks if vegetables from this farm- .<M

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~

' ( 'p.3' ;g$The corresponding initial ground deposition 'is 492 pCi/mwould produce

'h i$ni1.WiMK.

. mHote' that 'the '5em r%f.w.'yn figure doesWW,MJffjdthWNMM@Mi$

'not necessarily represent'an action Olevel where~c'on.fis.

~~ cation'~of foodstuffs'sh'ould bi~ carried'oilt" hi y

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DIABLO CANYOH POWER PLANT UNIT NOS.1 & 2 '

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE R-2

. TITLE: RELEASE OF AIRBORNE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS

~

, PART 3D (Cont.) .

~ '

determination is the responsibility of State officials. However, quantifying affected areas such as this will assist State officials in making such determinations by helping to scope the. magnitude of I the problem. -

l i

2) Since there is considerable cattle grazing in the vicinity of Diablo -

Canyon, it may be desirable to move some animals out of the affected

. areas for their own protection. A recommended action level for this

. is when the ground deposition of I-131 is such that the thyroid dose due to grazing may exceed 25 rem.

1 .

This dose will be received if the grazing land has been exposed to a cloud of 4.5x10-6 pCi-hr/cm3 , corresponding to an initial ground de-position of 80 pC1/m2 , ,

3

') Although exposure other than whole body or thyroid dose) may .be of interest, it should never be limitin(such g. That asis,Sr bonewhile

.it is desirable to collect and count particulate samples during the course of off-site monitoring operations, it should never be necessary to range farther afield than dictated by the limits of the affected area from the standpoint of milk exposure in order to encompass the areas where these other types of exposure could be a problem. In other nords, it should never be necessary to range farther afield lookirs for Sr than one would range while looking for I-131 contami-nation. .

~

4. Evacuation offebers of the Public Located Beyond t'he LPZ

a. Dose Cri M ria -

~

, The responsibility for ordering and carrying out evacuat, ion beyond the LPZ rests with the State and local government agencies. When evacuation is being considered beyond the LPZ, the number of people involved increases substantially over an evacuation limited to the LPZ, and authorities may

. choose to alter the criteria which are applicable to the LPZ rather than move thou' sands of people. -

3.w In any case, however, the present criteria for public evacuation are that persons should be moved as necessary to prevent:

1) Whole body dose > 500 mrem , , ,

[g. Ow. ;v..-(fy';]llfg....}

. _ . . .--  : 1 .1,

2) Thyroid dose > 5 rem.

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w N6-

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p

.y/N. y ' 4 9 . lat If histhese opinion levels.is sought, the Emergency Coordinator may recommend action .I

? y ' Mthe following action levels (assuming I-131 represents 50", of the thyroid' n J.T ~ - dose, that there 'is a 2' hour time ' lag tiorganize and conduct the " evac'uf "1 l ~

ation, and that the levels are expected to persist for a' period of time .

~

t m, comparable w.u.wkes.h.e ~to 't "specifled tiinie inwhich evacua' tion'should be* rstiGth a nnweuw cnwwwwmmmmnm 0 $ hlIdNkb

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DIABLO CAfiY0ff POWER PLAfiT U!iIT fiOS.1 & 2 EMERGEf1CY PROCEDURE R-2

. TITLE: RELEASE OF AIRBORilE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS l l PART 3D (Cont.) . -

1) If the dose rate reaches 250 mr/hr or the I-131 concentration reaches 6x10-7 pCi/cc, evacuate immediately.

2) If the dose rate reaches 125 mr/hr or the I-131 concentration reaches 3x10-7 pCi/cc, evacuate within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.,

3) If the dose rate reaches 70 mr/hr or the I-131 concentration reaches 2x10.- 7 pCi/cc, evacuate within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

4) If the dose rate reaches 20 mr/hr or the I-131 concentration reaches 8x10-8 pCi/cc, evacuate within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

5) If the dose rate reaches 10 mr/hr or the I-131 concentration reaches 4x10-8 ucure , emuoa within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

s .

Although governmental agencies are free to do as they please, it is recommended that the decision to evacuate persons beyond the LPZ be made on the basis of monitoring results, and only on the basis of pre-dictive calculations (curie release and meteorological data) if it appears' that monitoring results are not likely to be forthcoming in time to'be meaningful. '

b. Detailed Procedures The evacuation will be carried out by local law enforcement agencies using procedures contained in the " SLO County Emergency Plan."

c.. Extent of Evacuation The area which is evacuated must, of course, include the entire area in which that dose criteria are exceeded. However, for conservatism, a l

somewhat larger area than this should be evacuated. " -

' If the evacuation is required and the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator

~. is sought, the following rule of thumb can be applied, and should be con-servative On a map, draw an arrow pointing in the downwind direction.

Evacuate the 22.5* sector through which this arrow passes and a 22.5*

sector on either side of the downwind sector to a distance such that the direct downwind dose is less than the criteria. That i.s. evacuate an 67.5 sector out to the appropr,iate downwind distance. - .

D 5. ' Post-Accident Cleanup and Reentry .'

d ; & T.%),g,m- M / ", (

,.g

......a -

c 7, ,. ,In basic conducting guidelines post-accident should be followed: cleanup and reentry - operations, gg.by?,jsfthe 3:following ' ' (/

.x. 4h $ $:,.y;[i.

~

a fQy a  : 'y , 8_, $pwa+ & % fkTif $$v hm ea.- Reasonabic efforts consistent with the urgency of the situa Qtaken to minimize personnel radiation exposur,e.

Niq %l6&*iifiGE&'dM??NBd#A51GNMWst; The Emergenc Coordinator will. approve all reentries nto evacuat areas J

Wl;' C , . . -'. 7 g . ,

%f>* '"' .

C 0 N CSM~ d F  !

t2 TABLE F- 2 $N/INMNO . " -f;

I CLASSIFICATION OF EMERCENCY CONDITIONS . '

h ABNORMAL PROBABLE 1 l'.

EMERCENCY CONDITION DETECTED DETECTION MEANS l [

CLASSIFICATION SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED

[

I. POTENTIAL EMERCENCY CONDITIONS N:nrediological industrial Visual Personnel cccid:nts - Take actions to prevent radiological involvement.

Ingsstion or inhalation of Portal monitors, friskers, -

Personnel Conduct affected personnel t'o decon-  !

rediosctivity, dosimetars q body contamination, over- O, taminatio: area, collect appropriate expszure, or other person- samples, possibly transfer to Cin-n21 injuries involving -

cinnati Ceneral Hospital. E radiction.

• I~,

l i.

II. ZPS-1 STATION EMERCENCY CONDITIONS 11 e

'; . l' .

Szcurity threat Security system N

~;

Station See Security Plan. @l ["1 6'

Entthquake 1

Motion of surroundings .

Station Initiate safe shutdown procedures.

• t' Flood [s '.

External notice and/or 4

Station Initiate applicable procedure if water visual will rise above specified level. ,,

Tcrn:do and other high External notice or lo- Station winds Initiate applicable procedure. N cal weather instruments ,

r t

Emergtncy situations at t-cdjecsnt facilities Visual, notification Station 2 Initiate applicable procedure. '

en :o i: < i Fires or explosions Thermal detectors or vis- Station 2 E I 'l Contact Moscow Fire Dept., initiate HG [3; ual in affected area (s) fire-fighting procedure for affected h 8-rarea(s). Take actions to prevent Q* I(i radiological involvement. O p.

Vahicle accidents: U '

l: n

n. Cstlisions involving Visual i Station 2 a. Ensure continued operation of f

,L.

3 I f

~

~'

TABLE F- -(cont'd.) {j{,

..s ,

. *')

e ABNORMAL PROBABLE EMERGENCY ."

CONDITION DETECTED DETECTION MEANS CLASSIFICATION SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED  ;"

g t

cpent fuel elements heat removal system, conduct, radio-cr radioactive baste

- ~

! bkh pcckages logical surveys, restrict access as

'necessary. ' $

fi a

b. .S Collisions involving Visual Station b. Consult fuel vendor before starting new fuel elements recovery, f[': 7,4 4

c. Aircraft or other air- Visual Station Secure plant, rescue personnel berne object impact

,. c.

1 affected.

• fj

~: , :.

Fual-hrndling abnormalities: *

. [? i n,.

N

c. Decpped elements Visual f(, Station Consultation with fuel vendor before.

i

. recove.y or repair actions initiated. .,-

b. Dreaged elements QA procedures 5 ' I

c. Lecking spent elements High pool water

in fuel pool

y X activity

.,s ~

Y :i/

QA procedures +

d. Irproper placement in "U ..'

reactor vessel ".' a '

,/ * '

.-..  ;;, .;, M

, -S -}  ! i p, III. ZPS-1 CENERAL EMERCENCY CONDITIONS 1 * '

/ .\ ' f Ralessa of airborne or 3

. 3. ')

Vent radiation moni- General Take action as required to reduce.re

.i t

liquid re.'.osceivity to tor alarm (s) or (Notification)

• unrestricted area that leases to values within technical  !; > '

Effluent discharge specifications,. environmental moni-- '

exceeds technical specifi- radiation monitor (s) _toring. Nk.  !

cations. ~

m vi Short term airborne release Vent system radiation General 4 xs or direct radiation at site Take action as outli~ned in Emergency _E@

monitor alarm (s) boundary >50 aren but < 1 rem

.. (Mobilization alert)

Plan Implementing Procedure. Conduct environmental ac,nitoring.

"u.

whole body and/or > 300 mrem .~"

but <5 rem thyroid for plume u ~

exp2aures, or projected off-site centamination above,FRC pretsetive action guide,(30) ' '

rcd thyroid) for agricultural products.

A>

_ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - =-

j TABLE F-3 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO AVOID Wi! OLE-BODY AND TilYROID DOSE FROM EXPOSURE TO A CASEOUS PLUME M

t. . PROJECTED DOSE- -

}j! ZPS-1 CENERAL TO POPULATION Ri EMERCENCY CONDITION (rem) RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

• COMMENTS

'/ t Il NOTIFICATION Who!e-body > TS to <0.05 No protective action required.

Required notifications.

i Thyroid > TS to < 0.30 Increased environmental surveillance. ,

Mandatory reduction of gaseous emissions.

s I ,- .

' , MOBILIZATION ALERT: Whole-body 0.05 to < 1 ~

Moscow School - if affected. Previously recomended

, Short-term release - shelter. protective actions may ,

LEVEL WHITE Thyroid 0.30 to < 5 long-term release - evacuate. be reconsidered or 1

. States provide protective ~

terminated. I

action advisories.

Monitor environmental radiation levels, a

g ,

+ > g >

7 E! 0FFSITE CENERAL: Whole-body I to < 5 Seek shelter and await further 1 instructions.

h LEVEL YELLOW Thyroid 5 to < 25 Consider evacuation, particularly for ,,

p children and pregnant women. , ,

d Monitor environmental radiation levels.

J; Control access.

N OFFSITE CENERAL: Whole-body 5 and above Evacuate persons in af fected area. Seeking shelter would

[q Monitor environmental radiation be an al'ternative if p LEVEL RED Thyroid 25 and above levels. evacuation were not . en so

. 7,, Control access. immediately possible @@

• or prudent. NU j.. @8 O Si

• 7 5

y k

• These are the recomended actions for preplanning purposes. Protective action decisions at the time of any "

N] incident must take into consideration the impact of existing constraints.

' i) .

m Z

0: -

y t, w_--. - _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _

h .

O

' .; s TABLE F-2 (cont'd.) *;i-

l-ABNORMAL PROBABLE EMERCENCY 1

CONDITION DETECTED DETECTION HEANS'* CLASSIFICATION SPECIFIC ACTI5N REQUIRED .

Shsrt-term liquid release to ' Liquid discharge 5 ~I General Take action as outlined in Emergency 4 Ohio River 1 mpe after di- monitor alarm (s) (Mobilization Plan Implementing Procedure , conduct -

lution in the river. alert) environmental monitoring.

Actual or clear potential Radiation monitors, General Notify agencies involved (Figure F-1) to exceed plume PAG at pressure, level. (Offsite Cen- and take action as outlined in Emer-or beyond site boundary, temperature and flow  ; eral Emergency) gency Plan Implementing Procedures.

sensors, and automatic .Y

• Conduct environmental monitoring.

operation of ECCS g- i l equipment. , 'd-i > I Postaccident . -l radiation monitors. 'Ci Other system parameters *

(pressure, level, etc.) ,l N

=>

4, NOTES .

p. ,'

I O **

1. Notify Ohio DSA and Kentucky DES concerni., personnel emergencies that require offsite assistance.

~

2. Notify Ohio DSA and Kentucky DES concerning any station emergency of public Interest. ' '-

3. z.

Notify Ohio DSA and Kentucky DES. Notify three downstream waterworks if liquid. ,'

4. Notify Ohio DSA and Kentucky DES. Notify Hoscow school if building is within 67.5* plume sector. Reconunend e' evacuation route. '

5. Notify Ohio DSA and Kentucky DES. Notify Orsanco and three downstream water works. Recommend closing intakes during-slug passage.

$5 m <=

6. Notify Clermont County Sheriff and/or appropriate Campbell /Pendleton County'egency. Reconunend protective action in accordance with Table F-3. HG ho N*

0 2

~

NL v S e'se'

• TABLE F-4  :

+

STATION STAFF ASSIGNMENTS DURING EMERGENCIES LOCATION FUNCTION TITLE Station Superintendent Control room

• Overall direction l

Direction of security and access Assistant Superintendent Control room

• control or Felicity Armory ** Coordination of station activities -

with offsite agencies Technical Engineer Control room

• As directed by the Superintendent (assumes Assistant Superintendent ba l'u duties in his absence) 3' ha Emergency Duty Supervisor Control room 1. Overall direction until relieved by the Station Superintendent.

2. Performance of all functions coor-dinated from the Control Room until relieved by the designated <

supervisor.

3. Responsibility for offsit'e commun-ication, personnel account- un ps ability and record keeping. QQ Hs Operations Supervisor Control room * .,. Coordination of station operation E as "E

" with the duty shift supervisor. $*

s- U

• Proceed to primary alternate ECC if the control room is not accessible or habitable; proceed to secondary alternate ECC if the control room and primary alternate ECC are not accessible or habitable.

• • The Assistant Superintendent will proceed to the Felicity Armory during a General Emecgency.

V '

m Mb  ;

, s.

. .I 1

2 i

i -

TABLE F-4 (Cont'd)

LOCATION FUNCTION  !

TITLE l Control room

• Coordination of emergency team (s)

Rad / Chem Supervisor **

performing radiation surveys, mo-

' nitoring and/or decontamination.

d Maintenance Supervisor ** Emergency team On the scene coordination of staging area Emergency Team (s) performing fire fighting, first aid, rescue and/or basic damage control.

Instrument and Control Supervisor Emergency team On the scene coordination of staging area Emergency Team (s) performing fire (j fighting, first aid, rescue and/or y l' basic damage control. "*

u

i EIE!

d y$

• Proceed to primary alternate ECC if the control room is not accessible or habitable; proceed to secondary alternate ECC if the control room and primary alternate ECC are not accessible or habitable. y$

to O mz F8 i ** In the absence of the group supervisor, the group foreman will perform the designated functions. w 5"

c O A-( k

>}

i

~

i

r cd W UNITED STATES yo t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

' WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 4

j

'o

,[ APR 13 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution FROM: Jim Martin Reactor Risk Branch Division of Risk Analysis, RES

SUBJECT:

A PERSPECTIVE ON EMERGENCY PLANNING, RISK AND THE SOURCE TERM ISSUE Attached for your infonnation is a set of CCDFs which show the potential benefits of following the emergency response guidance in NUREG-0654/

FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Succinctly, this guidance says that for a core melt accident evacuate early, within about two miles, preferably before a major release; everybody else take shelter; send monitoring teams out to find hot

' spots (e.g. >g/hr); and evacuate the hot spots expeditiously if an actual release occurs.

To illustrate the potential benefits of this action plan a set of CRAC2 runs was made for the Shoreham site. Comparisons to the summary evacuation CCDFs in the SNL siting study were made for the SSTI release scenario.

Early evacuation areas within 1,2,3 and 5 miles of the site were assumed-everybody else was exposed to the 2 hr. puff release plus four (vs 24) hours of ground contamination before leaving. Cases with rain and no rain were invesitgated. People in the early evacuation zones were presumed to start to leave at the beginning of the release and traveled at 10 mph.

If they were to leave earlier an incremental additional benefit would accrue.

The results are displayed in the attached CCDFs, which are self explanatory for the most part. In essence, ZERO early fatalities were calculated for the three mile early evacuation cases and only two weather sequences contributed to early fatalities for the two mile early evacuation assumption. Little or no differences are observed when the rain cases are switched off (washout coefficient set equal to zero).

I The last set of CCDFs were generated with the release fractions for SSTl cut in half, except 100 percent of the noble gases was released.

Here, no fatalities were calculated for any weather sequences when an early evacuation of the two mile area was assumed.

E7drh f/)

APR i 3 1933 Early injury CCDFs are also attached. Here, the three mile early evacuations had a pronounced benefit and for the five mile early evacuation scenario no early injuries were calculated for the SSTl/2 cases.

The final graph shows the width of plumes jgt " downwind" distance. This shows that people normally would have to travel only short distances to get away from hot spots.

I'm writing a NUREG which will discuss these perspectives in more detail, but I believe the results are important enough to present the gist of them now. I should have a draft in a month.

Thanks to Dan Alpert and Jay Johnson of SNL for doing the runs for me.

fl .

_ /

Martin Reactor Risk Branch Division of Risk Analysis, RES

Enclosure:

As stated l

l l

Distribution:

R. Blond, RES P. Baranowsky, RES G. Burdick, RES J. Murphy, RES M. Ernst, RES R. Bernero, ASTP0 N. Silberberg, ASTP0 R. Matthews, ASTP0 S. Yaniv, RES S. Acharya, NRR J. Mitchell, NRR L.G. Hulman, NRR R. Houston, NRR B. Grimes, I&E

'J . ' Sears , I& E M. Solberg, I&E

'T. McKenna, I&E 4 . Jordan

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