ENS 41372
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
14:00 Feb 4, 2005 | |
| Title | 24-Hour Notification-Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control |
| Event Description | The following information was obtained from the licensee via email :
Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched ([DELETED]) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107. Time and Date of Event: February 4, 2005, 0900 hour0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />s: Reason for Notification: Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and by then preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers. Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder room is assured by controls such as a double roof, restrictions on firefighting combined with limits on combustible materials, limits on moderators for maintenance and cleaning, and rigorous control over powder moisture to ensure that no carts enter the bulk room that have polypaks with moisture above 0.3 wt%. Prevention of moderator from entering the bulk container is assured by controls such as procedure requirements to ensure visual inspection of all powder before it is dumped into a bulk container and the polypak dump hood interlock system. In order to dump a polypak into a bulk container, the operator must scan the polypak's unique barcode and place the polypak into the polypak dump hood mechanism. After the barcode is scanned, the interlock function checks the moisture data associated with the polypak to ensure it is <0.3 wt%. If the moisture results are not <0.3 wt%, the dump hood locks up, preventing further dumping of powder until the discrepancy is resolved. During routine dumping operations, an infrared [s]ensor became misaligned in the polypak dump hood in bulk powder blending room. This resulted in a failure of the polypak dump hood interlock to finish its 'cycle' for that pack. It was expected that this sort of problem would be promptly self revealing, i.e. that the scanning of the next pack would result in an error indicating that the previous pack had not been 'consumed.' While the errors were generated, they were not readily apparent, except to an attentive operator. The barcode scanner sounded the same, the visual cues were subtle, and the dump [hood] interlock did not lock up. The operator was able to scan additional paks and dump them. The moisture database would not have been consulted for any of these paks. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' As Found Condition: An operator found the problem after dumping the first polypak of a blend. Summary of Activity: The affected equipment has been shut down. New programming and other improvements are being developed. Conclusions: There was less than a critical mass of SNM involved. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed. The licensee will be notifying NRC Region II of this incident. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Electric Corporation Columbia, South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | Snm-1107 |
| Reporting | |
| Response | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.63 h0.0263 days <br />0.00375 weeks <br />8.62974e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | M. Owen Connelly 14:38 Feb 4, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Janelle Battiste |
| Last Updated: | Feb 4, 2005 |
| 41372 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Electric Corporation with Response | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 419332005-08-19T19:30:00019 August 2005 19:30:00
[Table view]Response Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Violation of Criticality Spacing Requirements ENS 417232005-05-20T22:40:00020 May 2005 22:40:00 Response, Part 70 App A (B)(5) Deviation from Integrated Safety Analysis, and a 24 Hour Notification - Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 414182005-02-17T17:00:00017 February 2005 17:00:00 Response, Part 70 App A (B)(1) 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin and Part 70 App a Unanalyzed Condition ENS 413722005-02-04T14:00:0004 February 2005 14:00:00 Response 24-Hour Notification-Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 409852004-08-24T14:05:00024 August 2004 14:05:00 Response 24 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin ENS 408882004-07-21T13:00:00021 July 2004 13:00:00 Response 4-Hour 91-01 Nrc Bulletin Notification Due to Adu in Non-Favorable Geometry Nitrogen Accumulator Tank ENS 408552004-07-07T21:00:0007 July 2004 21:00:00 Response Nrc Bulletin 91-01 - 4 Hour Report ENS 407932004-06-04T22:00:0004 June 2004 22:00:00 Response Licensee Reported a 4 Hour 91-01 Response Bulletin ENS 405672004-03-04T20:00:0004 March 2004 20:00:00 Response 24-Hour Notification - Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 404402004-01-12T20:45:00012 January 2004 20:45:00 Response 24 Hour Notification Bulletin 91-01 Criticality Control ENS 402552003-10-16T19:30:00016 October 2003 19:30:00 Response 24 Hour Bulletin 91-01 Notification from Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Facility ENS 402462003-10-14T11:30:00014 October 2003 11:30:00 Response 24-Hour Nrc 91-01 Bulletin Report Involving Improper Mass Control ENS 401522003-09-12T14:32:00012 September 2003 14:32:00 Response Improper Scanning of Lead Rods for the Product Engineering Laboratory 2005-08-19T19:30:00 | |