05000254/FIN-2015003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Adequately Inspect Relay Contacts for Oxidation Results in Relay Failure |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance procedure for HFA relays that was appropriate to the circumstances. Immediate corrective actions included burnishing of the associated relay contacts and testing the associated relays. In addition, the licensee revised their relay inspection procedure and planned future relay replacements during the next refueling outage. The licensee entered the issue into their CAP as IR 2485051. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the failure to perform adequate preventive maintenance on the automatic depressurization system (ADS) logic HFA relay in 2013 resulted in the build-up of oxidation on the relay contacts. This build-up caused the relay to fail its next scheduled test in 2015. A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation and determined the finding was of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of operating experience in the area of problem identification and resolution, because the licensee did not systematically collect, evaluate, and implement relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee identified several internal and external operating experience events related to relay contact oxidation and failed to implement changes to their relay inspection procedures to ensure that effective corrective actions were implemented [P.5]. |
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
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| Report | IR 05000254/2015003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Mathews K Carrington K Stoedter M Holmberg R Elliott R Murray S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Quad Cities - IR 05000254/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Quad Cities) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Quad Cities)
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