ML20207D944
| ML20207D944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/25/1983 |
| From: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Deyoung R, Michelson C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207B569 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8701020011 | |
| Download: ML20207D944 (65) | |
Text
7 JAN 2 51983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: R. C. Haynes, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
COMMENTS ON 10 CFR 50.72 AND 10 CFR 50.73 PROPOSALS Region I finds that the proposed LER rule, 10 CFR 50.73, meets our needs for operational safety information if certain changes are made to assure proper implementation. Specific comments are attached.
This rule, together with the proposed change to 10 CFR 50.72 should:
Reduce the number of LER's to those of Safety Significance.
Reduce the number of ENS reports to those needing NRC attention.
Significantly improve the quality of licensee reports if the implementing instructions are definitive.
Provide a major step toward standardization of all licensee reports irrespective of the issue data and the revision date of technical specifications.
Licensee event report have two distinct uses by the NRC. The proposed LER Rule meets the requirement for licensees to report events of safety significance. The proposed NPRD system will be used for PRA and component reliability studies.
PRA and reliability studies utilize component failure rate data over an extended period of time. PRA is currently limited because it uses a data base of failure that is not undergirded with statistical data of the target population. Implemention of the LER rule before the NPRD System is fully operational may result in a loss of data. However, this loss is only significant if there is an actual change in the failure frequency.
Region I recommends adoption of both 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. We also recommend that the NRC stress earliest possible implementation of the NPRD system to the extent needed for PRA and reliability data.
- # Original Signed 3r:
Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
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FEB. 17, 1983 CRGR BRIEFING FINAL RULE CHANGE 10 CFR 50.72 NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
. . HISTORY .
. MAJOR OBJECTIVES
. ALTERNATIVES
. ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES
, RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS
. RULE CRITERIA
. COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS N1k-86-229 M/2-
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HISTORY INDUSTRY FEEDBACK - MEETING WITH SHIFT ENGINEERS
- DRAFT 50.72 RULE CHANGE
- CRGR CONSIDERED 50.73 AND RECOMMEND C0ORDINATOR OF REPT. REQ. NOV. 81
- PROP. 50.72 RULE CHANGE DECEMBER, 1981 IN FED. REG. FOR COMMENT
- COMMENTS RECEIVED (20 LETTERS), MARCH 16, 1982
- REDRAFTED PRCPOSED 50.72 RULE CHANGE
- DISCUSSED REDRAFT 50.72 WITH INDUSTRY
- SOLICITED NRC COMMENTS ON REDRAFT 50.72, DECEMBER 1982
- BRIEFED CRGR DECEMBER 1982 MET WITH FEMA REDRAFTED 50.72 TO INCORPORATE COMMENTS TO THE EXTENT LEGALLY POSSIBLE FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL RULE .
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MAJOR OBJECTIVES
. 50.72 RULE CHANGE AS PROPOSED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT CLARIFY AND NARROW SCOPE OF 50.72 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY REPORTING - INJURIES, MINOR RELEASES, SECURITY REPORTS.
CAPTURE ALL EVENTS OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
. 50.72 FINAL RULE CHANGE NOW PREPARED RAISES THRESHOLD FOR REPORTING PERMITS LONGER TIME FOR REPORTING C0 ORDINATES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (REG. GUIDE 10.1)
LER RULE - 50.73, 50.36 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - 50.46, APPENDIX E, NUREG 0654 DEFECTS - PART 21 AND 50.55(e)
RADIOLOGICAL - PART 20 SECURITY '3.71 7
ACCOM0 DATES ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS COMMENT
. 50.72 IS A REGULATION ON REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 50.72 CAN NOT CHANGE REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER REGULATIONS. OTHER REGULATIONS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO SATISFY DESIRED OBJECTIVES IN EACH AREA: E.G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SECURITY, DEFECTS, RADIOLOGICAL l
ALTERNATIVES
- 1. ISSUE FINAL 50.72 RULE SIMILAR TO PROPOSED 50.72 RULE.
. NO ADDITIONS, ACCOMODATE PUBLIC COMMENTS.
- 2. ISSUE FINAL 50 '2 RULE WITH IMPROVEMENTS AND CLARIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT AS AN EMERGENCY.
. COORDINATION WITH OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
. RAISED THRESH 0LD FOR REPORTING
. CLARIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
- 3. ISSUE FINAL 50.72 RULE WITH IMPROVEMENT (SOME AS ALT. 2) EXCEPT NO REFERENCE TO THE TERM " UNUSUAL EVENT."
MODIFIED NUREG 0654 EXAMPLES FOR UNUSUAL EVENT INTO THE NON EMERGENCY CATEGORY OF 50.72.
- 4. DELAY FINAL 50.72 AND ISSUE PROPOSED 50.72 RULE CHANGE AND DRAFT PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO MODIFY NUREG 0654, APPENDIX E, 50.46, AND OTHER REGULATIONS AS APPROPRIATE
ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES
-ALTERNATIVE 1 - ISSUE FINAL 50.72 RULE SIMILAR TO PROPOSED 50.72 RULE ADVANTAGES: ACCOMPLISHES INITIAL DESIRED IMPROVEMENTS TO 50.72 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS DISADVANTES: DELAYS ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS WHICH ARE WITHIN SCOPE OF INITIAL PROPOSED RULE CHANGE G
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f ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES ALTERNATIVE 2 - ISSUE FINAL 50.72 RULE WITH IMPROVEMENTS AND CLARIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT AS AN EMERGENCY ADVANTAGES: . PROMULGATES FINAL RULE 50.72 WITH IMPROVEMENTS
. COORDINATES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 50.73, ETC.
. . CLARIFIES UNUSUAL EVENT DESCRIPTION DISADVANTAGES: . UNUSUAL EVENT STILL IN EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION ,
. 50.72, APPENDIX E, NUREG 0554, 50.46 REVISED LATER i ,
. COORDINATION NEEDED WITH FEMA / STATE AND LOCAL l
. PLANT EMERGENCY PLANS WILL BE REVISED NOW AND LATER
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.c ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES ALTERNATIVE 3 - ISSUE FINAL 50.72 WITH IMPROVEMENTS AND NO REFERENCE TO UNUSUAL EVENT ADVANTAGES: . PROMULGATES FINAL 50.72 WITH IMPROVEMENTS
. COORDINATES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 50.73, ETC.
. CLARIFIES AND POTENTIALLY RELAXES UNUSUAL EVENT
. REQUIRES MINIMAL C0 ORDINATION WITH FEMA, STATE / LOCAL
. REQUIRES MINIMAL CHANGE OF PLANT EMERGENCY PLANS
. POTENTIALLY ELIMINATES NEED TO CHANGE 50.72 LATER DISADVANTAGES: . UNUSUAL EVENT STILL IN EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
. EMERGENCY PREPAREE 5S REGULATIONS AND PLANS WILL BE REVISED LATER l
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4 ADVANTAGES / DISADVANTAGES ALTERNATIVE 4 - DELAY FINAL 50.72 AND MODIFY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS i
ADVANTAGES: . MODIFICATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS MIGHT BE STARTED S0ONER AND EXPEDITED
. MODIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS MIGHT BE MORE CONSOLIDATES DISADVANTAGES: . IMPROVEMENTS TO 50.72 WOULD BE DELAYED 1 TO 2 YEARS
. C0 ORDINATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE DELAYED 1 TO 2 YEARS
. CLARIFICATION AND POTENTIAL RELAXATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT WOULD BE DELAYED 1 TO 2 YEARS.
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PUBLIC COMMENT
. COORDINATE WITH OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS SEVEN COMMENTERS SAID THAT ,
THE NRC SHOULD COORDINATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.72, WITH OTHER RULES, NUREG-0654 AND REG. GUIDE 1.16, MANY OF THESE LETTERS IDENTIFIED OVERLAP, DUPLICATION AND INCONSISTENCY AMONG NRC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
. NOTIFICATION TIMING
_ THE COMMENTERS GENERALLY HAD TWO POINTS TO MAKE REGARDING THE TIMING 0F REPORTS TO THE NRC. FIRST, THE COMMENTS SUPPORTED NOTIFICATION OF THE NRC AFTER APPROPRIATE STATE OR LOCAL AGENCIES. SECOND, TWO COMMENTS REQUESTED THAT THERE BE A NEW FOUR TO SIX-HOUR REPORT CATEGORY FOR EVENTS NOT WARRANTING A REPORT WITH ONE HOUR.
. RADI0 ACTIVE RELEASE-THRESH 0LD SEVERAL COMMENTS SAID THAT THE THRESH 0LD OF 25% OF ALLOWABLE LIMITS FOR RADI0 ACTIVE RELEASES WAS T00 LOW A THRESH 0LD FOR 1-HOUR REPORTING.
. USE OF VAGUE OR INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA COMMENTERS OBJECTED TO USE OF " EVACUATION OF A BUILDING," " EXTENSIVE ONSITE CONTAMINATION," "READILY REMOVED," " EXPLICITLY THREATENS," AND "IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN."
. REACTOR SCRAMS SEVERAL COMMENTERS SAID REACTOR SCRAMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE SCRAMS BELOW POWER OPERATION, SHOULD NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF THE NRC WITHIN I-HOUR.
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l COMMENTS DISPOSITION REGION 1 - CONCURRED AND PROVIDED COMMENTS RES0VED SOME EDITORIAL CONCURRENCE OBTAINED REGION 2 -
- 1. APPLY ONLY TO POWER REACTORS 1. COMMENT RESOLVED
- 2. ONLY EVENTS WHICH WARRANT 2. BEYOUND SCOPE OF PROPOSED RULE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION SHOULD CHANGE AND ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE.
BE MADE ON ENS. REPORT OTHER THIS IS SIMILAR TO ALTERNATIVE 4.
EVENTS TO THE REGIONS DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS WITHIN 24 HOURS OF EVENT OCCURRENCE.
- 3. REMOVE UNUSUAL EVENT FROM 50.72 3. REMOVED UNUSUAL EVENT FROM 50.72.
AND THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHANGE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND NUREG 0654. REGULATIONS ARE BEYOUND SCOPE OF PROPOSED RULE CHANGE. THIS REQUIRES MODIFICATION OF 50.47 AND APPENDIX E.
THIS IS ALTERNATIVE 4 DISCUSSED ,
ABOVE.
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- 4. DO NOT CHANGE PARTS 20 and 73. 4. COMMENT NOT AD0PTED. ALL REGULA IONS i
LICENSEES SHOULD REPORT TO THE FOR TELEPHONE NOTIFICATIONS SPECIFY REGIONS NOT ON THE ENS. ENS PERSUANT TO 50.72.
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COMMENTS- DISPOSITION REGION 2 - CONTINUED i
- 5. ESTABLISH A 24 HOUR REPORT 5. COMMENT NOT ADOPTED. INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION. WOULD BE TOO OLD TO BE USEFUL.
INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY SHIFT ON DUTY AT TIME OF EVENT.
REGION 3 - A CONFLICT EXISTS 950.54 COMMENT RESOLVED -
REQUIRES LICENSEES TO NUREG 0654 NOT ADDRESSED FCLLOW NUREG-0654 AND NEW 950.72 WOULD REDEFINE
" UNUSUAL EVENTS" REGION 4 - CONCURRED AND PROVIDED COMMENTS RESOLVED -
SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS RULE WILL REPLACE INCLUDING THE SUGGESTION REG GUIDE 1.16 THAT REG GUIDE 1.16 BE REVISED .
i REGION 5 -
l 1. SEVERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1. MADE CHANGES TO EXTENT POSSIBLE.
ARE NOT CLEAR AND REQUIRE l EXPLANATION l
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COMMENTS DISPOSITION REGION 5 - CONTINUED
- 2. 10 CFR 50.72 AND 50.73 NEED TO 2. DISAGREE - NOT CONSISTENT WITH BE BETTER COORDINATED - 3 TIME OTHER COMMENTS.
FRAMES IS CONFUSING.
- 3. WILL RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL 3. AGREE, BUT THINK THIS IS DESIRABLE.
REDUCTION IN REPORTING OF RADIO-f LOGICAL EVENTS.
- 4. REVISION OF PART 50 INAPPROPRIATE 4. ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES FOR BECAUSE IT APPLIES TO ALL CLASSES POWER REACTORS.
OF LICENSEES.
- 5. RULE NEEDS BETTER SCOPE AND 5. IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE.
CLARITY ELD - DO NOT DISAGREE WITH ALTERNATIVES RESOLVING - MAKING CHANGES AS CHOSEN. MUTUALLY AGREED.
REQUIRES MORE SUBSTANTIAL WORK.
RES - FEMA'S CONCURRENCE SHOULD BE RESOLVING - MEETING WITH FEMA OBTAINED IF DEFINITION OF UF IN NUREG-0654 IS CHANGED.
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COMMENTS DISPOSITION CHANGING EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RESOLVED - PROPOSING TO LEAVE WILL REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION PRESENT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS WITH STATE / LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. IN PLACE.
ADM/NRR - FORMAT SUGGESTIONS.. RESOLVED -
ADOPTED CHANGES AND WILL CHECK WITH ADM AGAIN BEFORE 153UANCE.
NRR - INFORMAL COMMENTS RECEIVED RESOLVED -
MOSTLY EDITORIAL. CHANGES BEING MADE.
INPO - OPERATIONAL COMMENTS. OPERATIONAL COMMENTS RESOLVED.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMENTS. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMENTS BEING RESOLVED, l
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5 '- 50.72 NON EMERGENCY HOTIFICATION (1) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
(ii) Any event or condition during operation that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously
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degraded; or resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, in an condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or in a condition not governed by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site personnel in the performar.ce of duties necessary for the safe operation of theplank.
1 (iv) Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a resul't of a valid signal.
(v) Any event which results in a major Joss of emergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System).
(vi) Any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant including fires, and toxic gas or radioactive releases.
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d (1) Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
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(2)* Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection' System
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- (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, includir.g the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported. -
(3) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfill-
, cent of the safety function of struct'ures or systens that are needed to:
(i) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (ii) Remove residual heat, (iii) Control the release of radioactive material, or (iv) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Such events may include' one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, and/or procedural inadequacies.
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(4) (i) Any gaseous radioactive release that exceeded 2 times th'e applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B. Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour.
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(11) Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 t'imes the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20, of this Chapter 1) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e.,
unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.
! (5) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
(6) Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release
. is planned or notification to other governr.ent agencies has been or will be made.
Such events may include an onsite fatality on inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
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(d) Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications cade under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, each licensee, in addition to making the required notification', shall during the course of the event:
(1) Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions inc1uding those that require, or-initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.
(2) Immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related tc plant behavior that is not understood.
(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC C;erations Center upon request by the NRC. ~
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COST / BENEFIT COST = THE CHIEF INCREMENTAL COSTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH MODIFICATIONS OF PLANT REPORTING PROCEDURES; HOWEVER, MOST OF SUCH COSTS WOULD BE INCURRED VOLUNTARILY IF THE LICENSEE CHOSE TO MODIFY THESE PROCEDURES.
i BENEFIT = THE CHIEF BENEFIT IS ELIMINATION OF NOTIFICATIONS NOW REQUIRED BY.
650.72 AND THE ASSOCIATED REDUCTION IN BURDEN ON OPERATING PERSONNEL.
A 50% REDUCTION IN THE REPORTED BURDEN IS EXPECTEQ.*
WHEN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS ARE CHANGED THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS DUE TO FEWER EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS.
1 i *THIS IS SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH 50.72, PART OF THIS SAVING WILL NOT BE REALIZED UNTIL 73.71 MODIFIED.
J COST / BENEFIT DECEMBER 1983 SURVEY OF TELEPHONE NOTIFICATIONS
- 1. TOTAL EVENTS REPORTED 82 - REPORTS STILL REQUIRED BY REVISED 50.72 50 - REPORTS NOT REQUIRED BY REVISED 50.72 29 - COURTESY CALLS NOT REQUIRED 161 - TOTAL IN DEC '82
- 2. 50 40 REDUCTION-REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED
. OF THE 79 (50+29) CALLS NOT REQUIRED BY REVISED 550.72 15 INJURIES 16 LC0'S 11 MINOR RELEASES 32 SECURITY REPORTS (DELAYED UNTIL ROUTE 73 REVISION)
_ji, MISCELLANE0US 79 TOTAL NOT REQUIRED
- 3. UhUSUAL EVENT
. 11 0F 161 WERE UNUSUAL EVENTS
. ALMOST ALL WERE NONEMERGENCIES BASED ON SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- 4. OTHER EVENTS 1 ALERT 1 GENERAL EMERGENCY 1
. l Table Summary: Regs. Reporting Requirements Compared h8 /4'#Corresponding s' Corresponding ~. . Problems 50.72 50.73 0654 73.71 20.403 50.36 Identified Item Item Examples (1) 1 5 3 DR, IRT 2 6 10*, 12, 73.71(b) DR IRT I
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l 73.71 (a) dependent 0654 information on conseq)uences or length of time problem exists (insufficient (1) Dual Reporting (DR), Inconsistency: Reporting Time (IRT)
(A) Interrelationship undetermined; (B) to be changed by 50.73
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T46 McIEWMW REGULATORY ANALYSIS OBJECTIVE The objective of the revised Innlediate Notification System describcd in 10 CFR 50.72, "Icmediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Reactors" is to enhance the safet f nuclear plants by providing for timely notification to the NRC should safety significant events occur at operating nuclear reactors.
. BACKGROUND The existing provisions of'10 CFR 50.72 have generated basically threa types of problems. One problem is certain safety significant events are not required to be reported. A second problem is, certain events, that are insignificant from the perspective of protecting the public health and safety, are required to be reported. The third and perhaps mest important problem is that the existing reporting requirements are not coordinated with other existing and proposed requirements. For example, the existing 10 CFR 50.72 overlaps with and is duplicative to some extent with the " Unusual Event" category of -
NUREG-0654 as well as other reporting requirements of 10 CFR.
- NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergence Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Rev.1, November,1980.
Enclosure 4 Wl3
s Related to the problem of the exi$ ting regulation not requiring reports for all. events with safety significance, special consideration must be given to Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295). The intent of Congress as expressed in that law was for The Comission to establish specific guidelines for identifying accidents which could result in an unoTanned release of . radioactivity in excess of allowable ' limits and to rekuire immediate notification of these incidents. The revision of $50.72 is consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980.
The NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register (46 FR 81894) on December 21, 1981 and subse'quently received twenty letters of public comment.
These letters of public coment were generally supportive of the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 and these letters were most useful in providing details for the developmknt of the final rule now being promulgated.
ALTERNATIVES At the outset of this rulemaking, a wide v riety of regulatory alternatives was considered. One alternative that was rejected was t):e possibility of simply revising 10 CFR 50.72 without regard for coordination with other reporting requirements. The need for coordination with other provisions of 10 CFP most notably the new LER system 10 CFR 50.73, resulted in the present approach.
Each of the reporting criteria represented a range of possible alternatives in itself and each was considered carefully, usually by a committee representing the various elements of the NRC staff concerned with the information to be gained from that particular reporting requirement.
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3-Later, in response to public comments, the need to coordinate 50.72 with the overlapping " Unusual Event" category resulted in consideration of alternatives for eliminating confusion, and overlap between these reporting requirements.
The staff decided to explicitly incorporate criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 that would .
capture such events and supersede the definition of Unusual Event in NUREG 0654. This alternative was chosen because of the difficulty in trying to eliminate overlap and conflict between the definition of "significant event" as defined in 10 CFR 50.72 and " Unusual Event" as previously defined in NUREG
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0654. The staff thinks the new definitions of significant event and unusual event reflect amore carefully considered hierarchy of safety significence.
In attempting to reach a decision.on the appropriate course of action for the immediate notification rule move two alternatives were considered:
- 1. Delay the 50.72 rule while the Emergency Classes in NUREG-0654 are changed and 50.72 is republished as a proposed rule.
- 2. Publish 50.72 as a final rule continuing " Unusual Events," as a class of Emergency, but make the criteria consistent with 50.73. After added experience
- with the revised 50.72 consider the need for reclassifying " Unusual Events" as non-emergencies.
Alternative No. 2 keeps 50.72 revision on the same schedule with 50.73 and provides more experience with notification of state and local agencies of
" Unusual Events." The principal disadvantage is continued burden on licensees to report certain non-serious events as emergencies.
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- 4-Another alternative that was adopied as a result of public comment was the establishment of a 4-hour notification deadline for "significant events" that are slightly less significant and less urgent than those requiring a 1-hour notification deadline for " Unusual Events."
Still more alternatives were considered as a result of public comment, most notably changes in reporting threshold. A more detailed account of the alternatives considered as a result of public comment is contained in the
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Federal Register Notice for this rulemaking.
BENEFITS AND COSTS 4
The NRC staff weighed the costs and benefits associated with revising 10 CFR 50.72. .The optimum benefit is derived by revising both 10 CFR 50.72 and related portions of other reporting requirements. Accordingly, revision of 10 CFR 50.72 is being coordinated with development of 10 CFR 50.73. In addition, a number of substantive or administrative changes are being developed that will amend other sections of 10 CFR Part 50, Part 20 and Part 21.
The value of revising 10 CFR 50.72 goes beyond dollar benefits. The capability of the NRC to make timely decisions and to provide adequate assurances regarding actual or potential threats to public health and safety depends heavily on the rapidity with which significant events occurring at nuclear power power plants are communicated by nucierr power reactor licensees to NRC.
The majority of events occurring throughout the nuclear industry pose little or no serious or immediate threats to the public health and safety; however, certain events do pose such threats-or generate fear or unusual concern.
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NRC has an important obligation to collect facts quickly and accurately abo'ut significant events, assess the facts, take necessary action, and inform the public about ti.e extent of the threat, if any, to public health and safety.
Not only must NRC act promptly to prevent or minimize possible injury to the ,
public, it must also take appropriate action to alleviate fear or concern created as a result of such events. .
The staff expects that there will be little significant additional costs to the NRC or to licensees associated with the effective rule changes, however.
the staff would like to point out the costs that have been associated with establishing and implementing a " prompt notification system." These costs are 6 man-years per year of NRC staff effort for manning the telephones for notification and $1.5 million per year for dedicated telephone lines to each operating cornnerciil power reactor facility.
Other Government Agencies Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would contribute to improved State and local emergency response around nuclear power reactors.
- Applicant agencies (e.g., TVA, DOE) would be affected as presented under Section 1.3.3 below.
Industry There should be little additional cost to the industry associated with implementing the final rule changes additional to those incurred in order to comply with NRC's emergency preparedness regulations.
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Public Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would provide increased confidence that the health and safety of the public would be protected during a radiological emergency because the State and local governments would be better informed.
Decision on the Action Since the final rule reflects many of public comments and is generally recognized by-the public and the NRC as in the best interest of public health and safety, the final rule changes should be published in the Federal Register to become effective within 60 days of the date of publication.
SPECIFICATION OF CRITERIA It is generally recognized that the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 constitutes a significant improvement over the existing regulation. Even without making the many changes to the proposed rule suggested by public comment, a number of letters of public comments found the revised 50.72 to be an improvement. The changes adopted for promulgation in the final rule reflect many changes recommended by public coment.
The revised 50.72 should be a substantial improvement in terms of:
Clarity The final rule clearly and explicitly includes reporting criteria for
" Unusual Events" that were previously defined in NUREG-0654. The proposed rule required the licensee to notify the NRC when an " Unusual Event" was declared s b
. 3 7-but the actual reporting criteria for "Urusual Events" were not stated in the
. proposed rule itself. By including the " Unusual Event" criteria in the final rule, the clarity and legal basis for reporting are improved.
Order .
The order of the criteria in the final rule has changed from that in the proposed rule. By reorganization the criteria, Unusual Event criteria can be included, and improvements can be made in consistency between similar criteria
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in 10 CFR 50.73. .
Consistency The final rule incorporates many of the same types of reporting criteria used in 10 CFR 50.73.
Report timing Both the proposed and final rules incorporate a provision that requires them to notify the NRC "as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence." In addition, the final rule incorporates a provision for reporting sone occurrences within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This is permitted because occurrences satisfying some of the criteria reflect less serious or less inmediate safety significance. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reports are covered by Section b " Unusual Event" or the final rule and the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports are covered by Section c "Significant Event" of the final rule.
FINAL DECISION Based on the comments received on the proposed rule, and its own assessment of the impact of this rule, the staff has concluded that the revised 10 CFR
. l 8- l 50.72 will: (1) not place an unacceptNie burden on the licensees, (2) have significant safety benefits for the public, (3) reduce reporting burden-on licensees, (4) increase the effectiveness of the Immediate Notification System.
Therefore, the staff concludes that 10 CFR 50.72 ru"e should be promulgated.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Immediate Notification Requirement For Operating nuclear Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Final Rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations which _
j require imediate notification of significant events at licensed commercial nuclear power plants in light of experience with existing requirements and public coaments on a proposed revision of the rule. The Commission is clarifying the list of reportable events in 10 CFR 50.72 to include reporting criteria for unusual events that replaces separate criteria expressed as examples in NUREG-0654.
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EFFECTIVE DATE: (enter 60 days from date of publication)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory .
Commission, Washington, D. C. E0555; telephone (301) 492-4973.
A SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. BACKGROUND On Dcccmber 21, 1981 The Commission published in The Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking (46 FR 61894), and invited public comment on that rulemaking. The proposed rulemaking considered: (1)Theincorporationofthe immediate notification requirements of $50.72 into 550.54 as a condition of every operating license to implement the provisions of section 201 of the
" Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295)," (2) certain clarifications and refinements of the reporting requirements contained in 650.72.
Licensees are now subject to certain notification requirements, both as to the contents of their applications for operating licenses and to actions authorized by the operating licenses. All applications for section 103 and 104b licenses are now required by 650.54 to include emergency plans that
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3 contain the various elements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. These section 103 and 104b facilitites are the comercial nuclear power facilities that produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to the proposed license conditions as they are licensed under section 104a and 104c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, 42 USC 2133.
Section IV of_ Appendix E requires the plans to include procedures for notifying local, state and Federal officials. Once an operating license under section 103 and 104b is granted, the licensee is required by 10 CFR 50.72 to actuate imediate notification procedures upon the occurrence of any of the specific "significant events" described in 550.72.
The NRC has provided since the enactment of section 201, further guidance to operating licensees as to situations or events which require notification by the licensee of the NRC and State and local response organizations and other emergency personnel. On August 19, 1980, the NRC published the final rule on Emergency Planning, effective on November 3,1980(45FR55402-15). This rule established a multifaceted emergency planning and preparedness program and, amcng other things, required procedures to be established for immediate notification of the NRC and State and local emergency response personnel in l certain situations.
These situations were discussed in Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 l entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants" (hereinafter
.-4.
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~~ 1 Revision 1"), which was issued in November 1980, shortly after the Emergency Planning rule became effective.* Revision 1 specified four classes of Emergency Action Levels involving notification actions--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. Revision 1 also set forth examples of initiating conditions for each of these four Emergency
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Classes: 26 examples for the first level, 29 for the second, 24 for the third, and 15 for the fourth.
As stated on page 1-3 of Revision 1: The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equip-ment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are i
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- Copies of NUREG documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Attention: Publications Sales Manager l
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I not yet fully realized. A gradation in provided to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site area emergency class reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information.
In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and associated communications. The general emergency class involves actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containnent.
l The criteria set forth in Revision 1 and the examples of events triggering l
the respective Emergency Classes (with attendant notification actions) provide l
additional guidance for every operating licensee in the preparation, approval, and ultimately, the implementation of their emergency preparedness plans which must be submitted to NRC for evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47.
III ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS Twenty (20) letters of comment were received in response to the Federal RegisterNotice(46FR61894)publishedonDecember 21, 1981*. This Federal
- Copies of these documents are available for public inspection and applying at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555
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6-Register Notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 " Notification of Significant Events" and 10 CFR 50.54 " Conditions of Licensees." An overview of the more significant comments is as follows:
General:
A few general comments said that the " Commission already has the ability to enforce its regulations and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license."
Based on careful consideration of these comments and the advice of its Executive Legal Director, The Commission is not promulgating the proposed revision of $50.54.
Need for Coordination Seven letters' of comment said that the NRC should coordinate the require-nents of 10 CFR 50.72 with other rules, NUREG-0654 and Reg. Guide 1.16. Psny of these letters identified overlap, duplication and inconsistency among NRC reporting requirements.
The-NRC staff is making a concerted effort to ensure consistent and coordinated reporting requirements. The requirements contained in the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being coordinated with revision of 50.73,50.55(e),50
- Appendix E, 20.402, 73.71 and Part 21. In addition, the " Unusual Event" I
category is explicitly incorporated in 50.72 this eliminating overlap with
! NUREG-0654. The rule change replaces Reg. Guide 1.16.
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Building Evacuation Ten letters of comment said that the proposed 50.72(b)(6) iii regarding "any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuation of a building" was unclear and counter-productive by causing reluctance to evacuate a building.
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Based on this comment the NRC has revised this reporting requirement to eleminate reference to building evacuation and instead rely on specific radio-logical release rate criteria.
Plant Operating and Emergency Procedures Several letters of comment said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operating and emergency procedures because:
- a. It would take operators too long to decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures,
- b. The procedures cover events that are not of concern to the NRC, and
- c. The procedures vary from plant to plant.
The NRC staff position is that the plant's operating personnel should be familiar with their procedures. However, the wording of the reporting criteria has been modified (50.72(b)(2) in the final rule) to narrow the events captured to those that significantly compromise plant safety. Notwithstanding the fact the procedures do vary from plant-to-plant, this is a useful reporting criterion indicative of a more serious event.
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ESF / RPS Actuation Several letters of comment said reactor scrams, particularly those scrams jf'below power operation, should not require notification of the the NRC within 1-hour.
In response to these comments, the NRC staff has changed the reporting deadline to 4-hours. However, the NRC staff does not regard reactor scrams as "non-events" as do some commentors. Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety related problems.
Radioactive Release-Threshold Several letters of comment said the threshold of 257 of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low a threshold for 1-hour reporting.
Based upon this comment, the NRC staff has changed the threshcid of reporting to 2 times allowable limits.
Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as Basis for Notification A few letters of comment objected to citing 10 CFR 50.72 as basis when making a telephone notification. The letters of comment questioned the purpose, legal effect and burden on the licensee.
The NRC staff does not believe that it is an unnecessary burden for a licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by 10 CFR 50.72. There have been many occasions when the licensee could not tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with technical specifications,10 CFR 50.72, some other requirement, or just a
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_g_
courtesy call. Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report and it becomes more difficult for the NRC to quickly and properly respond to the event.-
Pe.sonnel Radioactive Contamination Several letters of comn.ent objected to the use of vague terms such as
" extensive onsite contamination" and "readily removed".in one of the reoorting criterion of the proposed rule.
Based on this comment a new criterion has been prepared that does not use these terms.
Notification Timing The letters of comment generally had two points to make regarding the timing of reports to the NRC. First, the comments supported notification of the NRC after appropriate state of local agencies. Second, two comments requested that there be a new four to six-hour report category for events not warranting a report with one hour.
Based on these comments, the NRC has established a "four-hour report" category titled "significant events" as was suggested.
Irrediate Shutdown Several letters of comment objected to the use of the term "immediate shutdown" saying that technical specifications do not use such a term.
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l Although the term is used in some but not all technical specifications, the NRC staff has revised the reporting criterion in question. The final rule requires a report upon the initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown
- required by Technical Specifications.
Explicit Threats A few commentors said that the intent of the term " explicitly threatens"
' was unclear. These commentors wonder what level of threat was being referred to. The term " explicitly threaten" that appeared in the proposed rule has been deleted from the final rule.
1 IV. SPECIFIC FINDINGS.
' Overview Of The Immediate Notification System When this final rule becomes effective, the immediate notification reporting requirement will provide the NRC with timely reports of emergencies and other safety significant events. This amendment of the existing 550.72, " Notification of Significant Events" will result in casically three types of improvements.
j One improvement.is that the NRC will receive notification of safety i ,
significant events that were not previously captured under the existing provisions l of $50.72. For example, the revision of this section requires reporting of any i- " major loss of emergency assessment of communications capability (e.g.,
significant portion of control room indicator or Emergency Notification System).
This and other changes in reporting criteria will provide the NRC with a more
- complete Immediate Notification System.
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A second improvement is that certain events that were previously reported despite having little safety significance, will no long r be reported. For example, the existing rule required reporting any fatality or injury occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility. This resulted in a large number of worker injury reports. The new rule requires reporting " transport of radioactively contaminated individual to offsite individual facility for treatment" or if " news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made," these changes and others are expected to greatly reduce the number of inconsequential reports.
The third and perhaps most important improvement is that the revision of this rule has been closely coordinated with other sections of Part 50, Part 20, and Part 21. Many of the reporting criteria in the final rule are similar in wording and intent to reporting in the new 50.73 "LER System." This should aid ease of interpretation, reduce loopholes and generally improve coordination in the generation, receipt and use of reports.
Several substantive revisions of other sections of 10 CFR are underway that will like-wise use similar wording in their reporting requirements (e.g.,
50.55(e)and10CFRPart21). In addition, a number of administrative revisions of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, 10 CFR 20.402 and 20.403, 20.405 and 10 CFR 73.71 are being made to ensure coordinated reporting requirements.
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Paragraph-By-Paragraph Explanation of The Rule Paragraph 50.72 requires:
"Immediate Notification Requirement for Operating Nuclear Reactors. Each licensee of a nuclear power reactor licensed under 550.21(b) or $50.22 shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System for any of the following five types of events: Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, Unusual Event, and Significant Event. When making such notifications the licensee shall identify which of the five types of events is being reported.
If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the the licensee shall make the required notifications via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system or any other method which will ensure a report being made promptly to the NRC Operations Center."
This initial paragraph reflects some consolidation of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and scope of this paragraph does not reflect any change from the proposed rule.
! Paragraph 50.72(a) [ proposed 50.72(a)] requires that:
l "The licensee shall notify the NRC each time there is initiation of the l following four Emergency Classes:
Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency. All such notifications to the NRC shall be made immediately after notification to the appropriate State or local agencies."
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e In response to public comments, " Unusual Events" are no longer defined by NUREG-0654, but are defined by paragraph 50.72(b). Public comments critized the overlap between the rule and NUREG-0654. Consequently, the criteria for Unusual Events were explicitly incorporated into the regulations with care to eliminate the overlap.
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"The initation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." While the intent and scope has not changed, the change in wording between the proposed and final rule is intended to clarify prompt notification is required once a shutdown is initiated.
In response to public comment, the term "immedia'.e shutdown" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the final rule. The term was vague and unfamiliar to those licensees that did not have Technical Specification using the term.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events for which Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown. This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events and some events captured by proposed 50.72(b)(1)] require reporting of:
"Any event or condition during operation that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded,
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in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant, or in a condition not governed by the plant's operating and emergency procedures." This paragraph is added for two reasons: One was to capture events previously classified as
" Unusual Events" thus eliminating overlap between this rule and NUREG-0654.
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The other reason was to provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule and 10 CFR 50.73 that has a similar provision. Both of these reasons were suggested by public comment. The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant, including its principal safety barriers, was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition. For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant need not be reported. However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural j circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be reportable. In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to significantly misunderstand the true condition of the plant is also an unanalyzed condition and should be l reported.
l The Comission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is not intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters,
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1 or to problems concerning single pieces of equipment. At any time, one or more safety-related components is likely to be out of service due to testing, main-tenance, or a not-yet-rectified fault. Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situation in which two or more often unrelated, safety celated components are formally out-of-service.
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Technically, this is an unanaiyzed condition. However, these events should be reported only if they involve functionally related components or if they reflect significantly compromised plant safety.
Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g., metallurgical, chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation the principal safety barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor c.oolant system pressure boundary, or the contain-ment). Examples of this type of situation include:
(a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of fission products.
(b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves etc.)
(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.
(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients.
(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during test or operation.
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(f) Loss of containment function or integrity including:
(1) containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits (ii) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation (iii) loss of main steam isolation valve function ~during test or
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operation (iv) loss of containment cooling capability Paragraph 50.72(b)(3) [ encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b)(2)]
requires reporting of:
"Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or interferred with site personnel in the perfomance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant."
This paragraph was reworded to correspond to a similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(3). By making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar in language, when possible, the NRC staff hopes to increase the coordination t between and clarity of the rules.
1 The paragraph has been reworded to make it clear that it applies only to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank car explosion). References to acts of sabotage have been removed that are covered by Section 73.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases) are now covered by that separate criterion paragraph 50.72(b)(6). This paragraph is intended to capture those events where there is an actual threat to the plant from an external condition or
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natural phenomenon, and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown conditions). The licensee should decide if a phenomenon or condition actually threatened th{ plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that was quickly controlled by fire fighting personnel and, as a result, did not present a threat to the plant should not be reported. However, a major forest fire, large-scale flood, or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported.
As another example, an industrial or transportion accident which occurs near the site creating a plant safety concern should be reported.
One letter of comment was concerned that events occurring on land adjacent to the plant, owned by the utility might be reportable. This is not the intent of this reporting requirement. The NRC is concerned with the safety of plant and personnel on the actual'Olte of plant and not with land adjacent to plant used entirely for non-nuclear activities.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(4) [ encompassing events previously classified as
" Unusual Events"] requires the reporting of:
"Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a result of a valid sigaal." This criterion is added to two reasons. One was to capture events previously classified as " Unusual Events" thus eliminating overlap between 50.72 and NUREG-0654. The other reason is to provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule and 10 CFR 50.73 that has a similar provision.
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a Both of these reasons were suggested by public comment. However, unlike a similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73, this rule requires reporting of a reactor trip from anjt power level. This requirement is based on the usefulness of this information in the past in identifying safety problems.
This paragraph is intended to capture those evants that result in either automatic or manual actuation of the ECCS or could have resulted in ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been taken.
One example of such an event would be if a valid ECCS signal was generated by plant conditions, and the operator put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock. Even though no ECCS discharge occurred, the event would be reportable.
A " valid signal" refers to the actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this reporting requirement would be those instances where instrument drift, spurious signals, human error, or other invalid signals caused ECCS. However, such events may be reportable under other paragraphs of sections of 10 CFR based upon other details of the event. Inparticular, paragraph 50.72(c)(2)wouldrequirea significant event report within four-hours if ESF were actuated.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(5) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events] requires reporting of:
"Any event which results in major loss of emergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System").
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i In response to public comment, this reporting criterion was added to those of the proposed rule in order to capture those events previously classified as Unusual Events. Thus,' the overlap between this rule and NUREG-0654 is eliminated.
l This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that would h . impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency. Notifying the NRC of these events may permit the NRC to take some compensating measures and to more completely assess the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.
3 Paragraph 50.72(b)(6)[encompassingsomeportionsoftheproposed
! 50.72(b)(2), (6) and (8)] requires the reporting of:
l "Any event or personnel act that threatened the safety of the nuclear
] power plant or interferred with site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant. Such events may include fires, strikes by operating personnel, exclusion of personnel access due to toxic or radioactive gaseous releases." Adding the phrase " exclusion of personnel i
j accessduetotoxicorradioactivegaseousreleases"toparagraph50.72(b)(6) i of the final rule covers paragraph 50.72(b)(8) of the proposed rule and the
" evacuation" portion of paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii)oftheproposedrule.
Since public cornnent was critical of this " evacuation" reporting criterion in the proposed rule, the staff made this change in wording for the final rule.
! While paragraph 50.72(b)(3) of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph 50.72(b)(6) captures other events, particularly acts by personnel . The Commission believes this management of the reporting criteria
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l in the final rule lends itself to more precise interpretation and is consistent
! with those public comments that requested closer coordination between the I reporting requirements in this rule and other portion of 10 CFR.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events, particulary j those caused by acts of personnel which endanger the safety of the plant or l interface with personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe plant operations.
Nevertheless, the licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section. For example, a small fire on site that did not endanger any
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plant equipment, that did not and could not reasonably be expected to endanger the plant is not reportable.
Paragraph 50.72(c) "Significant Event" [not in proposed rule] requires l that:
i l "The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases, .
I l within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following events if not reported under paragraph (a) or (b) above. The events to be reported are:"
f
! Although-the reporting criteria contained in the subparagraphs that follow
- were in the proposed rule, public comment prompted the Commission to establish i
- this "Significant Event" category for those events with slightly less urgency I
and less safety significance that may be reported within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1
- hour. Paragraph 50.72(c)(1)[encompassingsomeeventscapturedbyproposed ;
I 50.72(b)(1)] requires reporting of:
l "Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found i
! while the reactor we.s in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power i
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plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety".
Based upon public comments that rcquested close coordination be established between 50.72 and other rules, this reporting requirement is similar to a requirement in 50.73. Except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this reporting requirement is similar to a " Unusual Event" 50.72(b)(2). Because this refers to a shutdown reactor, events captured by this requirement have less urgency and cr.n be reported within four hours as a "Significant Event." Paragraph 50.72(b)(1) of the proposed rule was split into 50.72(b)(2) and 50.72(c)(1) in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports to be made within four hcurs. In terms of their combined effect, the overall intent and scope of these sections has not changed from that in the proposed rule. Since the types of events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to 50.72(b)(2) except that the reactor is shutdown, the reader should refer to the explanation of 50.72(b)(2) for more details on intent.
Paragraph 50.72(c)(2)[ proposed 50.72(b)(5)]requiresreportingof:
i "Any event or condition resulting in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
Actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.
In response to public comments, this reporting requirement has been made a "Significant Event" because The Commission agrees with the letters of comment t
that events captured by this requirement generally have slightly less urgency
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and safety significance than those events included in the " Unusual Event" paragraphs. The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have not changedfromthatintheproposedrule.J This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates, either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. It is based on the premise that the ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event, therefore, (1) they should . work properly when called upon and (2) they should not be challenged unnecessarily. The staff is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events whee, an ESF operated unnecessarily.
" Actuation" of c:ultichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportable if they do not complete the minimum actuation logic.
Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. However, if during the test or evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure, that actuation should be reported. For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need not be reported. However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported. The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically during an event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation. Actuations
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that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event (e.g., at the discretion of the licensee as part of a planned procedure).
Paragraph 50.72(c)(3)[ proposed 50.72(b)(4)]requirereportingof:
"Any event or condition that alone cc.ld have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(1) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; (11) Remove residual heat; (iii) Control the release of radioactive material.
Such events may include one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, and/or procedural inadequacies."
In response to public comments, the words "any instance of personal error, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words " event or condition".
This simplification in language is intended to clarify what was a confusing phrase to many of those who commented on the proposed rule. Also in response to public comment, this reporting requirement is a "Significant Event" to be reported within four hours instead of within one hour.
This reporting requirement is similar to one contained in 50.73, thus reflecting public comment identifying the need for closer coordination of reporting requirements between 50.72 and 50.73.
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In summary, the wording of this paragraph has been changed to make it easier to read, while the intent and scope of the paragraph have not been changed. This paragraph is based on the assumption that safety-related systems and structures are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident. While paragraph 50.72(c)(2) applies to actual demands for actuation of an ESF, paragraph 50.72(c)(3) covers an event where a safety system could have failed to perform its intended function because of one or more personnel errors, including procedure violations; equipment failures; or design, analysis, fabrication, construction, or procedural deficiencies. The event should be reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused the structure or system to be unavailable.
It should be noted that this paragraph applies to those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (e.g., containment isolation, emergencyfiltration). Hence, minor operational events such as valve packing 1eaks, which could be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, l
l should not be reported under this paragraph. System leaks or other similar events may, however, be reportable under other paragraphs.
Paragraph 50.72(c)(4)[ proposed 50.72(b)(6)]requiresreporting:
"(i) Any radioactive release that exceeded 2 times the applicable concentrations (see 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Note 1) of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of l one hour. (ii) Any liquid release that exceeded 2 times the limiting combined 1
Maximum Permissible Concentration MPC (see 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Note 1) i I
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at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclieds except dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour."
Based upon public comment, the reporting threshold has been changed from "25%" in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the final rule. Also, based on public comment, this has been made as a "Significant Event" to be reported within 4-hours instead of within I hour. '
Also based on public comment, this reporting requirenent has been changed to improve its clarity by referring to specific release criteria instead of referring only to technical specifications.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that :ause an unplanned or uncontrolled release of a significant amount of radioactive material to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently, however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and, therefore, should be reported.
Paragraph 50.72(c)(5) [ proposed rule 50.72(b)(7)] requires the reporting of:
"Any event requiring transport of a radioactively contaminated individual l to an offsite medical facility for treatment."
Three changes have been made to this reporting requirement. One is to eliminate the phrase " occurring onsite" because it is implied by the scope of the rule. The second change is to replace " injury involving radiation" with l
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" radioactively contaminated individual." This change was made because of the difficulty in defining injury due to radiation and more importantly because 10 l CFR Part 20 will capture events involving radiation exposure.
The third change which was in response to public comment was to make this reporting requirenent a four-hour notification, instead of one-hour notification.
Paragraph 50.72(c)(6) [not in proposed rule] requires reporting of:
"Any event or sitJation related to the health and safety of the public or site workers, or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made. Such event may include an onsite fatality or release of radioactively contaminated materials." This criterion covers those events or situations that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the news media, other government agencies, or the public. In terms of its effect on licensees, this is not a new reporting requirement because the threshold for reporting injuries and radioactive releases was much lower under the proposed rule. This criterion will capture those events previously reported under other criteria when such events require the NRC to respond because of media or public attention.
Paragraph 50.72(d) [ proposed 50.72(c)] requires:
" Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications made under paragraphs (a)(b) and (c) of this section, each licensee, in addition to making the required notification, shall during the course of the event:
(1) Promptly report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that requires, or may
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i require, initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.
(2) Promptly report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior that is not understood.
(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC."
This paragrapn has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule, except for addition of the title " Followup Notification" and some renumbering.
This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification 4 when:
(1) an event becomes more serious and (2) additional information or new analyses clarify an event.
- This paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel because of the need for continuing . followup information or because of telecommunication problems.
! V. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The information requirements contained in the regulation have been approved -
by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act,
' Pub. L.96-511(clearance number 3150-0011). The SF-83, " Request for Clearance,"
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Supporting Statement, and other related documentation submitted to OMB have '
been placed in the Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. l C. 20555 for in'spection and copying for a fee.
VI. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U. S. C. 605 (b), the Commission hereby certifies that these proposed regulations will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of semil entities. These proposed regulations affect electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under Sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The amendments clarify and modify presently existing notification requirements. Accordingly, there is no new, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor are the licensees within the definition of small businesses set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act,15 U. S.
C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 121.
VII LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Nuclear power plants and reactors, radiation protection, reporting requirements.
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VIII REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may examine a copy of the regulatory analysis
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at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555; telephone (301)492-4973.
PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING 0F PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES. 1. The authority citation for Part 50 is revised to read as follows: AUTHORITY: Sec. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended (42 U. S. C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2239); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1243, 1244, 1246 (42 U. S. C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U. S. C. 2152).
Sections 50.80-81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.
S.C.2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 issued unsed sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.
S. C 2236).
For the purpose of sec. 223, 68 Stas. 958, as amended (42 U. S. C. 2273),
50.10(a), (b), and (c) 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54 and 50.80(a) are issued under sec. 1618, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U. S. C. 2201(b); ,
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50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U. S. C. 22011); and 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U. S. C. 2201(o),
and the laws referred to in Appendices.
Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U. S. C. 552 and 553, the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 are published as a document subject to 4 codification.
- 2. Section, 50.72 is revised to read as follows:
650.72 Immediate Notification Requirement for Operating Nuclear Reactors.
Each licensee of nuclear power reactor licensed under i 50.21(b) or !
50.22 shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification
- System for any of the following five types of events. Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, Unusual Event, and Significant Event. When making such notifications the licensee shall identify which of the five types of events is being reported. If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notificatior.s via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system or any other method which will ensure a report being made promptly to the NRC Operations Center.
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(a) Emergency Notification. The licensee shall notify the NRC each time there is initiation of the following four Emergency Classes: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.* All such notifications to the NRC shall be made immediately after notification to the appropriate State or local agencies.
(b) Unusual Event. The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following eventsifnotreportedunderparagraph(a)above. The events to be reported are:
(1) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
(2) Any event or condition during operation that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded, in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, in an condition that was outside the design basis of the plant, or in a condition not governed by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
- These Emergency Classes are addressed in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" Rev.1, November i 1980. " Unusual Event" as described in NUREG 0654 is now superceded by 10 CFR 50.72(b).
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b2-(3) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or interferred with site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant.
(4) Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a result of a valid signal.
(5) Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System).
(6) Any event or personnel act that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or interferred with site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear plant. Such events may include, fires, strikes by operating personnel, exclusion of personnel access due to toxic or radioactive gaseous releases.
(c) Significant Events. The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon possible and in all cases, within four hours of the occurrences of any of the following events if not reported under paragraph (a) or (b) above. The events to be reported are:
(1) Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
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(2) Any event that re;ulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
Actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.
(3) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfill-ment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(i) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (ii) Remove residual heat; (iii) Control the release of radioactive material.
Such events may incIude one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, and/or procedural inadequacies.
(4) (1) Any radioactive release that exceeded 2 times the applicable concentrations (see10CFRPart20,AppendixB, Note 1)of10CFRPart20, Appendix B, Table II in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour. (ii) Any liquid release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) see 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Note 1) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclieds except dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.
(5) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated individual to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
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h4-(6) Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or site workers, or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made. Such events may include an onsite fatality on inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
(d) Followup Notification. With respect to the telephone notifications made under paragraphs (a)(b) and (c) of this section, each licensee, in addition to making the required notification, shall during the course of the event:
(1) Promptly report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that requires, or may require, initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.
(2) Promptly report the results of ensuing 3 valuations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and infonnation related to plant behavior that is not understood.
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L (3) Maintain an open, continuous comunication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.
Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of 198 .
For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Comission 9
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