05000317/FIN-2015002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Maintenance Instructions for Replacement of the Units 1 and 2 Containment Air Cooler Starters |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to include appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria for determining the auxiliary contacts and mechanical interlocks were properly installed and adjusted when the Units 1 and 2 containment air coolers (CAC) starters and contactors were replaced during plant modifications. The starter and contactors with associated mechanical interlocks and auxiliary contacts provide the necessary electrical coordination to shift the CACs from fast to slow speed during a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). The starter and contactor replacements occurred from July 2002 to July 2004. The inspectors determined that Exelons failure to include appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria for determining the auxiliary contacts and mechanical interlocks were properly installed and adjusted when the Units 1 and 2 CAC starters and contactors were replaced during plant modifications is a performance deficiency. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as IR02408755, completed an apparent cause evaluation (ACE), and completed corrective action work orders (WO) to adjust all associated starters and contactors auxiliary contacts. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined the issue is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued on June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screenings Questions, issued on June 19, 2012, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required for the actual loss of function of the 13 CAC for greater than its technical specification (TS) allowed outage time. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Calvert Cliffs Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model for Calvert Cliffs Unit 1, Version 8.27, for internal events and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the issue was not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000317/2015002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Siwy C Roettgen D Orr D Schroeder H. Anagnostopoulus J Furia R Clagg |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
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