05000333/FIN-2014002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | HPCI System Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by TS |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, ECCS [emergency core cooling system] - Operating, because filling the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system with low quality water from the suppression pool following maintenance caused the HPCI booster pump recirculation pressure control valve, 23PCV-50, to fail, thereby making the HPCI system inoperable, and this condition existed for greater than the TS allowed outage time of 14 days. Although the HPCI system was inoperable, it still maintained its safety function to provide emergency core coolant flow in the event of an accident. As corrective action, Entergy staff changed the procedure to indicate that the HPCI system should be filled using the CSTs, and submitted revision 1 to the associated licensee event report (LER) to report the TS violation. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2014-00961. The inspectors determined that Entergy staffs actions to refill the HPCI system with water from the suppression pool following maintenance, thereby causing the failure of 23PCV-50 to control pressure the next time that the HPCI system was operated, was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the issue resulted in failure of 23PCV-50 to control pressure, which caused the HPCI system to be inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent the actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, because FitzPatrick staff did not implement internal and external operating experience concerning the inadvisability of using suppression pool water to refill the HPCI system following maintenance [P.5] |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2014002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Burket E Knutson J Rady |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | CL.1, CL.1 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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