ENS 41197
ENS Event | |
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23:15 Nov 15, 2004 | |
Title |
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Event Description | THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
WET OFFGAS (WOG) LINE CALCULATION WAS NOT PERFORMED. Raffinate column WOG Vent [DELETED] is not sized appropriately to handle flow in the event of overflowing of [DELETED] combined with a loss of DI water pressure and a failure of DI water valve when transferring SNM material from sump columns ([DELETED] or [DELETED] using [DELETED]). This would prevent transferring SNM material into an unfavorable geometry tank. The WOG line is specified as IROFS [DELETED] and is listed as [DELETED] in the Recovery Deionized Water Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation Risk Indexing Supplement. Setpoint analysis was believed to be completed on all Recovery WOG lines. It was determined that this WOG line calculation was not performed at November 15, 2004. As such, IROFS [DELETED] was not reliable and available on [DELETED] and [DELETED] transfers to [DELETED] which occurred on October 28, November 2 and November 11, 2004. [DELETED] has been taken out of service. A follow-up memo to Operations will be provided to prevent the use of the pump and [DELETED]. Defense in-depth measures that were available are as follows: 1. Pumping operations did not overflow [DELETED]. 2. Deionized water line to [DELETED] was pressurized [DELETED]. 3. Administrative Control listed in the NCSE specified that the operator shut valve [DELETED] upon a loss of DI water pressure. This control is flowed down into the operating procedure. 4. Valve [DELETED] listed as a configuration controlled item was available to be closed upon a loss of pressure in the DI water line. 5. The WOG line was positioned lower than the DI water input line and listed as a configuration controlled item as such. There are no actual potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment due to defense in depth and configuration control items in place. In additional, overflow [DELETED] did not occur [DELETED]. What is the safety significance of the event? Not in compliance with 10CFR70.61. However criticality was not a concern due to defense-in-depth controls and configuration control equipment installed at the time. Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur: Transfer of SNM during a backflow scenario into DI water line and subsequent unfavorable geometry tankxx-001. What is the control(s) or control system(s) and the failure(s) or deficiencies? IROFS[DELETED] WOG line on [DELETED]. What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented? [DELETED] has been taken out of service on 11/15/04. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT. This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions. |
Where | |
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Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. Erwin, Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
License number: | Snm-124 |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 70.74 APP. A | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-4.25 h-0.177 days <br />-0.0253 weeks <br />-0.00582 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Scott Kirk 19:00 Nov 15, 2004 |
NRC Officer: | John Mackinnon |
Last Updated: | May 11, 2008 |
41197 - NRC Website | |
Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. with 10 CFR 70.74 APP. A | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 448902009-03-04T19:40:0004 March 2009 19:40:00
[Table view]Part 70 App A (C), 10 CFR 70.74 APP. A Glovebox Overflow Drains May Be Inadequate to Perform Their Safety Function ENS 445792008-10-17T20:15:00017 October 2008 20:15:00 10 CFR 70.74 APP. A Inadvertent Transfer of Unsampled Discard Solution ENS 412742004-12-18T03:30:00018 December 2004 03:30:00 10 CFR 70.74 APP. A
2009-03-04T19:40:00 | |