05000373/FIN-2014004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Limit Switch Testing Failure |
| Description | A self-revealed non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to provide instructions appropriate to the circumstances for an activity affecting quality. Specifically, the installation instructions for the reactor protection system (RPS) limit switch 1C71-N006B did not contain sufficient guidance to allow the component to be adjusted so that adequate clearance would exist during normal operation to ensure operability. The component failed its first in-service surveillance test. The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) and planned to evaluate maintenance training needs, potential procedure enhancements, and potential enhancements to model-work orders. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, RPS limit switch 1C71-N006B is a safety-related component that, in conjunction with other inputs, can initiate a reactor scram. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with the Significance Determination Process (SDP) because the inspectors answered No to each of the screening questions. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Training, because the licensee did not provide sufficient training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, in this instance, the level of individual training was at such a level that the procedure needed to be of greater detail to be appropriate to the circumstances. |
| Site: | LaSalle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000373/2014004 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil J Jandovitz J Laughlin J Neurauter J Robbins M Kunowski R Baker R Elliott R Ruiz R Winter R Zuffa |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2014004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2014Q3
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