05000354/FIN-2013008-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 22:48, 27 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures |
| Description | The team identified a Green, Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 2.C(7) of the Hope Creek operating license, in that the procedures for shutting down the plant in response to a fire in the cable spreading room, control equipment room, or control room were not adequate. Specifically, the alternative (remote) post-fire safe shutdown procedures were not adequate 1) to prevent overfilling of the reactor vessel following a spurious, fire-induced start of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) or 2) to ensure that cooling water is provided to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) prior to overheating. Corrective actions included initiating revisions to the safe shutdown procedures and entering this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as notifications 20600413 and 20601659. The finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone as related to the objective of ensuring the reliability and availability of mitigating systems under postulated fire safe shutdown conditions. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) based upon IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, because the procedural inadequacies would not have prevented the ability of the operators to safely shutdown the plant in a fire event. The team determined that operators had adequate operator training, there was operable detection/suppression systems in the fire areas of concern, there was no/limited ignition sources in the fire areas of concern, there was adequate administrative controls of transient combustibles and ignition sources, and the control room was continually manned. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because PSEG did not provide complete and accurate procedures. Specifically the safe shutdown procedures were not adequate to prevent overfilling the reactor vessel or overheating the EDGs. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2013008 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Lilliendahl K Young R Fuhrmeister W Cook J Rogge B Scrabeck J Patel |
| Violation of: | License Condition - Fire Protection License Condition |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||